

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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4 DECEMBER 1972

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1972

Widespread Federal Job Changes Set

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

KEY BISCAVNE, Fla., Nov. 9—President Nixon's plans for reorganization of the government during his second term may reach far beyond the top Cabinet and White House level and affect thousands of jobs deep in the federal bureaucracy, White House aides indicated here today.

"It's very extensive, there's no question about it," White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler told reporters.

Ziegler also said that the President's plans on the "whole matter of restructuring and reorganization during the second term" will be "quite far along by mid-December ... he will be well along with this before the Congress convenes."

Ziegler said that wherever legally possible, organizational changes will be made under the President's own powers, without asking the assent of Congress.

Ziegler initially announced on Wednesday that top presidential appointees had been asked to submit pro-forma resignations to give Mr. Nixon reorganizational freedom. The announcement had left the impression that, while the President might be planning a major shakeup of some Cabinet offices and sub-Cabinet jobs, the changes wouldn't extend much beyond that.

However, Ziegler emphasized today that resignations had been requested not only of Cabinet members and White House staff, as well as sub-Cabinet-level presidential appointees like under secretaries, assistant secretaries and some bureau chiefs, but also "all Schedule C (personnel), those who receive an appointment by a department head or a Cabinet member."

There are some 1,400 to 1,800 persons in Schedule C jobs—non-career political, policy-making and confidential appointees distributed among the departments.

Usually they are replaced only when the Cabinet member who appointed them leaves or when a new President takes office. These 1,400 to 1,800, coupled with direct presidential appointees and White House aides who have been asked to leave, are

reorganized or which of the thousands of resignation letters would actually be accepted by the President.

"It goes beyond individuals. It's a change of form," he told reporters. "No decisions have been made."

However, he said Mr. Nixon had been meeting with top aides on the reorganization problem and will be meeting again late today with two of his top White House assistants, Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. "He intends to go through a very intensive assessment leading to reorganization and restructuring during the second term," said Ziegler.

Ziegler said that after the President returns to Washington from his home here, he will be holding a series of meetings with Cabinet members into December to get their thinking, and then will start formulating his decisions.

"He has asked department heads, Cabinet heads, members of the White House staff to provide him with their thoughts." The objective, said Ziegler, is more efficient government.

Ziegler said many of the changes will be of a nature that can be put into effect by the President himself, without requiring submission to Congress, while others might require congressional assent. He said the Office of Management and Budget is preparing a study to show the areas where the President can act by himself. "Where the President can within the framework of existing legislation make changes by executive action, I assume he probably will," Ziegler said.

He noted that Mr. Nixon had already sent some reorganization requests to Congress two years ago. None passed.

put the number of potential forced resignations at well over 2,000.

Before leaving Washington, Mr. Nixon summoned Cabinet officials, White House staffers and other top officials to meetings at which he reminded them their traditional resignations were in order.

White House assistant H. R. (Bob) Haldeman is said to have reminded officials at the meetings that they serve "at the pleasure of the President," and asked them to keep their resignations short—not flowery.

Mr. Nixon is said to have thanked the officials for their efforts in his administration and his re-election campaign. He asked at least one group for their descriptions of the job each was doing, together with recommendations as to how the job might evolve or a description of another post the staffer might want.

Leading officials have already begun requesting subordinates to prepare the resignation letters.

One such meeting was held at the State Department on Wednesday, where Secretary William P. Rogers asked that all his top aides hand in the pro-forma resignation documents.

Further, State Department spokesman Charles Bray said today in Washington that Rogers had asked senior officials for ideas on how to promote promising younger officers to positions of responsibility.

As to Rogers' own plans, that is a matter between the Secretary and Mr. Nixon, Bray said.

Similar requests for resignations were passed on by other Cabinet officers to political appointees within their departments.

Ziegler emphasized today that absolutely no decisions had yet been made on what government agencies would be

These called for reorganization of the Interior, Commerce, Labor, Housing, Health, Education and Welfare, Agriculture and Transportation departments—seven agencies in all—into five new agencies: Agriculture, Natural Resources, Community Development, Human Resources, Economic Affairs.

Many of the changes recommended by Mr. Nixon under that plan were first proposed two decades ago by a government reorganization commission headed by former President Herbert Hoover.

On other matters, Ziegler denied "as a matter of absolute fact" that General Motors chief Edward Cole had been offered the job of Secretary of Defense. The present Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, and Secretary of Housing, George Romney, are two Cabinet members who had long been expected to ask that their resignations be accepted once Mr. Nixon was re-elected.

The President conferred with Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), leading to speculation that it was about Jackson's becoming Defense Secretary. Mr. Nixon offered Sen. Jackson the job in 1968 and the senator turned it down. Jackson had left for Europe, and could not be reached for comment.

Ziegler also said there is "no foundation" to reports that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell had advised Mr. Nixon to fire the present Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst. "As far as I know he has not talked to or consulted John Mitchell on this subject," said Ziegler.

Ziegler also released a summary of the April 1972 report of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Military Academy, concluding, "The Academy is carrying out its mission in a superior manner." The report recommended more tenure posts for Academy instructors, added pay for permanent professors, and a modern hospital for the Academy.

WASHINGTON POST
11 November 1972

Nixon Assessing Foreign Policy Agencies

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Nov.

10.—President Nixon has begun a major reassessment of the functions of all U.S. foreign policy agencies, the White House announced here today.

Deputy press secretary, Gerald L. Warren told reporters that the key question is the interrelationship between the State Department, which deals with foreign policy only, and other agencies such as the Treasury and Commerce departments that deal primarily with other matters but also have considerable influence over foreign policy questions.

Warren said, "It's a review of the basic organization and relations... it involves organization, budget, personnel—all along the line."

Warren said Henry A. Kissinger, the President's assistant for national security affairs, had met with White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman "into the night" Thursday on "the foreign policy structure." Neither Secretary of State William P. Rogers nor any other State Department representative was present.

Kissinger, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were part of the presidential party that flew here Wednesday for a stay of several days at the President's Key Biscayne retreat.

The foreign policy review is part of a broader reassessment of the functions of all federal agencies that Mr. Nixon has ordered to start off his second term. "The basic thing we're talking about is how to make

government operate better," said Warren.

In order to give himself a free hand to realign functions and get rid of personnel unresponsive to his policies, the President has demanded that all persons holding direct presidential appointments to federal jobs, and all persons appointed to Schedule C jobs by Cabinet and agency heads submit pro-forma resignations.

Warren emphasized again that no decisions had been made yet on which of the resignations would actually be accepted, or what plans for reorganization would actually be adopted. White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said Thursday that the President's thinking on these matters would be "quite far along" by mid-December.

Warren said that he couldn't quarrel very much with newspaper estimates that the total of persons required to submit pro-forma letters of resignation was about 2,000, although he said this might be a bit high. It is estimated that at least 1,400 to 1,800 persons hold Schedule C jobs alone.

Warren said letters of resignation aren't being requested of regulatory agency appointees with fixed tenures, but he believed they are being sought from "Foreign Service officers at home and abroad if appointed by the President" and all U.S. attorneys.

Warren said the President "will operate within the confines of existing legislation" and "intends to make use of all the machinery available to the federal government to make it more efficient."

The problem of foreign policy coordination in recent years has been a substantial one. Although the State Department traditionally is the arbiter of overseas and diplomatic policy, other agencies have enormous influence over foreign policy and the White House has increasingly taken a direct role in foreign policy through such powerful aides as Kissinger, who has been the President's chief negotiator on Vietnam affairs.

Decisions made by the Treasury Department on international currency matters, by the Commerce Department on trade matters, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, the Defense Department and the Export-Import Bank may have as much or more impact on the U.S. image and real position in the world as anything the State Department does at a given time. The realignment of Western currencies forced by the United States on Treasury recommendation after the August 1971 economic crisis, for example, was a foreign policy act of the most critical nature.

The objective of the foreign policy reassessment, Warren indicated, is to obtain better coordination and execution of broad foreign policy questions.

Warren said Mr. Nixon had met with Haldeman this morning to discuss various matters and had talked on the phone with Kissinger. He said Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's deputy who has just arrived in Saigon, is "expected" back in Washington "sometime this weekend." He refused to dis-

cuss the contents of a letter which news stories had said Haig was carrying to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and said he had "no information" on whether Kissinger will be leaving shortly for Paris or Hanoi.

Returning to the reorganization theme, Warren said stories that the President's reassessment of government functions is designed "to arrogate more power to the President" aren't correct. "That's not the case at all," said Warren. "The reason for this reassessment is to make government work better."

Report on Academy

On another matter, the White House released a summary of the April 1972 report of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Air Force Academy. A similar summary on the U.S. Military Academy had been released a day earlier. The Air Force report called the cadet honor code "a viable working part of cadet life," but called for care "to insure that the individual rights of cadets undergoing investigation under the honor code be scrupulously protected." Higher pay for permanent professors, and improved runway and storage areas were also recommended.

The report also recommended that if the constitutional amendment requiring equal rights for women is approved by the necessary 38 states, "the Air Force be prepared to comply... and that planning for the admission of women be based on the premise that existing admission and graduation standards be maintained."

WASHINGTON POST

12 November 1972

Colson Blasts Post Watergate Reports

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Staff Writer

KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine, Nov. 11 — Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon, tonight denounced the reporting of the Watergate case by The Washington Post as "unconscionable," and said that its impact was to "erode somewhat public confidence in the institutions of government."

In a speech to the Society of New England editors meeting here, Colson said, "The charge of subverting the whole political process, that is a fantasy, a work of fiction rivaling only

'Gone With the Wind' in circulation and 'Portnoy's Complaint' for indecency."

Colson, one of the President's closest advisers, tonight spoke with The Washington Post and said that his remarks tonight were the first he had ever delivered to a group of newspaper editors.

The bulk of the remarks dealt with The Washington Post, and Colson singled out Executive Editor Benjamin C. Bradlee for special criticism. He said that "Mr. Bradlee now sees himself as the self-appointed leader of what Bos-

ton's own Teddy White [Theodore White, author of "The Making of the President"] books describes as the tiny fringe of arrogant elitists who infect the healthy mainstream of American journalism with their own peculiar view of the world."

Colson, as other leading Republican did before the election, linked The Washington Post's reporting of the water-gate "liberal" ties to George McGovern.

He said, "The Post, I believe, perceived before George McGovern did that he was in deep political trouble with respect to the real issues of the '72 election...."

"So The Post, on its own

initiative, began a daily Page 1 attack on the administration."

He said that if McGovern wished to raise the Watergate case, "then it was fair enough for him to talk about it. What I do think is unconscionable is the way in which some elements of the media... reprinted and eventually reported as fact that which indeed was not fact."

He said the "tragedy of The Post's handling of the Watergate affair is that the net impact was probably to erode somewhat public confidence in the institutions of government, and it also eroded as well the confidence of a lot of fair-minded persons in the objective reporting of The Washington Post."

NEW YORK TIMES
16 November 1972

Don't Forget the State Department

By Anthony Lake
and Leslie H. Gelb

WASHINGTON — The hoped-for Vietnam settlement, if it materializes, would be a triumph of personal diplomacy. It could only have been accomplished by Henry Kissinger working with the President alone. But will the President draw the wrong lessons from this experience, as well as from his Moscow and Peking "triumphs," about how to make policy?

Whether or not these breakthroughs could have been achieved in a different manner, the question for the future is how they can be transformed into the stuff of everyday policy. This will require the inclusion of the foreign affairs bureaucracy in the President's plans.

Who really knows what President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger are up to? For three years, scholars, journalists, legislators — and even the President's own national security bureaucracy — have debated the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. Is it simply a guise to continue the same old world-police-man policies, a kind of cut-rate cold war? Is it a genuine effort to redefine our world interests and refrain from military involvement in the Third World? Is it an attempt to construct a "new alliance system" based on five major powers? If so, does it make any sense to expect Japan and Western Europe to play the same kind of political-military role in the world as the United States, Russia and China? Who is privy to the Nixon-Kissinger game plan? Who can carry on and avoid "the petrification of the international system"?

Certainly not the State Department. When the Russians seemed to threaten making the Cuban port of Cienfuegos a base for nuclear missile-firing subs, it was Kissinger who reportedly worked out secret arrangements with Soviet diplomats. When the SALT

talks sputtered, the President and Mr. Kissinger stepped in to bargain directly with the Russians. The China gambit has been entirely their show, like the Vietnam negotiations. And so it goes down the line with every major foreign policy issue.

These moves may be counted as personal successes. But what about the professionals in the State Department who have to deal with these issues on a day-to-day basis and who will be around long after the "masters" have gone? They have been left out in the cold. If they are not given to understand the underpinnings of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy and, if they are not brought to accept its wisdom, they will purposefully or inadvertently undermine that diplomacy in the future.

Neither is the Defense Department in a position to carry on. While the President and Mr. Kissinger easily have grasped the mantle of diplomacy from State, they have not begun to exercise control over Defense. The time requirements for personal diplomacy have left no time to watch over Secretary Laird's department.

Military officers in Vietnam can carry out sustained bombing raids over North Vietnam without apparent authority to do so. And believing that massive spending on new weapons systems is necessary to his foreign policies, the President has failed to exercise close control over the Defense budget. What we therefore appear to have is the confusing prospect of a peacetime foreign policy and a wartime defense budget.

Nor is the Congress able or willing to provide institutionalized support for the Nixon-Kissinger policies. The Congress remains a multiheaded body with such diverse views and levers of power that it cannot be expected to lead. So far, the Congress has been awed and cowed by the foreign policy successes of the Nixon Administration.

But underneath, many Congressmen

are mistrustful. Key Congressional committees have sought in vain to establish regular contact with Mr. Kissinger to find out what he is doing. Secretaries Laird and Rogers will not do. Without a routine basis of consultation with the "master," irritated Congressional leaders are bound to lay in wait for a foreign policy failure on which to pounce.

It is that time of year when in the headiness of landslide victory at the polls, the President will let little things, like avoiding the "petrification" of the system fall through the cracks. More than a reshuffling of Presidential appointees is needed. If the President and Mr. Kissinger believe that much of what they have done is worth preserving, they should start institutionalizing their policies now. These months present an important opportunity to reveal and reinforce their vision.

At the least, key assistant secretaries and desk officers at the State Department should be briefed by the White House on what has been withheld from them, given a chance to discuss the issues, and — most importantly — drawn into implementation of the President's policies.

The President and Mr. Kissinger should also question the assumption that higher defense spending is necessary to a "generation of peace." In fact, it will undercut it. Big power distrust thrives on spiraling defense spending, as well as vice versa. While the President and his adviser devote their time to personal diplomacy, increased military spending will reinforce superpower suspicions and confuse the American bureaucracy and public about their leaders' goals.

Leslie H. Gelb was director of policy planning and arms control in the Defense Department, and is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Anthony Lake worked on the staff of Henry A. Kissinger.

WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1972

The White House And the State Dept.

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The following column appeared in Saturday editions of The Washington Post with several paragraphs transposed or omitted. The complete, corrected story follows:

"Some friction" is bound to exist between the White House national security adviser and the State Department, President Nixon finally has said with refreshing candor.

A degree of friction and "competition," the President went on to say in his recent

interview, "is not unhealthy," because out of constructive competition more effective foreign policy can emerge. Indeed it can.

The reality, however, is that there has been friction without competition between the White House and State Department for nearly three years. The State Department virtually has been out of the game since Elliot L. Richardson left as State's No. 2 man to become Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Wel-

fare in June 1970.

At the start of the Nixon administration there was an outside chance that the foreign policy-making offices might function constructively with dynamic Henry A. Kissinger at the White House and genial Bill Rogers at State, if State had a strong man to run the department with Rogers serving, as the role has been described, as the President's trusted chief lawyer in foreign affairs.

Kissinger and Richardson, who comes out of the Boston Brahmin strain of intellectualism, respected each other, worked together well. State was hopeful of developing an institutional input in shaping policy, with no question, of course, about who was on top. The National Security Council web of authority across the government was controlled, as President Nixon intended,

in the White House, with Kissinger holding the strings.

Rogers was not a nonentity. Indeed, his non-ideological outlook on the world probably was far more supportive of President Nixon's turnaround on U.S. policy toward China, and the general abandonment of "confrontation" in place of "negotiation," than ever has been credited to Rogers.

The vital No. 2 post at State vacated by Richardson was filled by Rogers' nominee, John N. Irwin II. Rogers wanted a quiet-working deputy; Irwin has been almost unnoticeable in the post of Under Secretary.

Rogers often has scoffed at the talk of "low morale" in the State Department, saying that has been claimed almost since the department came into existence. That is correct as a generalization, but partly at the point of the present dismay. Franklin D. Roosevelt often

WASHINGTON POST

24 November 1972

Helms at Camp David

It's Time to Look At the CIA

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

MR. HELMS, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was publicly summoned to Camp David this week to participate in what the White House terms its "major" reassessment of the American foreign policy structure. If his summons indicates that the United States' large secret intelligence establishment is to undergo the same Executive scrutiny being accorded the agencies which operate more in the public eye, then this is welcome and important news.

Before saying more, I should perhaps state that I am not one of those journalists with a close discreet working relationship with the CIA; for purposes of this article I requested an on-the-record interview with Helms or his chosen representative and did not receive one.

It would seem self-evident, however, that as the United States moves from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, from a time when Russia and Communism were widely perceived as terribly menacing to a time when both the country and the ideology are increasingly regarded as adequately neighborly, then the role of the CIA has got to be reviewed.

Now, obviously a great nation must have a professional intelligence service. The imperatives of defense, not to say elementary prudence, demand it. A case can even be made that a certain kind of technological intelligence is more essential in a period of incipient detente—in order to supply policy makers and their publics with the assurance they need in order to enter into new agreements with old adversaries.

THE SALT-I agreement apparently is unique in granting explicitly each side's right to lob intelligence satellites over the other's territory to count missiles, tests and so on. Presumably satellites would be similarly useful in verifying and in nourishing public confidence in any shifts made as a result of the forthcoming European force reduction talks. In all cease-fire situations, Mideast, Indochina or what-have-you, intelligence can be vital.

In at least two areas, however, intelligence needs review: for "dirty tricks" and for its secrecy.

The act of 1947 setting up the CIA specified that, in addition to intelligence duties, it was to perform "such other functions" as the National Security Council might direct. A "plans division" was set up in 1951. Most CIA directors, including Helms, have come up through Plans. The group seems to have been active, and conspicuously so, through the 1950s, toppling uncooperative governments, harassing wayward Communists, etc. The whole atmosphere was permissive: it was a President who ate up the James Bond books who let the Plans Division organize Cuban exiles (and a few Americans) to invade at the Bay of Pigs.

It is now murmured around town that the deputy director for Plans, an old Helms man, operates on a much tighter leash (doing no more, it is said, than the Republicans are alleged to have done to the Democrats); that the old problems of policy control and separation of intelligence from operations are in hand; that the small and weak countries which once were the CIA's playgrounds are no longer so vulnerable to its deeds.

At the same time, one hears that the President's old anti-Communist juices have not altogether stopped fermenting and that he receives and is responsive to reports that the Russians still play some pretty rotten tricks and, by golly, we ought to show them they can't do that to us and get away with it.

WHATEVER THE TRUTH, I would submit that the time is ripe for the Congress to review the dirty-tricks mandate it gave to the CIA a quarter-century ago as the cold war was beginning to dominate the American outlook on the world. It is inconsistent, at the least, that the State Department should now be zeroing in on measures to combat "international terrorism" while the CIA retains a capacity to practice certain forms of it. Cuba's continuing lack of love for the CIA, restated in its bid for hijacking talks last week, underscores the point.

Secrecy is something else. No one who accepts the need for intelligence would argue that the whole process and products should be made public. But no one concerned with the health of democracy can accept that condition with equanimity. The general sense of being at war with communism since World War II has produced a far more secretive government than we would want or tolerate in other times. With that sense of being at war danger fading, the rationale or spur for secrecy diminishes accordingly. There is further the claim that the secrecy surrounding the CIA may have undermined the larger job of conducting a wise policy, i.e., one well discussed and debated.

This is the principal basis on which Senator Cooper earlier this year proposed that the relevant act be amended to give the foreign relations and defense committees of both houses access to the information and analysis obtained by the CIA—exactly as the Atomic Energy Commission has given such secret material for decades to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Predictably, the President objected. The Foreign Relations Committee approved the proposed amendment; the Armed Services Committee, otherwise preoccupied, did not act on it. Cooper is retiring but Senator Symington, who has his own sense of the need to assert the Congress' foreign policy responsibilities and his own record of concern for improving congressional oversight of the CIA, may be prepared to receive the torch. He's No. 2 on Armed Services, too.

The CIA is out of the news these days. It usually gets into the news only when it fouls up. But a lot more about its place in the new bureaucratic and international scheme of things ought to be known. Whether the CIA's activities are all essential and whether they are all organized efficiently are questions which a responsible Congress should not want to leave to a Chief Executive huddling privately out in the woods at Camp David.

expressed despair with the State Department; John F. Kennedy called it "a bowl of jelly," and so on.

The Nixon administration entered office with a double legacy of suspicion. President Nixon was Vice President in the Eisenhower administration, in which Rogers was Attorney General. In 1969 State was still trying to recover from the gaping wounds inflicted upon it during the Eisenhower administration from the bureaucratic terrorism of the McCarthy era.

Still Crucial

Rogers attempted to allay the mutual disquiet. He commissioned a soul-searching study with the department on the bureaucratic couch for self-analysis. It concluded, among other things, that "the role of top leadership in stimulating creativity is crucial." That is still true.

The State Department today has tumbled into despair. As one official said in the depths of frustration, "We are something like American Express—but without its prestige."

Part of the slide was probably inevitable under President Nixon's style of operation, in which "so many initiatives . . . had to be undertaken at the presidential level."

The President's and Rogers' determination to prevent, above all, any State news "leaks," has succeeded admirably; the department rarely knows anything worth leaking. Top officials, for example, were humiliatedly unaware for years of the secret Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks which began in 1969; even today most do not know what is in the draft Vietnamese peace plan, except for what is in the press.

Kissinger had told many associates he is very seriously concerned about the need to repair this damage in President Nixon's second term, and to help "institutionalize" the future conduct of foreign policy. It is ludicrous, Kissinger has said, to portray him, as some critics do, as "despising" the Foreign Service, for the majority of Kissinger's staff is drawn from it. So everyone, presumably, accepts the problem. All that is still needed is a solution.

WASHINGTON STAR
19 November 1972

The Cowboy... on His

Morse

Kissinger Talks About Peace and Kissinger

By PETER LISAGOR
Chicago Daily News Service

Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger has told an Italian magazine that he "might agree" that the Vietnam war was useless, but that his task has been to end it, not judge whether it was "useful or useless."

"The war must be ended with principle, with judiciousness, and this is not the same thing as saying that it was right to enter the war," Kissinger told Oriana Fallaci in a long interview published in the left-of-center magazine L'Europeo.

In the interview, which was conducted in Kissinger's White House office Nov. 4, President Nixon's chief peace negotiator voiced the conviction that "peace will come in a few weeks after the resumption of negotiations, not in many months, in a few weeks."

The contents of the interview became available here as Kissinger prepared to leave for Paris today to resume private talks with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho tomorrow.

(Asked by The Star-News to comment on the interview, Kissinger said that he was distressed by it and felt that some of his quotes were taken out of context and that others may have been garbled in the translation from English into Italian.

(He said that Miss Fallaci had agreed to let him see the transcript of the interview before it was printed, but that she hadn't done it.

(He also said he gave the interview to Miss Fallaci at the request of the Italian Ambassador, and added: "Why I agreed to it I'll never know.")

In a section of the interview dealing with his personal views of power, President Nixon, his reputation as a ladies man, and his future, Kissinger is quoted as making these points:

o The opening of China "has been an important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet this is not the main point . . . The main point comes from the fact that I have acted alone. The Americans love this immensely. The Americans love the cowboy who leads the convoy, alone on his horse, the cowboy who comes into town all alone on his horse, and nothing else. Perhaps not even with a gun, because he does not shoot. He acts, and that is enough, being in the right place at the right time. In sum, a Western.

"This romantic and surprising character suits me because being alone has always been part of my style, or, if you wish, of my technique."

o "If you should go through my past political life, you wouldn't imagine that President Nixon could fit in with my plans. I was one of his opponents in three electoral campaigns . . . President Nixon showed a great vigor, a great ability, even in picking me . . . I do not know of many leaders, among the very many I have met, who would have the courage to send their assistant to Peking without letting anyone else know it. I do not know many other leaders who would leave the negotiations with North Vietnam up to their assistant."

o Spinoza and Kant, not Machiavelli or Metternich, influenced him most.

o He was not "embarrassed" by his playboy reputation in dealing with Le Duc Tho, Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung because it "has been, and is, useful . . . in reassuring people, to show them that I am not a museum piece."

His reputation as a ladies man is "partly exaggerated, but in part it is true." But women don't play a main role in his life. "For me, women are only amusing, a hobby. Nobody spends too much time on a hobby." He prefers being with his two children as often as his busy schedule permits. He may get married again, but "you know when one is as serious as I am, to coexist with someone else and survive that existence is very difficult."

o He is unlikely ever to go back to teaching at Harvard because "there are more interesting things to do." He hasn't made any decision yet "as to whether to quit this job. I like it very much, did you know that?"

Pressed in the interview to say whether he could persuade South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu to accept North Vietnamese troops in the South or whether the United States should sign a separate agreement with Hanoi, Kissinger begged off, saying:

"I can tell only that we are determined to make this peace and we shall make it in the shortest possible time after my new meeting with Le Duc Tho. Thieu can say what he wants. It is his business."

Asked if he liked Tho, Kissinger replied: "Yes, I found he is a dedicated man, very serious, very strong, and always courteous and polite. Sometimes very hard, difficult to deal with, but this is something for which I have always respected him . . . naturally our relations have always been very professional, but I sensed much kindness within him."

"It is true, for example, that sometimes we even succeeded in joking. We used to say that one day I would teach international relations at Hanoi University and he would teach Marxism-Leninism at Harvard. I would say that our relations were good."

Could he say the same about Thieu, Miss Fallaci asked.

"Also with Thieu, my relations have been good . . . before," he said. Reminded that the South Vietnamese had said they did not part the best of friends, Kissinger added, "let's say we parted allies, Thieu and I."

Kissinger said he felt "optimistic" in dealing with Thieu. "I still have something to do. I have not finished at all. And I do not feel powerless. I don't feel discouraged at all."

He said the Vietnam negotiations have been the "most painful enterprise" of his life. "You see," Kissinger said, "the rapprochement with China has been a difficult job intellectually but not emotionally. To make peace in Vietnam has however been a job emotionally difficult."

Besides his loner style, said Kissinger, the power of his conviction was also an essential ingredient of success. "I am always convinced that I must do what I am doing," he was quoted as saying.

"And people believe it. They feel it. It is important for me that people believe me; when people are touched, when they are conquered, they should not be cheated. . . .

"I do not look for popularity," he continued. "I do not ask for popularity. As a matter of fact, if you really want to know, I could not care less about popularity. I do not fear to lose my public. I can afford to say what I think. I am talking of whatever genuine is in me. If I would let myself be bothered by people's reaction, if I were to act only for a calculated technique, I would not be able to do anything."

Kissinger acknowledged that "when one holds power in one's hand, and when one holds it formally for quite a long time, you get used to considering it as something you are entitled to have." He was quite certain, he said, that he would miss that power when he leaves his job.

But he added that "power as a self-concelled medium does not have the slightest attraction to me. I don't wake up every morning with the thought of, by the way, isn't it fantastic to have at my disposal a plane, a car with a driver waiting for me at the door?"

"What I am interested in," he continued "is what you can do with power. You can make marvelous things with it, believe me. . . ."

The American embassy in Rome made an English translation of the long interview and sent it to the Defense Department, State Department, United States Information Agency and the White House, as well as the Voice of America center in Munich, Germany.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 November 1972

Nick Thimmesch.

The sentences heavy with 'I's' are pure Kissinger

Washington.

While Henry A. Kissinger has what looks like his finest hour, winding up the Vietnam settlement, official Washington chatters about the extraordinary and pompous interview he granted here recently.

The way Dr. Kissinger told it to Oriani Fallaci, a charming, diminutive writer for *L'Europa*, a leftist Italian rotogravure magazine, the new foreign policy directions and the Vietnam settlement were virtually authored by Dr. Kissinger alone.

One wonders if United States foreign policy is a one-man show named Kissinger. President Kennedy and President Johnson would never have tolerated such ego venting, frank as it is.

Example: Dr. Kissinger spoke of the new relationships with the Soviet Union and China as "what I wanted to do," spoke of China as "an important element in the mechanics of my success," and praised President Nixon for sending him to Peking "without letting anyone else know it."

Moreover, "I do not know many other leaders who would leave the negotiations

with North Vietnam up to their assistant, with only a very small group of people aware of it."

He sees himself as a solitary figure, destined to do great things.

"I have always acted alone," Dr. Kissinger said. "The Americans love this immensely. The Americans love the cowboy who leads the convoy, alone on his horse; the cowboy who comes into town all alone on his horse, and nothing else. Perhaps not even with a gun, because he does not shoot."

"He acts, and that is enough, being in the right place at the right time."

Dr. Kissinger seems keenly aware of power:

"What I am interested in is what you can do with power. You can make marvelous things with it, believe me. . . .

"Pursuing power, however, was not what led me to this work. If you should go through my past political life, you wouldn't imagine that President Nixon could fit in with my plans. I was one of his opponents, in three electoral campaigns."

Asked about a statement attributed to him years ago

that he felt Mr. Nixon was not suited to be President, Dr. Kissinger replied that he might "have said something like that," and cites the remark as "evidence that Mr. Nixon was not included in my plans for climbing to power."

Dr. Kissinger added, "No, I didn't know him, that's all. I behaved toward him as a conventional intellectual. . . . I was wrong."

"President Nixon showed a great vigor, a great ability. Even in picking . . . me . . . I was astonished. After all, he knew I had little friendliness and he knew of the very limited appreciation I had always shown for him."

Alas, Dr. Kissinger admits that after holding power in his hand for a long time, he will one day miss it, and that it is unlikely he would return to Harvard. "I haven't made any decisions yet as to whether I should quit this job. I like it very much, did you know that?"

While he rejects any suggestion that President Nixon is surrendering to Hanoi, Dr. Kissinger said he "might agree" with the idea Vietnam was a "useless war." He explains he just is not in position to make that kind of judgment now.

Dr. Kissinger firmly repeated that peace was coming "in a reasonably short time," and his explanations are bathed in a sea of first person "I's."

He says the press was originally too pessimistic, then too optimistic, about peace, and that "you do not want to get it through your heads that everything is proceeding the way I always believed it was going to be from the moment in which I said that peace was at hand. Then I estimated a couple of weeks, I believe."

Once the Fallaci interview got into print, Dr. Kissinger explained he granted it only because the Italian ambassador, Egidio Ortona, asked him to, and "Why I agreed to it, I'll never know."

There is the usual squabble over quotes out of context, and violation of a right-to-read-first agreement, and now the White House press office says some of the interview is "wide of the mark."

Those who have been subjected to Dr. Kissinger's enormous ego do not think it is wide of the mark at all. They think it is pure Henry. Amen.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 November 1972

HIGH COURT DENIES ELLSBERG APPEAL ON WIRETAP DATA

By FRED P. GRAHAM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13—The Supreme Court cleared the way today for the resumption of the Pentagon papers trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., who are accused of making public the top secret study of the origins of the Vietnam war.

In an unsigned order, the Court refused to hear an appeal by the defendants of the trial judge's refusal to let them see the transcript of a defense lawyer's conversation that had been picked up by a Government wiretap.

A stay issued by Justice William O. Douglas had stopped the trial last July, after a jury

had been sworn in and only hours before the lawyers' opening statements were to have been made.

Two Justices Dissent

Today's action had the effect of dissolving that stay. The trial is expected to resume next month or early in January before Federal District Judge William Matt Byrne Jr. in Los Angeles.

Justice Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan Jr. dissented, saying that the Court should have heard the appeal. Four votes are normally required before the Supreme Court will hear a case, but the outcome today does not necessarily mean that the Court has turned a deaf ear to the defendants' wiretap plea.

In opposing the appeal, the Justice Department had argued that the Court would encourage "plocemeal" appeals of criminal cases if it kept this case on lee while it spent months reviewing the wiretap point. The Government pointed out that if Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo were convicted, they could raise the wiretap issue in their

appeal, along with all other issues raised by the case.

Justice Douglas charged in his dissent today that the issue was too important to be put off. He noted that the Supreme Court had ruled that defendants who had been overheard on an illegal Government wiretap had a right to see the transcripts before their trials, to assure them that no illegally obtained information was being used by the prosecution.

The same rule should be extended to overheard conversations involving defendants' lawyers, Justice Douglas asserted. He disclosed that the person overheard was one of the 15 defense lawyers, and not one of the four defense consultants.

The Justice Department had conceded last July that one of its "foreign intelligence" wiretaps, placed without court authority, had picked up a conversation involving either a defense lawyer or consultant. Judge Byrne read the transcript and refused to let the defense see it because he concluded that the conversation had nothing to do with this case.

Justice Douglas's dissent disclosed that the wiretap was on "the telephone of a 'foreign national,'" but he said "the conversation was an inquiry by one of the counsel concerning wholly personal social and commercial matters."

He noted that the Supreme Court had said that the Government must obtain court warrants to conduct "national security" eavesdropping against domestic groups, but that it had not ruled on warrantless wiretapping directed against foreign espionage.

Hearing Termed Needed

Because this conversation did not concern espionage, he argued that the Court should have given the case an early hearing to consider the Government's authority to set up "schemes of pervasive surveillance of foreign nationals that is unrelated to espionage." Reached at his home in Cambridge, Mass., Dr. Ellsberg said the defense would ask Judge Byrne to dismiss the jury and pick a new one, on the ground that the jurors' attitudes might have been tainted during their long absence from the courtroom.

Since the trial was stayed, the names of newly enfranchised 18-to 20-year olds have been added to the prospective jury lists, but Dr. Ellsberg

doubted if younger faces on the jury would help his cause. He said that many of them had cast hawkish votes for President Nixon, raising questions as to "how much it's worth to have younger people on our jury."

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are accused of espionage, conspiracy to release classified documents and unauthorized use of Government information, growing out of their admitted

NEW YORK TIMES
29 November 1972

Popkin Freed in a Surprise As U.S. Jury Is Dismissed

By BILL KOVACH
Special to The New York Times

BOSTON, Nov. 28—Prof. Samuel L. Popkin of Harvard was released from jail today after the Federal Government, in a surprise move, dismissed the grand jury investigating

the distribution of the Pentagon papers.

Mr. Popkin was jailed for contempt last Tuesday for refusing to answer certain questions put to him by that grand jury. His sentence was designed to expire with the grand jury. The United States Attorney's office said last week that the jury would continue to Jan. 12. Today the office said that the jury, which has been sitting since July 12, 1971, had been dismissed to avoid any conflict with the prosecution of criminal charges against Daniel Ellsberg.

The trial of Mr. Ellsberg is scheduled to begin soon in California in connection with the public distribution of the once-secret Defense Department analysis of Vietnam policy.

Bok Joins Defense

The decision to dismiss the jury came from Washington. Last Friday, Daniel Steiner, general counsel to Harvard University, met in Washington with A. William Olson, head of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice and urged that some way be found to release Mr. Popkin from jail as soon as possible.

Harvard had shown its interest in the case last week when, in an unusual move, the university's president, Derek C. Bok, joined the case to argue defense motions in an effort to head off the contempt conviction.

Mr. Steiner, reached at his Harvard office today, declined comment on the meeting with Mr. Olson and would only say that university officials "are very pleased with this decision the Government has reached."

While the dismissal of the grand jury resulted in the release of Mr. Popkin, it does not automatically end the Gov-

release of the Pentagon papers

when they were employed by the Rand Corporation, a Defense Department "think tank" in California. When the Supreme Court ruled in June, 1971, that The New York Times and The Washington Post could not be barred from publishing the material, it left open whether those responsible for the publication could be punished under the criminal laws.

ernment's interest in his testimony or the investigation. Federal attorneys here had no comment on plans, but another grand jury could be asked to pick up the investigation. If the jury so desired it could subpoena Mr. Popkin again and ask him the same questions he refused to answer before.

That thought was clearly on the 30-year-old Asian scholar's mind at a news conference following his release from the Norfolk County House of Detention at Dedham this morning.

"Beyond all else," Mr. Popkin said, "I hope my case has brought concern to bear on the need to look at grand juries more carefully—at the coercive powers vested in grand juries. There is an incredible bag of tricks that go with grand juries. It is a hidden corner of American law. I would expect to give information to a grand jury, but without any information about the grand jury or what it is after, how can you decide if a legitimate function is being served?"

Mr. Popkin, believed to be the first American scholar to be jailed for refusing to identify a source, did not refuse to answer all questions put to him by this grand jury. Beginning last October, when he was first subpoenaed, he spent more than 10 hours answering questions. He refused only when the questions would have required him to give the names of Government officials and others who had talked confidentially with him during his own research on Vietnam.

"I'm not trying to protect any privilege," he said. "I'm protecting the public's right to a free flow of information—it's the First Amendment right that I'm concerned about. It is in the interest of scholars and journalists alike to see to the free flow of information. Lawyers have an immunity from testifying because lawyers write the laws; journalists and scholars do not."

Disclaiming any sense of martyrdom, Mr. Popkin said he had, "just been put into a position of fighting for a principle."

BALTIMORE SUN
29 November 1972

Kennedy role doubted in Watergate probe

Washington (AP)—Senator Edward M. Kennedy's expected probe of alleged Republican espionage and sabotage in this year's presidential primary may be canceled. But another panel may decide to investigate the allegations.

Democratic sources at the Senate are expressing doubts that public hearings, if held, will be conducted by a judiciary subcommittee headed by the Massachusetts Democrat, despite preliminary groundwork already done under his direction.

They indicated also that some Democrats are having second thoughts about launching any full-scale investigation of the Watergate bugging incident and related matters.

New Jackson role expected

One source close to the situation said the way currents are moving now the chances are that, if hearings are held, they probably will be handled by the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee.

This is a unit of the Government Operations Committee. In the new Congress, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) is expected to succeed Senator John L. McClellan (D., Ark.) as chairman.

Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.) the influential

chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, said earlier that the subcommittee Mr. Jackson is slated to take over was the appropriate one to conduct an investigation.

Mr. Mills said his concern was not so much with the June 17 break-in and alleged bugging of the Democratic national headquarters, but the published allegations that forged letters, leaked information and organized sabotage were used to disrupt the campaigns of Democratic presidential aspirants.

Drawbacks hinted

Some Democratic senators reportedly share the view that an investigation of these charges by Mr. Kennedy's subcommittee would have drawbacks in that Mr. Kennedy is widely regarded as the likely Democratic presidential nominee in 1976. As a result, they say, any investigation he conducted might be considered politically suspect.

There also are indications that some Democratic senators are wondering if an investigation would turn out to be politically profitable.

One source said they were hesitant to get into an investigation without knowing where it might lead and whether it could backfire on them.

that no other scholar has been put into.

"I began work in my field," he continued, "believing a certain code of conduct was acceptable and for years I have talked with Government officials with confidence I could protect them. How am I to know that those questions asked me were not designed as part of some great purge of young Foreign Service officers who might have helped me over the years to understand Government policy?"

For this reason, he said, because witnesses have no way of discerning a grand jury's intent nor any right to withhold any answer that the entire systems needs investigation.

"The grand jury was originally designed to stand between the people and the Government and it is time it was brought back to that role," he said.

His experience, he said, is bound to have a shilling effect on other scholars.

"Look at me, for example. I would be very careful to comment on my experiences in jail now because, if I did, I might

be called before a grand jury," Mr. Popkin said. "Although I am a trained observer and what I saw and learned in prison might be useful, I'm afraid to talk about it because it might just lead to another grand jury summons."

After a brief vacation with his wife, Susan, Mr. Popkin intends to return to his job teaching government at Harvard next Tuesday. He plans some lecturing before groups of scholars and journalists on the grand jury system and, "to keep up work I started in prison with two guys I started to help on their high school equivalency examinations."


With a sigh of relief at his unexpected freedom, Mr. Popkin concluded his meeting with the press with a statement of gratitude to other scholars and university officials for their financial and moral support.

"I believe, if I have proved anything," he said, "I proved that the people at the universities in America take the First Amendment very seriously. Other than that, I'm not sure I proved anything."

Friday, Dec. 1, 1972

THE WASHINGTON POST

Kennedy Panel Summons Watergate



By Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

Donald H. Segretti, identified by federal investigators as an undercover agent allegedly hired by White House aides to sabotage and spy on the campaigns of Democratic presidential candidates, has been subpoenaed to testify by a Senate subcommittee headed by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.).

The subpoena is the most persuasive indication to date that Kennedy intends to pursue an investigation by his subcommittee into the Watergate break-in case and related alleged acts of political sabotage and espionage.

Although Kennedy's staff members refused to discuss the matter, other Capitol Hill sources confirmed yesterday that the senator's Judiciary Subcommittee on Administra-

tive Practice and Procedure had subpoenaed Segretti for a closed-door appearance before the end of the year.

The subpoena, they said, calls for Segretti to bring with him any records or documents he may have that are related to acts of alleged political sabotage and espionage.

The subpoena, the same sources said, does not necessarily mean that Kennedy's probe will lead to open public hearings by the subcommittee. That will depend on the quality of information obtained during the subcommittee's investigation and whether successful attempts are made to kill the probe by either the White House, Senate Republicans or Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), who is chairman of the full Judiciary Committee and often an ally of the White House.

The sources also categorically denied published reports

that plans are being made to voluntarily drop the Kennedy probe or transfer it to another congressional committee.

Because the issuance of a subpoena—served on Segretti at his Los Angeles County apartment in Marina Del Rey—indicates Kennedy's investigation is proceeding aggressively, it could trigger attempts to stop the probe, Senate sources said.

Segretti has refused to discuss publicly what role—if any—he played in an undercover campaign of sabotage and spying that federal investigators say was conceived in the White House and directed by presidential aides against the Democrats.

After Oct. 10, when The Washington Post first described the undercover activity and identified Segretti as a participant in it, he disappeared from public view.

He returned to his fashion-

able one-bedroom, California apartment on Nov. 10 and, when visited by a Post reporter the next day, refused to discuss his alleged activities for the record.

Segretti, according to information obtained by The Washington Post, attempted to hire numerous persons for activities aimed at disrupting and spying on the campaigns of Democratic candidates. It is known that some of those persons carried out those activities.

Segretti reportedly was hired for his alleged undercover work by Dwight L. Chapin, President Nixon's appointments secretary and one of his closest aides. Chapin has called such reports "fundamentally inaccurate," but neither he nor other White House staff members have been willing to discuss the reports in detail.

WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Nov. 29, 1972

Going, Going...

Ambassadorships for the Highest Bidders

By Charles W. Yost

A curious spinoff of the curious way that we Americans finance our very costly election campaigns is that approximately one-third of our ambassadorships are every four years in effect bought and sold. That is to say, about one-third of these prestigious positions are filled not from the career foreign service but from non-professionals, for the most part without significant experience in foreign affairs, from whom the incoming administration has received financial contributions or political benefits.

For example, in the partial reports of contributions to the President's campaign published shortly before the election there are included contributions ranging from \$300,000 to \$25,000 by four incumbent and two former political appointees to embassies. How many others who contributed large sums expect to and will be rewarded with embassies within the next two or three months cannot be exactly predicted but there are no doubt a substantial number. One of the two largest contributors to the Nixon campaign, W. Clement Stone (more than \$1 million), was reported by The Washington Post as saying that he would be honored to be named Ambassador to Britain.

This is not a partisan matter. The ratio of non-career appointments by Republican and Democratic administrations has been about the same, though there have been variations in the concentration of non-careers in the more desirable posts. For example, during most of the past four years there have been only two ambassadors from the career service in the whole of Western Europe. The remaining 14 were for most of that period political appointees, as were those in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Pakistan.

Up until the beginning of the 19th century senior military and naval officers in most parts of the world were chosen by reason of family position or wealth. No government would dream of appointing generals and admirals, colonels and captains, on this basis today. Strict professional standards are now applied also to almost all civilian services, except very properly to the handful of policy-makers at the top of each department or agency.

THIS SAME evolution from political patronage to career professionalism has taken place over the past century in the diplomatic service of every advanced country except the United States. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, not to mention the Soviet Union, appoint career ambassadors to practically all posts, major or minor, except for an occasional prominent political figure with considerable experience in foreign affairs.

As for the United States, it could be argued up until 1917 that our foreign affairs were not for the most part too significant and that it did not matter who represented us even at great capitals abroad. For the last 55 years, however, we have been, first, one of the half dozen great powers, now, one of the two superpowers whose foreign policies and relations most decisively affect peace and stability throughout the world. When we are represented in foreign capitals by inexperienced and often incompetent people, our national interests and prestige suffer materially, and the "structure of peace" we seek to build is seriously impaired.

It is sometimes maintained that in this era of instant communications an ambassador is

no more than a messenger boy delivering instructions from Washington. This is as silly as saying that a general in the field, an admiral at sea, or for that matter an astronaut in space, blindly carries out orders from headquarters. Broad lines of policy or strategy are of course laid down at the center, in times of great crisis even small details may be, but even in these cases policy is for the most part based on recommendations from the man on the spot. If it is not, it is almost certain to be based on misconceptions and to go awry.

IN THE LIGHT of more than 35 years in the foreign service, I would say without hesitation that an able and experienced ambassador continues today to play a major role, both in the determination of policy and in the maintenance of good relations with the country to which he is accredited. Conversely an incompetent or inexperienced ambassador can seriously damage those relations and, by failing to report accurately and opportunely, can contribute to gross errors of policy by his government.

It is therefore an outrageous anachronism that the most powerful nation in the world should still preserve the 19th century practice of selecting one-third of its ambassadors on the basis of contributions to political campaign funds or of other political favors. The system should be flexible enough to permit the occasional appointment of such distinguished non-professionals as Averell Harriman, John McCloy, Douglas Dillon, David Bruce and Ellsworth Bunker, but 95 per cent of ambassadorial appointments should be made from the career service, as all our allies in Western Europe do and as we ourselves do in our armed and other civilian forces.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 November 1972

Are State Department 'blues' for real?

By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

There's a plethora of talk these days about the low morale at Foggy Bottom. Foreign policy, the plaint goes, is now made in the White House. Henry Kissinger doesn't communicate with the State Department. Other government agencies have absconded with foreign economic policy. Veteran diplomats are being retired because there are no jobs for them. Young officers are restless.

Things are so bad, satirizes Art Buchwald, that the State Department should ask for diplomatic relations with the United States and set up an embassy in Washington to find out what's happening in the Kissinger plant.

To add to the blues, President Nixon contemplates a reorganization of the government bureaucracy that may churn up the State Department as well.

Management vs. substance

There is considerable dissatisfaction, to be sure, and this reporter has heard a fair share of it. But the telling observation can also be made that, although the department has lost its preeminence, there is widespread approval of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, even the close-to-the-chest manner in which it is conducted.

Moreover, many officers with creative ideas and imagination are active in the policy-formulating process and are making their mark, while others, though talented, are falling by the wayside. In short, the quarrel seems to be largely with management rather than substance.

"The talk about low morale is grossly exaggerated," comments one young, bright Foreign Service officer. "There is always grumbling in a bureaucracy and there has been at State since the McCarthy era."

"Frankly, I don't think Foreign Service officers ever made foreign policy. Rusk was not an officer, for one, and Dulles sealed himself off in a cocoon."

Says a high State Department official of Mr. Nixon's Far East policy: "There has been more progress in the directions we have wanted than ever before — despite the humiliation to our pride when we are not credited."

Historically there is a reason for the State Department's woes. That is the technological revolution.

Before World War II, when domestic affairs had priority and communication was slow, stripe-trousered diplomats around the world could handle foreign policy without detailed instructions from Washington. As international relations grew in importance, however, and as instant communications were installed with all power centers of the globe, foreign policy came to be run from Washington and not in the field. There was less need for the diplomat and less leeway for his ability and professionalism.

Where field officers once evaluated information and the State Department gathered it, diplomats began sending in the raw material, so to speak, while headquarters digested it. As a result, the department expanded out of proportion to field officers. It grew large and less efficient and a smaller vehicle was needed to manage.

So there are in effect two State Departments now. At Foggy Bottom there is a gross imbalance. Two-thirds of the personnel are engaged in administration. Perhaps one-sixth of the remainder are in functional jobs; that is, technicians in ACDA, SALT, AID, and so on. The remainder are basically a small group with expertise in foreign affairs, and only a few of these are used by Dr. Kissinger.

This has led to bureaucratic inertia and a fierce competition for policy-making jobs. Many Foreign Service officers, to their dismay, have high-sounding posts without a real function. In the old days an ambassador at least had prestige; now even that has eroded.

"The problem with State," observes a middle-rung officer with no 'big personal bones to pick, "is that it does not run a military chain of command."

"It's a bowl of jelly," he says. "Power

always gravitates to the people who know how to use it, and the elite pyramid is now padded with structural workers who know how to manipulate and cut back others. And because of vested interests, often protected by Congress, it is hard to reorganize the department."

Despite the bureaucracy, some officers are in a good position because of their personality and skill. If they are superior — and Joseph J. Sisco, the Middle East hand, is an obvious case in point — they are called upon and are deeply involved.

Where Secretary of State William P. Rogers is often faulted, however, is in failure to demand the ideas and expertise which the White House requires, to communicate them to the President when they are available, and to ride herd over the managerial apparatus.

"Top-grade officers often carve out a niche for themselves by sheer force of their expertise," says one man, "but many extremely capable people are being shunted aside because there are no openings for them. It's an appalling waste!"

In one way, perhaps, the diplomatic corps has brought on its own problems. Officers used to think that to get ahead they had to specialize in the political field. There has always been less enthusiasm for service in economic affairs, population control, and other areas considered peripheral.

Yet U.S. foreign policy is moving in precisely these directions. Economics, in fact, is expected to dominate diplomacy in the 1970's and '80's.

"Criticism of the State Department on economic policy has been deserved," says a key official concerned with this area. "We have not given enough attention to commercial policy and it is not surprising that Commerce and other government agencies have run with the ball."

This sentiment is echoed by the young officer quoted above. "There has to be greater recognition that we are living in a different world than a decade ago," he says, "and there is a new dimension to our work that involves global problems — pollution, terrorism, environment. We have not responded quickly enough."

"I think there is more opportunity for service now than ever before because there is no sensitive issue today — whether it is narcotics or ecology — that does not have an international component."

Looking to the future, experienced hands believe the State Department still has an important function to fulfill in implementing policies on a day-to-day basis and making certain that political ramifications of major economic decisions are kept foremost.

How President Nixon views the department's role — and how the department will respond — remains to be seen.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 November 1972

Nixon Order Fails to Ease Access to Classified Data

Bureaucratic Obstacles and High Costs Are Impeding Efforts to Obtain Older Government Documents

By FELIX DELAIR JR.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 21—177 requests made to various agencies in the five months through October, 83 were granted in full and four in part; 52 were denied in full and 38 are still pending, the White House figures show.

The breakdown, however, does not take into account that some of the information granted was not responsive to a request. One of the features of the system is that the person requesting declassification must agree in advance to buy the material. He must agree in advance to pay the cost of locating, identifying and reviewing the material even though it may not answer his question.

Balked by Officials

Officials' attitudes, as much as the rules permitting continued classification, hinder access to old papers on defense and foreign policy, it has been charged. Some of these officials relate prestige and the importance of their jobs to the volume of secret information coming across their desks, according to testimony before the House Subcommittee on Freedom of Information.

Rear Adm. Gene R. La Rocque, who retired from the Navy after 31 years and who received the Legion of Merit for his work on strategic planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House panel that Pentagon classification was ordered for a variety of reasons other than the legitimate one of preventing information from falling into the hands of a potential enemy.

He listed among the other reasons: "To keep it from the other military services; from civilians in their own service; from civilians in the Defense Department; from the State Department and, of course, from the Congress." He said that many officers regarded Congressmen as "bad security risks" because of a tendency to "tell all to the public."

Future Effect Seen

Those in charge of carrying out the President's order say it will have a greater effect in years to come as more papers are brought under review and new restrictions inhibit the use of secrecy labels.

To Professor Gardner, however, "the brightest prospect is that Congress will put an end to secret classification by administrative orders and spell out in legislation what material can be put under security wraps and by whom." A House watchdog committee has charged that the President's June 1 order was issued to head off such a bill, on which it was then holding hearings.

Figures compiled by the White House staff suggest that results under the new order—the first "reform" since 1953—have not been too bad. Of

manage them, and—eventually—in capable of determining their own destinies."

Despite this endorsement of a better-informed public, the language of the President's order makes access to classified information more difficult rather than the reverse.

The order provides that, after 10 years, secret material on national security and foreign policy must be reviewed for declassification on request, provided that the information is described "with sufficient particularity that it can be obtained with only a reasonable amount of effort."

The drawback in this requirement, those who have made the effort say, is that only the officials know what is in the classified files and how it is identified. Outsiders can guess at what is there and provide approximate dates. But to start the process the outsider must agree in writing to assume any costs entailed in identification and location of the material and security review.

The average citizen and most news media consider this cost prohibitive.

The Washington bureau of The New York Times, within a week of the effective date of the President's order, submitted 31 foreign policy questions to the State Department and requested declassification of the material presumably containing the answers. All together, 55 requests went to five Federal agencies.

Three weeks later the State Department responded that "we have concluded that your request does not describe the records you seek with sufficient particularity to enable the department to identify them, and that as described, they cannot be obtained with a reasonable amount of effort."

The Associated Press submitted eight requests on June 1. Seven have yet to be answered with a yes or no.

Among the June 1 requests by The Associated Press was one to the Defense Department for certain material on the Korean war. The Pentagon replied on July 11 that the material was not in the files of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. Another reply on Aug. 8 said that the material could not be located "with a reasonable amount of effort."

When it was pointed out that the material had been referred to in the memoirs of former President Eisenhower as coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon searchers said they would go on looking.

Before its rejection of the request by The Times, the State Department advised that the cost of identifying, locating and reviewing the material could be "as much as \$7,000 or more"

but that this was not to be taken as an estimate of any validity and none could be attempted.

In any case, The Times was told it would have to state in writing in advance that it would assume whatever cost was assigned, to producing the material, even though the review

process determined that it could not be declassified and released.

Pending the outcome of a written protest to David Young, head of declassification operations at the White House, The Times on June 21 withdrew its requests to the State Department and four other Federal agencies.

In a letter to Mr. Young, Max Frankel, the Washington correspondent of The Times said that "we will not buy a pig in a poke, nor should the Government ask us to play research roulette, even if we acknowledged some responsibility for sharing the costs involved."

Mr. Frankel's chief complaint was that "the bureaucrats misunderstand virtually every issue involved in this whole proceeding." He said, "We have, first, the admission (and in the case of the Pentagon papers, the demonstration) that vast amounts of information have been either misclassified or wrongly held classified for too long."

Mr. Frankel, who is also chief of the Washington bureau of The Times, said that the obvious intent of the President's order had been to correct both categories of error and said:

"If the Government intends to honor the intent and the spirit of the President's order, then it should facilitate access, not raise one barrier after another. In short, if the Government means what it says and took elaborate credit for so saying, it ought to find the means to deliver."

Mr. Young, after receiving the Frankel letter, suggested to State Department officials that their blanket rejection of all requests of The Times had been ill-advised. He said they should at least make "some gesture as a mark of good faith."

Without any further action by The Times, it was advised by letter on July 18 that the State Department was processing three of its 31 requests. These, the least consequential on the list, included the Department's assessment of a speech by Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union in January, 1960, about "wars of national liberation" and its bearing on United States foreign policy.

The other requests were for material on a visit of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany to Moscow and for details of an agreement with the Soviet Union to exchange Rudolf Abel, the convicted Soviet spy, for Francis Gary Powers, the United States U-2 pilot imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

To test the operation of the review process, The Times agreed to pay for this material.

The 181 pages of material, which provided no new information, required the department 35 hours to locate and review and cost The Times \$194.90. The department's rejection of the 28 other requests for "lack of particularity" still stands.

The Central Intelligence Agency ruled that it would not declassify materials asked for in six separate requests from The Times, including comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The C.I.A. and the National Security Council have so far refused to declassify any of the material in their possession.

PARADE • NOVEMBER 12, 1972

Keeping Up... With Youth

by Pamela Swift

CIA Recruiting

The War in Vietnam has caused more problems than it has resolved. One of these is the problem of recruiting competent university graduates for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Despite its honorable and brilliant director Richard Helms, the CIA has suffered a tarnished reputation among some students, not only because of its past infiltration of campus groups but also

and is through open solicitation, and another is through covert means.

The open method is best exemplified in a recent interview in *The Daily Texan* with William B. Wood, the Southwest personnel representative for the agency.

Called upon and questioned by Danny Douglas, a young University of Texas journalism student, Wood is quoted as having said: "I want to make it clear that we do not run a clandestine organization, and there is no cloak-and-dagger purpose in our hiring students."

Wood, according to the interview, then went on to point out that professional opportunities existed in the CIA for seniors and graduate students of almost any discipline—journalism, physics, political science.

"We are also interested," he explained, "in students with foreign language knowledge, especially unusual languages like Laotian and Swahili."

Wood's pitch for young recruits was frank and forthright.

Now, consider another CIA approach. It is best described in the following letter recently sent to this department.

Dear Pamela Swift,

My curiosity was first aroused by a cryptic advertisement in *The Chicago Tribune* which announced, "Russian linguist. important, interesting position for a person with native fluency in written and spoken Russian." I enclose a copy of the advertisement.

In spite of the fact that I am not a fluent speaker of Russian, I did major in Russian in college, so I sent off a letter of inquiry. Within a week I received a letter of reply with the heading, "Headquarters U.S. Army Research Translation

Group."

I enclose a copy of the letter, with the word "colleague" misspelled.

After reading the letter several times I inquired through many friends about the U.S. Army Research Translation Group. I looked through several Department of Defense directories. No one seemed ever to have heard of it. I wondered what it was.

Again, curiosity triumphed, and I phoned the telephone number given in the letter. A secretary connected me with Colonel Stratton. My conversation with him was relaxed and brief although it seemed to me that he spoke English with some sort of foreign accent.

Colonel Stratton warned me that the average student who majored in a Slavic language generally lacked sufficient command of the spoken language. I inquired about job details, and the colonel was rather hazy. All he would say was that the job entailed transcribing and translating Russian language tapes into English.


We arranged to meet at a military location, and I subsequently wandered around there for a while before I found the right room. It was a classroom with fixed seats.

Colonel Stratton turned out to be a man with gray hair and rather long sideburns, at least for a military man. He sat at the instructor's desk, and a younger man took a seat in the fifth row and off to the side. I was asked to sit in the first row.

The conversation was friendly, warm and informal. The colonel asked questions about my background and schooling, while the younger man took notes.

Colonel Stratton didn't seem terribly interested in me until at his invitation I began speaking Russian. He was surprised that I could carry on a simple Russian conversation, and that in addition I could speak other languages. He gradually grew enthusiastic.

He thereupon explained some of the job particulars. I would sign up after a training period in the U.S., for a two-year hitch overseas. If assigned to a "friendly" country such as West Germany, I would put in a 40-hour week in the U.S. Embassy trans-



THIS AD IN CHICAGO NEWSPAPER
CAUGHT STUDENT'S EYE.

because of its clandestine operations in Southeast Asia as well as its cloak-and-dagger ambience, all of which is anathema to many young people.

Still, the agency needs recruits. How does it get them? One meth-

lating the tapes. In a neutral country I would live incognito, attending a university as a cover and translating tapes at home.

Although everybody would like to be stationed in Paris, Colonel Stratton explained, the odds of my being sent to Paris were very slim. Most probably, he said, I would be sent to some Latin American country because of my knowledge of Spanish. I would then be enrolled in some university and given tapes to transcribe at home.

The job sounded glamorous, and the pay offered, about \$11,000 per year, high, plus all sorts of allowances and benefits.

I was tempted very much to sign up, but then Colonel Stratton and his colleague began speaking Russian, and I was surprised to discern the number of gram-

matical mistakes they made in Russian.

It was only when the interview was approaching its end that I began to think of the risks involved in the work. Suppose I was sent to some South American country like Bolivia and given Russian voice tapes to translate? Where would the tapes come from? How were they obtained? Was someone tapping someone else's telephone line? Did the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires regularly tap the U.S. Embassy telephone lines? Did the U.S. Embassy in turn tap the Soviet Embassy telephones?

Suppose, I asked myself, I was apprehended transcribing Russian tapes in Buenos Aires? Who would protect me? Who would acknowledge me? Who would take the responsibility for me?

Ironically enough, Colonel Stratton, a most perceptive man, must have read my mind, because it was he who raised the question of the morality of the work. He said he didn't know how I felt about it, but he could very well understand why many young people under the circumstances would not consider working for the U.S. Government in that particular job.

He asked me to give it some thought and to phone him any time I wanted exam tapes mailed to me.

I decided after a few days that I didn't want that type of job. Later, I learned that Colonel Stratton represented the Central Intelligence Agency.

I only wish he had told me so at first.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Nov. 20, 1972

Investigation Can Be a Big Weapon

By Jack Anderson

For years, we have reported on the alarming trend toward government by investigation. The federal bureaucracy is crawling with investigators who, if they are to earn their salaries, must investigate someone. Today, this could be almost anyone who deals with the government or makes out a tax return.

It has become an all too frequent practice, in conflicts between private citizens and federal agencies, for the government to try to settle disputes by investigating the disputants. The power of investigation, which is supposed to be used for the good of the citizens, is often used instead to intimidate, coerce and strike back at persons who challenge the rulings or oppose the policies of government.

Government files are literally crammed with the life histories of wholly innocent citizens. These files are loaded with derogatory information—true statements, deliberate lies, idle gossip—whispered into the ears of eager government gumshoes.

The dirt these gumshoes pick up on people is swept into dossiers which are freely exchanged between federal offices. This gives an alarming number of government employees access to the raw files. If the subject happens to be a prominent person, the gossip from his files travels swiftly in titillating whispers.

The Secret Service, for example, recently wanted to know more about a famous singer. A request for information brought in a deluge of raw allegations from various government agencies.

The FBI had a full file on the singer, a black woman, although she has been accused of no crimes and isn't likely to commit any. Even the CIA submitted a confidential rundown on her sex habits, with this cautionary note:

Sex File

"Because of the sensitive nature of this information and the method by which it was procured, it is furnished for LEAD PURPOSES ONLY, and should not be utilized for

any other purpose, quoted, or disseminated further without the permission of the originating office."

Having cleared its conscience, the CIA proceeded to spell out unsubstantiated charges about the singer's sex life. "A confidential source," declares the three-page memo, "advised . . . that her escapades overseas and her loose morals were said to be the talk of Paris. The source stated that subject had a lurid sex life in Paris and described her as a sadistic nymphomaniac. . . ."

The memo went on and on about her sex activities, with these added comments: "Another informant described her as having a very nasty disposition, a spoiled child, very crude, and having a vile tongue. The informant states subject was not well liked by most actors and actresses working with her. The informant states she is a very selfish, shallow person who deliberately upstages and misuses actors working with her."

"The informant states the subject did not associate with very many Negroes and often bragged that she had very little Negro blood. The informant states that those who work with subject know from experience either to play up to her or to keep their distance to avoid subject's treachery."

A spokesman stressed, and we have confirmed, that the CIA doesn't keep files on American citizens, except for security files on its own personnel. The information about the singer turned up in another context.

This illustrates, nevertheless, how promiscuous the traffic in unproved allegations has become inside the government.

Footnote: Even the National Security Agency, which is supposed to limit its activities to deciphering foreign codes, produced material about the singer. The NSA offerings, however, were limited to texts of foreign broadcasts about her.

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RAMPARTS
Dec 1972

SPOOKING. THE SPOOKS: the victor marchetti story by james otis

"I'm a scoutmaster" says Victor Marchetti. He is, in fact, more than a scoutmaster.

Until 1969 he was executive assistant to the deputy director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Rufus Taylor. More recently, he has been the subject of a legal case which could crack open the darkest recesses of America's clandestine government. "I am the kind of a guy who manages Little League teams," he goes on. "Well, my scouts and ball players began to grow up on me and they became draft age. They let their hair grow; they changed. Now I know these were good boys, and they started to get to me. They began saying, 'I'm not going to go and get shot in Vietnam, because it's an unjust war.'" Doubts, gnawing doubts about Vietnam and the CIA's role in foreign affairs. He says that he saw himself becoming a lifer, an intelligence bureaucrat, and he "didn't want to play the game any longer." After 14 years as a spy for America, Marchetti quit.

That was 1969. Now, in August, 1972, in Washington, D. C., he sat in a Chinese restaurant known as a place frequented by CIA agents. Far from the taciturn and glamorous killer, Marchetti looked stolidly middle class, of conservative mien and talkative manner. As he spoke, he furtively sized up the occupants of the other tables and mentally chronicled the comings and going of all patrons, presumably out of habit. Did he think the interview was being bugged? "It's not beyond them," he replied, his face a mixture of edginess and resignation.

It had not always been like this. He had left the agency on the best of terms, his boss assuring him that he "had a home to come back to." "In the first year I was away, it was just as if I was at the Agency. I was going to dinner parties . . . we'd sit around and talk. In fact, I saw as much of Agency people as I did when I was working."

But somewhere along the line he got the notion that he wanted to blow the whistle on the CIA: "I would go down to a shopping center and walk around. For the first time in 15 years, I began to look at a check-out clerk as a human being, instead of a check-out clerk. I got interested in people and my ideas about the Agency became firmer and sharper, and I began to focus on precisely what was bothering me."

Victor Marchetti decided to write a book. While the process of writing can be a solitary and private experience, he

could scarcely expect to scribble away, merrily exposing his former employers, without it coming to their horrified attention. True, the CIA's record has been afflicted with tragicomic vicissitudes, but it can presumably keep tabs on its own.

Within weeks of his book outline being shown to various New York publishers, the CIA obtained a copy through a source within the industry. It immediately sought, and received, a court injunction against any further revelation of the book's contents. The order additionally restrains Marchetti from even discussing the as yet unwritten book with his literary agent, publishers, or wife. It is an injunction of unprecedented scope—never before has the government gone to court to prevent former employees from speaking or writing. At the heart of the case lies a basic conflict between the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the government's interest in keeping a lid on its various clandestine—and often illegal—activities. Provoked by the wave of "whistle-blowing" attendant on Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers, the conflict arises because of official activity which offends the moral sensibilities of rather ordinary, and very loyal, public servants like Victor Marchetti. If the Supreme Court backs Marchetti's right to talk, it could open a floodgate for a torrent of revelations about the nefarious activities of American spy agencies. If it upholds the CIA, it could cut down on the trickle of information which currently keeps the Invisible Government on its guard.

Aside from the broader implications of the case, the CIA has good reason to fear what Marchetti himself might reveal about his erstwhile employers. He is unquestionably the highest-ranking intelligence official to threaten exposure of the Agency's more questionable endeavors. He knows where the skeletons are hidden. Indeed, Marchetti is given credit for developing the surveillance techniques which led the CIA to discover Russian missiles in Cuba and thereby provoked the 1962 Missile Crisis.

As Marchetti tells the story, "After I was with the Agency for five or six years, I was assigned to the Cuban problem. This was exciting and personally very satisfying because another fellow and I evolved a strange analytical working tool which we called crateology. With it we were able to identify the merchant ships that were arms carriers. Over a period of time, since the Soviets were very methodical, we began to learn which crate contained a SAM 2 and which crate contained a Mortar torpedo. We could even tell whether a ship was out of the Baltic or the Black Sea.

"In 1962 we saw in Cuba a build-up the likes of which we'd never seen before in the world. At the same time, the Soviets were doing other things as diversionary tactics. In Indonesia and Yemen, for instance, they were using Soviet pilots and submarine crews for the first time. I don't think that stuff ever came out. Meanwhile the Pentagon was writing rebuttals to our reports, saying the Russian ships were just part of big agricultural and economic aid programs. But because of our work, the U-2 flights were sent. They came back and the first photographs showed all the SAM sites being put in. We have always taken great pride in this."

Later, Marchetti was assigned to keep tabs on Soviet efforts to develop an anti-ballistic missile system. "The point we kept hammering away at was this: Try as they might, the Soviets could not produce ABM's. All the fears they had around Washington were not founded. The anti-ballistic missile system is a dream. By the very nature of the game, it cannot work. You cannot develop a gun which will shoot a bullet from a gun already fired at you. Only Tom Mix could do that."

By this point, Marchetti's star was rapidly rising within the Agency. He was moved to the "executive suite," and there, ironically, his doubts began to develop. Vietnam was the issue. "It started off with me being hot and saying, 'We're gonna fight these gooks. Let's beat their asses, we can do it. Don't let them nickel and dime you to death. Whump 'em a couple of good ones.'" But the Johnson Administration chose another, more expensive course, and Marchetti grew frustrated. "They had money going down the drain like crazy. At the same time I was becoming more and more aware of the social problems in this country. It started out as a simple financial concern. We have ghettos. We have all kinds of other problems that have to be taken care of. Why spend money out there?"

Marchetti was never "radicalized," and he is certainly no radical today. But his frustration deepened, and he grew more and more disillusioned. "Vietnam was just one issue. I became disenchanted with a lot of the clandestine activities. I thought they were useless. Actually counter-productive. Upholding a dictator somewhere in a country which . . . if we had any brains . . . we would have nothing to do with."

At first, he simply said his piece and avoided the Vietnam "account"—as it is called in CIA jargon. But he saw himself becoming a bureaucrat in an institution whose basic activities he questioned: "For example, so much money is spent on research and devel-

opment, and I couldn't think of anything to research or develop. So I spoke with the guy who ran R & D and concluded that—out of 1200 people working for us—we had 300 to 600 too many. He wanted to keep them! He was a real bureaucrat. I was thinking what he had become and I could see myself that way. So my decision, in the end, was highly personal, emotional as well as logical. I just typed up my resignation and fired it in one day."

Though he confesses to missing "certain things about the Agency," Marchetti is today more critical than

ever of its operations. "I am convinced that the U.S. intelligence, the CIA, are drifting toward, if they are not already involved in, domestic operations. It's only logical. I mean you can't spy against the Soviet Union and China. Those targets are almost impenetrable. Really the only place they can operate with any kind of success is in the underdeveloped areas of Latin America, Africa, certain parts of Asia. In any case, intelligence should be collecting information and analyzing it, but Agency people are most interested in influencing events. They're more interested in covert action operations that put certain people into

office, in a coup d'état if necessary."

And so Marchetti fights his legal battle and jots down in private his recollections of life in the CIA. He does it, he says, because the only way to reform American intelligence is to open it up for public review. If he wins his case and publishes these memoirs (now scheduled for release in 1973, by Alfred Knopf and Co.), his story, we are assured, will present the American people with a view of the CIA which has heretofore appeared only in the nightmares of its most severe critics. If he loses, the dangers of which he warns are certain to multiply.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Nov. 3, 1972

U.S. Delivering Two Subs to Taiwan

By Jack Anderson

In a move that could upset the delicate diplomacy between Washington and Peking, the U.S. is delivering two submarines to Communist China's arch enemy, Chiang Kai-shek.

The transfer was approved by the President's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, in a secret order dated Oct. 16.

White House sources stress that the subs had been promised to Chiang several months ago and that the delivery violates no agreement with Peking. "We have been meticulous about keeping our agreements with the People's Republic of China," a top policy-maker told us.

Kissinger also placed strict conditions on Chiang's use of the subs. The order to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird emphasized:

"With reference to your memorandum of Sept. 13, 1972, regarding provision of two diesel-powered submarines to the Republic of China (Taiwan), the transfer is approved subject to the following conditions:

"That the first ROC submarine crew's underway training not begin until late November.

"That we obtain from the ROC, as a condition of the transfer of the two submarines, a formal written understanding that the submarines

are to be used exclusively for government on earth." He also extols the bombing of the north.

"That whatever press guidance covering both the beginning of underway training and the formal transfers of the two submarines be cleared with the White House."

Junketing Jesuit

A junketing Jesuit, who was sent to Vietnam by the White House at the taxpayers' expense, came back loaded with political ammunition.

The outspoken priest, Dr. John McLaughlin, is now making campaign speeches for President Nixon on the Vietnam issue. As evidence that the good father's Vietnam lectures are strictly political, all his travel expenses are picked up by the Committee to Re-elect the President.

Father McLaughlin's speeches are so militant that he sometimes seems to contradict the official White House line. He appears to disagree with White House negotiator Henry Kissinger on the prospects for a Communist takeover, which McLaughlin warns will mean a "blood bath" with up to one million victims in South Vietnam.

In contrast with Kissinger's moderate tone toward North Vietnam, the bluff, bearish priest cries out that North Vietnam is "the most aggressive brutalizing and austere

His views on Vietnam have changed radically in the last two years. Father McLaughlin came to President Nixon's attention in 1970 when the goodly friar ran a spirited, pro-peace campaign against Sen. John Pastore, (D-R.I.) The President was so impressed with McLaughlin's slam-bang style that he recruited the priest as an adviser.

Father McLaughlin became close to the inner circle of the National Security Council, the White House policymaking arm whose works and finances are hush-hush. The council sent the friar to Vietnam last Spring, ostensibly to study refugees, war casualties, ecology damage and the like.

But on his return, the White House dispatched him at least seven times to make sabre-rattling political speeches based on his Vietnam trip.

Sen. Lee Metcalf, (D-Mont.) learned of the clerical campaigner and fired off an inquiry to Defense Secretary Laird. The letter was referred to the Pentagon Chaplains Board, whose executive secretary, Col. Duncan Stewart, wrote back to Metcalf disclaiming any responsibility for Father McLaughlin's junket.

"The command chaplain (in Vietnam) had no knowledge of his visit until he met him at a

luncheon in Saigon," wrote

Colonel Stewart. "Father McLaughlin is an adviser and writer for President Nixon."

We reached Father McLaughlin at the White House. He explained that the National Security Council had wanted him to look at the war "from a humanitarian perspective." He saw nothing wrong with using the information he gathered on his trip for political purposes.

Political Potpourri

Secret White House polls show an alarming number of voters are drifting away from President Nixon into the doubtful column. This is the reason the Republicans are putting on the steam during the final week of the campaign.... When Mike Mansfield gives up the Senate Democratic leadership, two powerful senators will jostle for the right to step into his shoes. Already squaring off for the showdown are Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey and West Virginia's Bob Byrd.... Sen. Ted Kennedy doesn't want the leadership and has promised his support to Humphrey.... George McGovern's campaign coordinator, Frank Mankiewicz, would like to run his next campaign for himself. He had his eye on the California governorship.

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GENERAL

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 13, 1972

SPECIAL REPORT

BEHIND THE RISE
IN CRIME AND TERROR

Skyjackings . . . kidnappings . . . wanton murder and assault—all add up to violence on the march over the world, with criminals and revolutionaries sometimes working together.

Motives are mixed, frequently psychopathic. More often than not, innocents are selected to be the victims. It is a "new breed" of terrorism now emerging—and its end is not in sight.

IN A WORLD LARGELY at peace, terrorism and wanton brutality are cutting ever more deeply into the lives of people and nations.

No longer is it only governments and ruling classes that possess the power to inflict fear on large segments of humanity. Today it is the common man—acting alone or in groups—who is making terror a common event in common places: a downtown street, an athletic contest, an airliner high above the earth.

Whether solitary criminals or terrorist gangsters, such persons are leaving a trail of death and desolation. This trail is widening over much of the world by assassination, skyjacking, rioting and random murder. Now moving into the foreground over the globe is the political terrorist—more so than at any time since the years leading to the Russian Revolution in 1917.

"No moral limits." With the "new terrorism" has come a "new morality" that encompasses the willful murder of the innocent. Two years ago a spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine stated it clearly:

"There can be no political or geographical boundaries or moral limits to the operations of the peoples' camp. In today's world, no one is 'innocent,' no one is a 'neutral.'"

Letters that explode when opened go not only to officials but to random targets—a home for elderly Jews in West Germany, for instance.

Diplomats, once guaranteed safety, are on the firing line. Diplomatic kidnappings, sometimes murders, have occurred in such countries as Uruguay, Canada and Turkey. Snipers, presumably motivated by anger at treatment of Russia's Jews, endangered the lives of four sleeping children at the Soviet mission to the United Nations in New York.

At one time the wanton killer—criminal or political terrorist—was held to be "possessed of devils," a theory on which the Russian author Feodor Dostoevski a century ago constructed "The Possessed," a classic novel of nihilist terrorism.

New reasons. Today, newer explanations of violence are available.

These range from "childhood deprivation" or "social injustice" to "alienation." Recently fashionable is the idea that twentieth-century mankind inescapably inherits the instinct

for violence from prehistoric times. Going far beyond attempts to explain or excuse violence, revolutionaries of the "New Left" now celebrate it as a positive virtue.

Violence, they say, promotes the "manhood" of oppressed people, and leads to freedom and unity—or, as French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre defined it:

"Violence, like Achilles's lance, can heal the wounds it has inflicted."

It was the late Frantz Fanon, a West Indian physician and revolutionary, who spelled out this doctrine in his book "The Wretched of the Earth," a chronicle of his experiences and reflections during the Algerian uprising in the 1950s.

Fanon, too, envisaged a new alliance between revolutionaries and the lumpenproletariat—the criminals and idlers of society. He wrote:

"The pimps, the hooligans, the unemployed and the petty criminals, urged on from behind, [will] throw themselves into the struggle for liberation like stout working men. All the hopeless dregs of humanity, all who turn in circles between suicide and madness, will . . . march proudly in the great procession of the awakened nation."

Terrorists usually are persons with education, and most groups have a sprinkling of professional men and an occasional aristocrat. Nonetheless, experiments in making common cause with criminals are developing, as in efforts to politicize black convicts in America.

In the worldwide upsurge of violence, signs are few that "the wretched of the earth" are about to inherit it. So far, no government has been toppled by crime and terrorism, nor has the basic course of world diplomacy been changed.


Even so, it is becoming clear that violent criminals can inflict fear on cities and blackmail on governments—pitting against the power of the majority a willingness to kill and be killed for political or psychopathic reasons, or both.

World attention, for example, was riveted in the final days of October on two incidents that point up the new balance between power and violence:

○ Two Palestinian guerrillas seized control of a Lufthansa jetliner over Turkey and threatened to blow up the plane and its 20 passengers and crewmen unless the West German

(continued on next page)

Violence—a world problem.



Government released three Arab terrorists held since the assassination of 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich on September 5. To save the lives of hostages aboard the plane, West German officials complied with the terrorist demand.

Three Americans, including a recently resigned Department of Commerce official and his son who were said to be "Maoist" New Leftists, were accused of fatally shooting a policeman and bank manager in an attempted Arlington, Va., holdup. They fled to Houston where, with a fourth man, the Federal Bureau of Investigation said they killed an Eastern Airlines employee in forcing their way onto a plane and redirecting it to Cuba—long a haven for U. S. fugitives.

The late J. Edgar Hoover, until his death the Director of the FBI, noted last year:

"As our society becomes more complex, industrial, urban and interrelated, the greater will become the power of a fanatical minority—one, two, a mere handful—if it so desires, to disrupt, inconvenience, destroy and endanger the rights, lives and property of others."

Developing worldwide is a situation that recently was described in these words by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Russia's dissident author and Nobel Prize winner:

"Violence [is] less and less embarrassed by the limits imposed by centuries of lawfulness. . . . Dostoevski's devils—apparently a provincial nightmare fantasy of the last century—are crawling across the whole world in front of our very eyes, infesting countries where they could not have been dreamed of. And by means of hijackings, kidnappings, explosions and fires of recent years, they are announcing their determination to shake and destroy civilization. And they may well succeed."

A GLOBAL STAGE FOR CRIME

Violent crime is a worry not only in the U. S. but in Europe, Africa and Asia. It transcends continental barriers, so that letter bombs mailed in Malaysia explode in Sydney or London, and poppy farmers in Turkey send their produce to Marsilles for processing and forwarding to heroin consumers in the United States, contributing to crime in this country.

In today's "global village," desperate persons move with ease and speed undreamed of by killers in the past.

Arthur Bremer, in dull rage against human authority, pursued potential victims from Wisconsin to Canada to a Maryland shopping center where he shot and crippled Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama, then campaigning for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency.

Student revolutionaries, often using credit cards, flitted across country and even across oceans to participate in campus riots. Arab terrorists traveled unchallenged from the brown hills of Syria to Europe on their mission of murder in Munich.

As air travel grows spectacularly—from 46 million passengers worldwide in 1952 to 325 million last year—killers find it easier to move undetected through air terminals such as that at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City, which handles up to 50,000 passengers a day. Because of the load, government and airlines moved slowly in installing electronic and other devices that forestall hijackers but also would retard the movement of air traffic.

On the side of violent terrorists and criminals is the rising availability of weapons, many the residue of recent wars: grenades, pistols, rifles, bazookas, machine guns and explosives. No one knows how many weapons are moving into illegal channels, but some estimates run into the millions each year. And there is speculation that criminals and terrorists, in another decade or two, will be armed with nuclear devices.

Even without that ultimate weapon, violent acts are growing in numbers and ferocity.

Americans were horrified three years ago by disclosures of gory killings carried out by ex-convict Charles Manson and his southern California "family" of young followers, who obeyed his commands without question.

Worldwide terrorism. A similar instance, with political overtones, developed in Japan this year with disclosures that a terrorist group known as *Rengo Sekigun*—the United Red Army—tortured and killed 14 of its members, using ice-picks and swords. The reason given was their "unrevolutionary" behavior.

In Britain, where violent crime last year showed a 16 per cent gain over 1970 and murders an increase of 30 per cent,

a high police official confessed that a "substantial number" of such crimes seemed motiveless.

In West Germany, despite stepped-up security measures, more than 320 bank robberies were committed last year, often with hostages involved—prompting newspaper outcries that the country was becoming an oversized Chicago.

Nigeria's military Government is putting armed robbers to death before the firing squad, sometimes in batches of a dozen or more. In Israel, an increase in bank robberies is blamed by police on an influx of guns since the Six Day War of 1967—and submachine guns, one official said, are "the cheapest and most obtainable weapon."

As in the past, the U. S. continues to lead almost all other nations in violent crime—armed robberies, assaults, rape and murder.

State of siege. From 1966 through 1971, such crimes rose by 90 per cent. The number of policemen killed has risen from 57 in 1969 to 100 in 1970 and 125 last year.

Some of America's big cities have entered a state of virtual siege. Says one federal law-enforcement official:

"We're back to medieval times when peasants worked their fields by day and returned at night to the castle for safety against marauding bands—only now it's the apartment house that is locked up and placed under guard."

A recent visitor to a Boston public-housing project was puzzled when an elderly couple refused to answer a knock at the door. Finally, a frightened voice was heard: "Please, go away—we don't have anything. Please leave us alone."

In New York City, following the daylight murder of a Columbia University professor on a street near the campus, students and teachers took to leaving the campus in groups for mutual protection. One student, displaying a roll of masking tape, told a "New York Times" reporter:

"I've been thinking of what to do, and this is all I can think of. A roll of tape to put around the club I carry at night, so I can get a better grip. Pretty meaningful, huh?"

Some of this violence is racial, as in Los Angeles where an Iwo Jima veteran—a white man in his 50s—was beaten to death, without provocation, by 15 to 20 black youths while he was taking food to a destitute black friend. But enough of this violence flows from nonracial causes to convince many authorities—community leaders, police, scholars and churchmen—that old notions of self-restraint, once thought necessary to make life tolerable, are in serious trouble across a broad spectrum of Americans.

Nowhere does this loosening of restraints appear more dramatically than in the skyjacking phenomenon.

Between 1930 and 1967, inclusive, airlines reported 46 skyjackings. Between 1968 and the end of 1971, airborne pirates did "their own thing" on 175 planes.

Ransom has come to as much as the 5 million dollars paid to Arab terrorists by the West German Government for the return of a Lufthansa airliner. Highest ransom paid without recovery to an individual was the \$303,000 given to an American skyjacker who later was arrested in Central America, returned to the U. S. and sentenced to prison without revealing where he hid the money.

Experienced criminals, some of them self-styled "political revolutionaries," have seized aircraft. But dozens of persons with no known criminal past have also entered the desperate game of airborne terror, often citing high-minded social and political causes such as child welfare or peace as their reasons for seeking ransom money.

Other forms of terror, too, draw a mixture of motivations.

British authorities in Northern Ireland suspect that psychopathic killers are serving one or both sides in that civil conflict. Reported over a five-month period were nearly 50 assassinations, some involving torture and mutilation. One victim was a retarded boy, 15 years old, reported to have the mind of a child of 4.

In Chile last year, authorities linked the murder of the opposition-party leader to a young extremist who was said to be organizing criminals for revolutionary violence.

In West Germany, a "Red Army" faction led by Andreas Baader and Mrs. Ulrike Meinhof—both dedicated revolutionaries—were blamed for a series of bank robberies, arson, and police killings lasting several months before their capture.

Revolution by robbery. In the U. S., student revolutionaries have resorted to theft and robbery. Most startling was the alleged participation of two coeds in a Boston bank holdup along with three parolees—followed by the killing of

a policeman during the getaway.

The underground Black Liberation Front—in the January, 1972, issue of its publication "Right On!"—gave the following account of a supermarket robbery in Brooklyn:

"On December 20, a *lumpen* brother ripped off Key Food Supermarket. He was taking what was his when a swine [policeman] came along named Carson Terry and stuck his nose in the people's business. The brother had ripped off \$800. The pig chased the brother around the corner into a hallway where the brother turned around and righteously blew him away. This is a victory to Black and Third World people because Terry was a sergeant in Vietnam."

In the same issue was an article telling how blacks in the Virgin Islands were raiding white homes, and gun shops for weapons and ammunition. The article concluded:

"Now the blacks, too, are armed and their flames of justice keep on burning up the properties of the U. S. racists and imperialist oppressors."

Eight months later, seven blacks—none known to belong to a revolutionary group—stormed into the clubhouse of a golf course on St. Croix Island, killed seven whites and one black with automatic gunfire, and fled, taking with them less than \$1,000 in loot.

The gunmen wore green fatigues. Two were said to have been veterans of Vietnam fighting.

NEW GOALS OF TERRORISM

What has emerged is a "new breed" of terrorists—differing from their predecessors not only in weapons but in tactics and purposes. From Dr. Paul Weiss, Catholic University philosopher, comes this observation:

"Prior to the Russian Revolution, terrorists directed their efforts at the overthrow of governments, kings and anyone they considered to be a primary enemy. They had the naïve idea that by getting rid of a person, they could bring change.

"Today, it is clear that public figures are not in full control as kings and prime ministers were. Now the goal becomes one of intimidation—that is, setting up a process that reaches the supporting structure behind the target."

In Northern Ireland, where Protestants and Roman Catholics are at each others' throats, both sides concede that their real purpose is not to kill each other but to influence the British Government's eventual decision on what to do about the whole problem.

Palestinian Arabs are killing Jews with the avowed aim not of forcing Israel to its knees but of forcing its Western backers to act on behalf of Arab claims in what once was Palestine. A Palestinian leader explains:

"We have to shock the West out of its guilty conscience about the Jews and into recognizing the plight of the Palestinian people. That's why Lydda [Tel Aviv's airport] and Munich were such tactical successes. They showed we were prepared to die for our cause."

The Palestinian recalled how an Arab skyjacker—a girl—yielded a hand grenade to her Israeli captors instead of blowing up the plane and its occupants. He added: "I'd have given her a medal for being a good human being, but I'd have kicked her out of the commando movement for being a lousy revolutionary."

The willingness to kill and be killed—what Fanon called "the creative madness" of violence—is forging a common bond among terrorist groups of the New Left scattered over the globe.

This unity, in its present rudimentary outlines, focuses on the Palestinian Arabs' organization. Its guerrilla camps, armed to some extent with Russian weapons but infused with Maoism, have drawn white and black revolutionaries from the United States—along with others from Japan, Turkey and West Germany. There is evidence that training has also been given to terrorists from Iran, Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Mexico and Iraq.

Last year assassins who said they had been trained in Palestine killed Israel's consul general in Turkey—and the Turkish courts this year imposed prison sentences on 14 youths allegedly trained at Palestinian camps.

Even stronger ties with Japan's *Rengo Seitgun*, reportedly forged by a Palestinian propagandist's visit to the Far East, led to the dispatch of two men and one woman to Beirut for military instruction. From there they went to Rome and thence to Tel Aviv to carry out their massive

killings at the air terminal.

The Palestinian training camps are a magnet for young revolutionaries elsewhere, largely because of the financial and moral support provided by Arab governments.

Oil-rich countries such as Libya and Saudi Arabia contribute large sums to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Libya's revolutionary Prime Minister, Col. Muammar Qadhafi, openly boasts of his support for Irish terrorists and U. S. black revolutionaries, and provides "cover" passports to Arab terrorists on their missions abroad.

Neighboring Algeria, in recent years, has become a haven for U. S. and other revolutionaries on the run. Iraq's Government last spring openly urged Iranian radicals to greet President Nixon in Teheran with bombs and bullets—and three bombs were exploded.

WHY THEY HATE

The internationalizing of terrorism is raising questions on the world's young revolutionaries—and what motivates them.

Not all are found to be emotionally unbalanced. Many, as suggested by a University of California study of student nonconformists, are well-adjusted and stable persons. Strong evidence exists, however, that emotional disturbance sharpens the cutting edge of revolutionary fervor, especially among those emerging from poverty into a life of frustrated aspirations.

One example is revealed in "Soul on Ice" where Eldridge Cleaver describes his feelings in raping a white woman:

"I did this consciously, deliberately, willfully, methodically—though looking back I see that I was in a frantic, wild and completely abandoned frame of mind. Rape was an insurrectionary act. It delighted me that I was defying and trampling on the white man's law, upon his system of values, and that I was defiling his woman. . . . I felt I was getting revenge."

More subtly, this factor of emotional derangement is found by psychiatrists among skyjackers—who, in some cases, are judged to be psychotic, unable to distinguish between reality and fantasy.

Probably the world's foremost authority on the psychology of skyjacking is Dr. David C. Hubbard, psychiatrist and director of the Aberrant Behavior Center in Dallas. Studying 46 skyjackers and their companions, he learned this:

In family background, the father often was a violent alcoholic and the mother a religious fanatic. As children, skyjackers frequently suffered from faulty co-ordination that placed them at a disadvantage with other youngsters. Their classroom work usually was poor, and most had dropped out by the tenth grade. Few dated girls.

As adults, many skyjackers said they dreamed frequently about unaided flight. In reality, they drifted from one routine job to the next. They had few friends, and marriages generally were a failure. Summing up these and other characteristics, Dr. Hubbard reported, skyjackers tend to be sexually inadequate persons with strong fantasies. At least half act to some degree out of paranoid-schizophrenic impulses, and most evidently have a subconscious wish to die.

In another study, this one involving 11 men arrested for threatening the U. S. President, Dr. David Abrahamsen—a student of violence and criminal psychiatry for nearly 30 years—found four to be schizophrenic to the extent of needing institutionalization.

The seven others, to one degree or another, were described as either neurotic or showing signs of character disorder. In his recent book, "Our Violent Society," Dr. Abrahamsen concluded:

"Looking broadly at the political assassin in our history, we see that he was always a personal failure, an isolated human being, incapable of exhibiting genuine relationships and possessing extraordinary ambitions that were out of proportion to his intellectual and emotional assets."

Dr. Abrahamsen offered the view that "the assassin sees the world around him as ugly because his own inner world is ugly." Furthermore, "he would like to rationalize his violent act—give it some moral-political cause," much as skyjackers often do.

Nowhere is the bleak inner world of the lone fanatic revealed more strikingly than in the diary that Arthur Bremer kept. In this rambling document, the convicted assailant of Governor Wallace presented to the world not an apology, but a justification for his act:

"My future was small, my past an insult to any human being. . . . I thought about killing myself every day for months at a time."

Hatred, too, echoes in the background of terrorism—nowhere more strongly than in the past-oriented Arab world as it mourns its lost lands and glories. These are the words of Fawaz Turki, a young Palestinian, from his recent book "The Disinherited":

"And so I hated. I hated the world and the order of reality around me. I hated being dispossessed of a nation and an identity. I hated not being a part of a culture. I hated being a hybrid, an outcast, a zero. A problem."

"... So I hated, and the world hated me because I hated. . . . Give me a gun, man, and I will blow my own or somebody else's brains out. Leave me alone, and I will go somewhere to hide behind the hills; maybe then I can begin to understand. And on the way I will write slogans on the walls . . . to tell the world what I think of their gods; and their angels, of their values and matrix of logic, of their sense of history and the sadness of poetry suppressed in the soul of disinherited men."

"DO PEOPLE REALLY CARE?"

It is a world which is shaken by upheavals of all kinds—sharply altering its politics, cultures, economies and communications—that is offering the new openings for terrorism and destruction.

Vanishing is the stability anchored to a fixed hierarchy of values and authority in this world and the next. What is emerging in the West is a free-form attitude toward human relationships and responsibilities.

Dr. James Hitchcock, professor of history at St. Louis University, noted recently that the ideal of "self-fulfillment" in the new culture is freeing people from rules, institutions and the past. Almost as sacred, he said, is the nebulous ideal of "service to others" which "can include everything from middle-class charitable works to flirtation with guerrilla movements."

This shift, decades in the making, blossomed during the 1960s when youthful rebels promised an Aquarian age of "harmony and understanding" as restraints loosened.

So far, however, critics find that what is mainly visible is a rising flow of violence and disorder, in real life or simulated on the screen.

"R" and "X" movies make ever more daring forays into depictions of blood-spattered horror. On television, the war in Vietnam is shown with no holds barred—along with riots and other forms of mayhem.

To a remarkable extent, crime and terrorism are becoming the "theater of the streets" promised by young radicals.

During a recent bank holdup in Brooklyn, television cameras ground away while assembled onlookers eagerly watched the cast of characters assembled during a 14-hour vigil: two homosexuals keeping guard over their seven hostages while bargaining with federal agents and city police. An indignant editorial in "The New York Times" branded the entire episode as comparable to "a diverting movie or television serial."

Television also conveyed to a world audience much of the suspense and terror of the Arab assault on the Olympic competitions in Munich. Afterward, a young Arab visitor observed of the guerrillas:

"They have seen death many times until now it is nothing for them to kill and hijack planes. It makes me very sad. Do people really care? Will it be just excitement if another one dies today?"

Linked closely to the seeming spread of desensitization to violence is an undercurrent—even among the law-abiding—of hostility toward authority.

Published in Britain recently was "The Children's Bust Book," written by some social workers, which offered such advice to youngsters as the following:

"Never trust a copper to keep his word."

"Helping the police is hurting yourself and your mates."

"The law is not interested in the truth."

Terrorists' folk heroes. Folk hero for a time in the U. S. was the pseudonymous "D. B. Cooper," the first parachuting skyjacker—and perhaps the only one—to make a seeming success of his venture though he has not been seen or heard from since jumping out of a hijacked plane last year.

At the peak of his fame, youngsters' sweatshirts carried

his name, and he was celebrated in a popular song:

"D. B. Cooper, where are you now?"

"We're looking for you high and low."

"With your pleasant smile,

"And your dropout style,

"D. B. Cooper, where did you go?"

(—Copyright, Fremont West Music)

It was adults last year who popularized "The Battle Hymn of Lieutenant Calley," selling more than a million records. This extolled an Army lieutenant found guilty in a court-martial of ordering his men to massacre men, women and children in the Vietnamese village of My Lai.

Supportive of violent crime and terrorism are some intellectuals and their hangers-on—the *lumpen intelligentsia*—who at cocktail parties talk of a "theology of violence" or excuse such acts as the skyjacking of a U. S. airliner by a young Vietnamese student who opposed the American bombing of North Vietnam.

Deemed somewhat related to today's violence is the growing shift of guilt from the individual aggressor to society as a whole. New York City policemen tell, with grimaces, how a woman who was violently mugged not long ago refused to identify her attacker. Reason: She felt he had suffered "deprivation" in his youth.

Dr. Hannah Arendt, who has made extensive studies of terror and disorder in the modern world, noted in her widely read essay "On Violence":

"Rage and violence turn irrational only when they are directed against substitutes. . . . It has become rather fashionable among white liberals to react to Negro grievances with the cry, 'We are all guilty,' and Black Power has proved only too happy to take advantage of this 'confession' to instigate an irrational 'black rage.' Where all are guilty, no one is; confessions of collective guilt are the best possible safeguard against the discovery of culprits."

Problems in the courts. To a considerable degree, courts in the U. S. and elsewhere are accommodating themselves to the concept of the guiltless aggressor.

One instance occurred in Washington, D. C., when a 20-year-old black student went on trial for what was described as the wanton killing—without provocation—of a white man, a "liberal" and an antipoverty worker, after a minor traffic accident.

During the trial, the defendant laughed frequently, and sneered when details of the killing were brought out. Repeatedly he insisted that he was "proud" of killing "the white s.o.b." and announced that he was "above the white man's law."

At the conclusion of testimony, the judge—himself a Negro—stated that he "understood" the defendant's way of thinking, and dismissed the charge of first-degree murder. He offered to reduce the 10-year sentence under a lesser charge if the defendant showed at least "some remorse."

Such instances, along with courts' emphasis on criminal "rights," prompt critics to assign to them a portion of responsibility for today's crisis in violence.

Strangely—perhaps because of a "death wish" or a desire to philosophize to his captive audience—one of the Brooklyn bank robbers informed hostages:

"I'll shoot anyone in the bank. The Supreme Court will let me get away with this. There's no death penalty. I can shoot everyone here, then throw my gun down and walk out, and they can't put me in the electric chair. You have to have a death penalty, otherwise this can happen every day."

On an international scale, Marxist shifts have given terrorism a new kind of thrust.

For nearly a half century, revolutionary tactics remained more or less stabilized—and disciplined—under Soviet leadership. Now, disillusioned with what the Kremlin has to offer, revolutionaries are turning to an existential ideology of action and "impact," and discarding dialectical arguments on the inevitable downfall of capitalism.

At its extreme, the new revolutionary philosophy is defined by the U. S. radical, Abbie Hoffman, as follows:

"We become Communist-racist-acid-headed freaks, holding flowers in one hand and bombs in the other. . . . By allowing all: loving, cheating, anger, violence, stealing, trading, you become situation-oriented and as such become more effective."

Psychopathic element. As Alan Harrington and other observers see it, such definitions point strongly to a psychopathic element in the New Left—a tendency to live in what Norman Mailer, the controversial author-journalist, has de-

scribed as "the enormous present" where morality is based on doing "what one feels whenever and where it is possible."

UPHEAVAL WITHOUT END?

Can the surge of violent crime and terrorism be reversed? Except for elimination of a rear exit which on some aircraft had permitted skyjackers to parachute to safety, measures to curb terrorism have not achieved major success. Negotiations for a treaty to curb terrorists are moving slowly, despite the removal of the word "terrorism" from the U.S. draft because of objections from Arab nations.

"Sky marshals" to deal with skyjackers have not proven effective in the U.S. and have been removed. Airlines are using armed guards as well as electronic and other surveillance of passengers and baggage on a slowly-rising scale, and X-ray devices are being used to ferret out letter bombs.

West Germany has put its home-grown terrorists out of business, and gives its 70,000 Arab students and workers a "tough" screening, with dozens of deportations now ordered.

Kenya has set the death penalty for armed robbery, which rose by 70 per cent last year. Arguments for restoration of capital punishment are being heard in Israel and Britain.

In the private sector, the war on crime and terrorism is developing products with big markets in the U.S. and abroad.

Research last year suggested that 9 out of 10 major U.S. firms have been threatened with bombing. Today, as one management research specialist put it, "Some urban office buildings have security procedures that rival even the Pentagon's elaborate precautions—arriving visitors are electronically scrutinized, briefcases are inspected, and visitors are personally escorted to their destinations by security officers."

Even so, it was noted that culprits go undetected in almost two thirds of bomb cases because they are less likely to have a prior criminal record, are better educated and build more sophisticated devices.

To deal with this problem, all kinds of alarms and other protective devices are being developed for businessmen and home-owners. A recent conference of security agents in Washington, D. C., featured a bullet-proof vest, light blue and washable, which sells for \$99. Said the manufacturer's representative:

"One of these days we'll have bullet-proof pajama sets in full color. If this creeping paranoia continues there will be a market soon—and we'll get around to that."

No far-reaching confidence is apparent that such measures, alone, can produce the security that ordinary people want.

Violent veterans. Still to be measured, for instance, is the final fallout of violence among Vietnam returnees.

Already some are turning up as alleged criminals and terrorists—the latest example developing in Chicago where murder charges have been filed against eight black veterans belonging to a group called "De Mau Mau." The men, all dishonorably discharged from the service, are accused of

committing at least nine murders.

Also causing concern is a small but noticeable minority of veterans whose war experiences recur in hallucinatory—often violent—flashbacks from time to time.

A sociologist who has made an extensive study of such men, Dr. Charles Levy, told Congress last year of the comments of one veteran:

"You see guys with legs blown off, Cooks with their legs off and their chests wide open. You say, 'Man, is that all there is to it?' Just, you're dead. And no more. You get that attitude that people are just matter. It is just something you begin to live with. So that when you come home and you get in a fight or something, when I think nothing of biting a person's ear off because it is just something that I've begun to live with."

"These men go through uncontrollable spasms of violence—breaking a chair, knocking down wives or girl friends, pulling a knife. One kid even choked his mother, screaming at her because he thought she was the Vietnamese woman whom he found carrying a hand grenade."

The family scene. From Dr. Abrahamsen comes this observation from his many years of studying violent persons:

"A real answer to the problem of violence we have today must come from within the family and in the way we raise our children. There is no mass solution—not in our schools, our jails, or in environmental controls that condition men's minds."

If that is so, statistics suggest that violence will be around as a critical problem for a long time.

Each year an estimated 10,000 children are physically battered and abused by their parents. Stability is threatened when nearly 20 per cent of all U.S. families move their place of living in any given year. Thirteen per cent of the nation's 69 million children live only with their mothers.

Ten per cent of all U.S. schoolchildren are regarded as emotionally disturbed—a danger signal for their adulthood. Fewer young people are anchored to religious belief, as attested by polls showing sharp declines in regular attendance at church among persons in their 20s.

Where hope emerges. Still, some elements of hope are developing in the worldwide upsurge of violence.

Such revolutionary nations as Cuba and Algeria are losing enthusiasm for the role of host to foreign revolutionaries and terrorists. Setbacks to terrorists in Uruguay, Guatemala and West Germany suggest that the lure of violence wears thin—and so does its popularity, even among the most zealous.

This process of disillusionment, some feel, may be discovered eventually to work more quickly now than in the past because of the overexposure given violence in movies, TV shows and press.

Whatever hope exists, bringing violence under control may take years to realize, say the men close to this problem.

The crisis in violence, in their view, reflects a worldwide crisis in values and institutions at a time when changes are shaking the earth. And that upheaval is not yet finished. [END]

LONDON OBSERVER

5 Nov. 1972

CIA report started hijack row

by COLIN LEGUM

ISRAEL is still not prepared to accept West Germany's angry denials of having been involved in a secret deal with the Black September organisation before the hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft last Sunday. The hijacking led to the release of three Arab prisoners held after the Munich killings during the Olympic Games.

It transpires that the crucial element in the bitter controversy about alleged collusion between Bonn and the Black September group was a report made by agents of the

US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They reportedly leaked the story of an alleged secret meeting held in Rome before the hijacking between certain high officials from Bonn and Black September leaders. It is on the basis of this report that much of the circumstantial evidence has been built up in support of the collusion theory.

Prominent Israeli security and political figures take very seriously the possibility of some kind of a secret deal. But the Minister of Transport, Mr. Shimon Peres, has said he did not believe Chancellor Willy Brandt's Government would involve itself in 'so foul a deed.'

The Israelis have noted in particular the statement of the West German Minister of Transport that the authorities had received warnings that a strike was being planned in the latter part of October to secure the release of the three Arab prisoners.

Herr Franz Josef Strauss, who was one of the three non-Arab passengers in the hijacked aircraft, there were nine bombs 'as big as bottles', eight hand grenades and three pistols. Reports from Beirut indicate the possibility of rapidly improving German-Arab relations, but Arab sources denounce the 'collusion' story as 'a typical piece of Israeli fabri-

had been set.' But it is recognised that Herr Strauss, who is involved in the present German elections, may simply be concerned with a possible electoral advantage by repeating the charges of collusion.

Nevertheless, sharp questions are being asked in Jerusalem. If there was some kind of warning why were no adequate security precautions taken, especially on Lufthansa flights operating out of Damascus and Beirut, the two major centres of the Arab guerrilla organisations? How did the weapons get on board the Lufthansa plane?

According to a Spanish journalist, who was one of the three non-Arab passengers in the hijacked aircraft, there were nine bombs 'as big as bottles', eight hand grenades and three pistols.

Reports from Beirut indicate the possibility of rapidly improving German-Arab relations, but Arab sources denounce the 'collusion' story as 'a typical piece of Israeli fabri-

NEW YORK TIMES
17 November 1972

In a Remote Asian City, A U.S. Girl Dies of Drugs

'World Is a Carousel'

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan, Nov. 13—"The world (was) (is) a cotton handi carousel, all the people (were) are the ornaments & and as it floats by, bubbles & bounces, all i can do is watch in amazement, or gaze with a blank look on my countenance & let it all happen—let it whirl, twist or turn, let it spangle & bangle, let each piece take its turn being man, but i cease to be on it for the moment & all i can do is watch it all pass or float by . . . the color of elowns in the circus."

So ends the diary of Melanie R. of Brooklyn, and the last page of the big 69-cent Spiral notebook remains empty. Her body was taken to a morgue here to await autopsy and shipment home.

Melanie—that is not her real name—died eight days ago, 19 years old, after smoking 26 pipes of opium, leaving in the flophouse where she spent her last eight days her Donwilt Teller and Lord & Taylor charge-account cards, her student card from Emerson College in Boston, a letter from her distraught mother, a sleeping bag, and a carpet bag containing a few clothes and odds and ends.

"You're a murderer!" said the American narcotics agent last Saturday to the small, trembling Afghan who runs the New Istalif Hotel off Chicken Bazaar Street, where friends say Melanie smoked the heavy dose of opium preceding her collapse. She died a few hours later, never having regained consciousness. "Suffocation" or "pulmonary failure" is often given as the clinical cause in deaths induced by narcotics, but not necessarily by a fatal overdose.

"I'm not a murderer," replied Abdul Wahid, a ragged and unshaven man who speaks English. "Your people are killing yourself."

Wahid had just kept an appointment with the agent of the American Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in front of his hotel. He had delivered to the agent, a young man with long hair and mod clothes who posed as a narcotics dealer, a consignment of 20 pounds of powdered opium and 30 pounds of high-quality hashish.

Overpowered by the agent and another American narcotics man who covered his colleague's rendezvous from the opposite corner, Wahid was

taken into custody by a group of Afghan plainclothesmen directed by a West German adviser.

The Afghans appeared reluctant, embarrassed and incompetent in arresting Wahid and young narcotics users—all Europeans or Americans—in the ensuing raid on the hotel. They left the decisions to the American agents and the German adviser, who would have preferred to have the local police act on their own. Policemen are officially unauthorized to take police actions in a foreign country.

The plainclothesmen's reluctance was explained by knowledgeable sources: The leading detective had been a friend of Wahid since boyhood and feared that the arrest might cause difficulties with people, likely to be powerful, who had clearly afforded him protection to run his narcotics haven and engage in wholesaling on the side.

The sources suggested that the seized opium and hashish—and perhaps Wahid—would, true to Afghan form, reappear on the market before long.

"It was so serene—I was stoned, but for the first time in a long time i was happy. i was a kid again—less innocent of course—but i dug it."

Melanie was writing from Israel, where her diary began last May. A few days later she wrote:

"I can barely write. i'm tripping my brains out & there is quite a bit of speed in this acid."

The narcotics agents, who said that to disclose their names would hamper their usefulness, reported that they had had Wahid and his hotel under surveillance for three weeks and decided after Melanie's death that they must hasten their move to put him out of business.

Those who lived with her at the Green Hotel, a place like the New Istalif with three or four beds in each room, said that they had not gotten to know her well between her arrival Oct. 29 and her death but that she had been stoned all the time.

In registering at the United States Embassy, where she had pages for new visas added to her well-traveled passport, she wrote that she had come from Tolcheran, planned to stay for two weeks and would go on to India.

Instead Melanie walked out into the night from the New Istalif—no one knows how and when—and collapsed on the sidewalk near the Green Hotel. She was found there early Sunday and died at 2 o'clock in the afternoon in the Hospital for Women.

For the last week of her life Melanie was one of the few hundred American and Western European transients in the flophouses in the Shar-i-Nau section of this disheveled mountain capital, where a bed costs 20 afghanis (25 cents) a night.

Young, generally well educated, wearing long hair and composite costumes of Oriental origin, they shuffle vague-eyed through the turbaned crowds, expressing their boredom with the rich West through the cheap narcotics of the East.

"i am alive?" Melanie's diary asked.

In a country where thousands are starving to death for want of food or money, the young transients are ill-nourished, though they have money, traveler's checks or credit cards in their pockets, because opium and hashish cause them to neglect all else. Experts here attribute the frequent deaths among them more to general debilitation and lowered resistance to the manifold ailments of this undeveloped country than to overdoses of narcotics.

Ten or 11 Americans are reported to have died in the last two years, but other deaths may have gone unreported. Those who fall ill get little attention from fellow travelers.

Americans make up about a fifth of the transients, whose annual wave begins in May, peaks during the summer and falls off in November. Last year's total was 61,000 tourists in a country with one decent hotel. From here most of the young travelers continue across the Khyber Pass toward Katmandu, Nepal, the other main station of the hashish pilgrimage.

Although most are noticeably unwashed and their clothes are shabby, they do not appear to be poor. Americans who run

out of money get more from home, according to embassy officials. In three years only two have had to be repatriated by the embassy for lack of funds.

The price lists displayed on Wahid's walls said:

MENU

Acid\$1
Opium30 afghanis
Heroin 7 afghanis

Ask Abdul

Few of the guests were in at the time of the raid. They were mainly asleep on webbed cots with dirty mats and

blankets. There was little space between cots in the small rooms of what had been a family house until it became more lucrative to turn many houses in the Chicken Bazaar section into hotels.

"How much you shootin'?" the narcotics agent asked a morphine addict from California whom he had just shaken awake.

"Five tabs a day," the young man replied as he filled his back pack with the things he was taking to one of the world's worst prisons.

"Will you get sick when you have to get off it in jail?"

"Oh yeah, i'll get sick," he replied in a polite conversational tone.

"When's the last time you shot up?"

"This morning. By 5 or 6 i'll be sick."

The first entry in Melanie's diary reads:

s
t
r out. Perhaps i
a just want to
i rest my soul.
E i'd rather go
h east e a s t
t E A S T.
n

year, though less than in the past.

He said that "cocktails" made up of narcotic mixtures were appearing more and more and added that cannabis-oil injections were posing a new danger to users.

Dr. Sten Martens, director of United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs, also based here, said that drug use was spreading geographically, and that while Eastern European countries were aware of the danger, "no country, no social system is safe."

Dr. Martens said that China had "effectively remedied" the opium problem within its borders and that he knew of no opium export traffic ever having been organized there.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 November 1972

World Drug Use Seen Rising Despite Government Drives

GENEVA, Nov. 11 (Agence France-Presse) — World drug use is increasing especially the use of cocaine, heroin and cannabis oil, although governments are intensifying their cooperation to stop narcotics traffic, according to the head of the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board.

The board is holding its 11th session here.

The board's president, Sir Harry Greenfield, said here yesterday that cocaine from South America was once again being used in the United States and Western Europe and that heroin use had increased again this

NEW YORK TIMES
18 November 1972

Afghans Look Other Way As Drug Outflow Expands

By HENRY KAMM
Special to The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan, Nov. 13—Steady streams of opium and hashish flow over the unpatrolled and porous borders of this landlocked kingdom and through its two airports, aided by a largely indifferent Government and many of its officials and employees.

Most of the opium—about 100 tons a year—crosses the forbidding mountainous border into Iran, carried by camel or donkey caravans guarded by heavily armed nomad tribesmen. No evidence has been turned up to show significant quantities of Afghan opium reaching Europe or America.

However, qualified American sources estimate at one to two tons a month the amount of Afghan hashish—the best and most plentiful—reaching Western Europe, the United States and Canada, with a third going to the United States.

American officials fear that the growing cleverness of the hashish smugglers, combined with the possibility that Turkey's ban on the cultivation of opium poppies will cause an eventual shortage of heroin for the lucrative American addict market, will tempt the hashish traffickers to move Afghan opium to the United States.

"By interfering with the hashish traffic now, we will help to close an opium route to the United States," said the American Ambassador, Robert G. Neumann, in an interview.

The United States receives only minimal cooperation from the Afghan Government. Although Mr. Neumann praised what he called a change in attitude from minimal interest in the narcotics problem to greater concern, it appears evident that Afghanistan has made no significant attempt to curtail the outflow of opium and hashish.

Qualified official sources, Americans as well as experts from other nations, are convinced that Afghans in positions of power, reaching into the family of King Mohammed Zahir Shah and members of his court, are engaged in the narcotics traffic or tolerating and protecting it, out of financial or political gain.

"In a country where it requires a Cabinet minister's approval to spend \$5 of Government money," one of the experts said, "it is inconceivable that so large a traffic could be going on for so many years without its being tolerated at the top."

Few seizures are made independently by the Afghan authorities, the sources asserted, unless they are directed against

operators who have bypassed normal trade channels to avoid paying customary bribes to certain officials. After such seizures the traffickers quickly resume their established payoffs.

U. S. Agents Frustrated

The two agents of the United States Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs assigned to the embassy initiate many investigations and provide much intelligence—although indications are that not all intelligence is shared with Afghan officials for fear it would tip off the traffickers—but their attempts to bring offenders to justice are usually frustrated.

Last summer, for example, an American agent arranged a raid by the Kabul police on a luxurious home where Americans were operating a distillery for liquefied, highly concentrated hashish. Twenty-five gallons, worth perhaps \$6-million when broken down for sale on the streets in the United States, were seized.

Two of the Americans were captured; three or four others known to have been involved, were not there and escaped. The two, who gave their names as Jacob Black and Saul Walters, were jailed by the Afghan authorities. Shortly thereafter they escaped in return for a \$3,000 bribe to an official.

Their organization, part of Dr. Timothy Leary's Brotherhood of Eternal Love, supplied them with new passports as false as those they had when they were arrested, and they went to Hawaii.

The sources said that the hashish for the distillery had been supplied by a leading politician who has long been engaged in the smuggling of opium to Iran.

Dramatic Growth Reflected

Another source of supply to the brotherhood has been identified by United States agents as Hayatullah Tokhi, an Afghan. According to the agents, Mr. Tokhi's rise to great wealth from small-time peddling in his native town of Kandahar is indicative of the dramatic growth of the hashish traffic.

A few years ago Mr. Tokhi graduated to the purchase of a hotel for young transients in Kandahar. Soon thereafter, the American agents say, he installed a garage next to it, which made it possible to drive Volkswagen campers, a favorite vehicle of Western smugglers, into the garage. In one operation "traps"—secret compartments—were installed and filled with hashish.

Mr. Tokhi's American associates are known to have invited him to the United States and

entertained him lavishly, including a visit to Disneyland.

About 20 to 30 big hashish operators have been identified by the experts here. They have come a long way from the world-traveling hippies who discovered Afghan hash about a decade ago, although some are known to have begun that way.

"People sometimes pretend to turn their backs on Western materialism," Ambassador Neumann said. "Their concern is something I regard with suitable cynicism."

And Then the Payment

The operators—American, West German, Canadian, British and Italian—usually station one of their associates here, to handle the buying, payoffs to officials and arrangements for shipment. Another member arrives when all is set, takes up residence at the fashionable Inter-Continental Hotel and makes payment.

The Kabul airport and, to a lesser extent, that at Kandahar, are the largest leaks through which hashish flows. Ranking airport and customs officials have been implicated in smuggling by foreign experts but remain in their positions.

The hashish, usually listed as drugs or antiques, is flown to destinations in Europe. A favorite method is to station a member of the gang in such a transshipping center as Frankfurt, a port of call for Ariana, the Afghan airline. He arranges for immediate forwarding to an American destination without clearance through West German customs, so the hashish arrives in the United States with a German waybill, which arouses less suspicion than cargo openly originating in Afghanistan.

Airline employees are favorite contacts for smugglers, and a large number of hashish operators are former airline employees. Recently a \$50-a-month Ariana steward, dismissed on suspicion of involvement in smuggling, met his death here when he crashed his expensive new Mercedes-Benz into a truck.

Unlike opium smugglers, who tend to conform to the popular image of the gangster, hashish traffickers appear to be a new breed—younger, more educated and of middle-class origin.

Some Deal on Their Own

In addition to large-scale shipments by air or road, sizable quantities of Afghan hashish are carried out by individuals acting on their own or as couriers. The dark-brown malleable drug has been sewn into the linings of clothing or shaped into inner soles and stuffed into hollowed antiques or the false bottoms of

suitcases.

Since the development of liquid hashish, worth \$300 an ounce to American wholesalers, couriers have taken to swallowing rubber containers filled with the substance, to be recovered after nonstop trips to the United States.

The rewards of smuggling are great. A 100-pound shipment, including purchase price, bribes and courier fees, is estimated to cost an average of \$10,000; its wholesale value in New York or Montreal is about \$90,000.

Diplomatic sources, as well as the rare impartial Afghan observer, believe that all forms of smuggling and corruption are so deeply imbedded into the way of life of this country, one of the world's most backward, that little will change unless the Afghans reach a higher level of development. Few believe that this is near.

The farmers who raise opium poppies—many are switching to hashish, which brings them a higher return per acre—have no other cash crop that they can take to market in a country that has almost no roads except the major highways built by the United States or the Soviet Union.

Law enforcement is entrusted to a police force whose officers generally owe their jobs to family connections that they must protect and whose ordinary policemen are made up of the lowest 10 per cent of military conscripts.

Police literacy is estimated at 2 per cent and the pay of an ordinary policeman at 80 cents a month. No pistols, badges or identification cars are issued lest they be sold.

Although West Germany has maintained a police advisory mission here for 12 years and has trained 140 officers in German academies, well-placed sources say, unjokingly, that the mission has succeeded mainly in creating the most highly organized criminal element in Afghanistan.

Afghan officials are suspected of carrying sizable quantities of hashish on their official trips abroad. A ranking member of the national Olympic body is known to have secreted almost 100 pounds in the equipment bags of the wrestling team that went to Munich last summer.

King Mohammed Zahir Shah is believed to be incapable of acting against the pervasive corruption that surrounds him because his power is weak in a country with no developed sense of nationhood, in which his survival is largely dependent on his success in balancing strongly independent-minded tribes and clans.

18 November 1972

BIG HEROIN RINGS SMASHED BY U.S. LEADERS INDICTED

By MORRIS KAPLAN

The reputed leaders of two international heroin-smuggling rings were indicted yesterday on charges of conspiring to smuggle more than 1,100 pounds of heroin, valued at \$250-million, into the United States between January, 1968, and April, 1971.

Flown from Brazil at the request of the Justice Department, the two were held in record bail of \$2.5-million as Federal prosecutors said the suspects were responsible for channeling massive quantities of the drug into the country.

Two separate indictments unsealed before Chief Judge Jacob Mishler in Federal District Court in Brooklyn named 20 suspects—six Frenchmen, four Americans, three Swiss, two Argentines, two Italians and three "John Does."

Ringleaders Named

The Federal authorities identified the ringleaders as Christian David, a 41-year-old French citizen living in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and Michel Nicoli, 42, another Frenchman taken into custody by the Brazilian police at Washington's request.

Although each had separate sources of supply, they frequently joined in heroin operations based in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, according to Robert A. Morse, United States Attorney for the Eastern District.

The heroin originated in the poppy fields of Turkey, was processed in Marseilles and was shipped to South America. Customs agents and agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, together with specialists of the Brooklyn Strike Force Against Organized Crime, seized 26 kilograms of heroin, but at least 474 kilograms found their way into the retail market. Half of it was sold in New York City, narcotics agents said.

Arrested 3 Weeks Ago

Judge Mishler fixed the record-high bail on both David and Nicoli on the basis of an affidavit by Thomas P. Puccio, an assistant United States Attorney who coordinated the prosecution.

He reported that both had been arrested three weeks ago at the request of the United States Government by the no-

20 November 1972

On hijacking

By Erwin D. Canham

My job requires a lot of flying. I have not been hijacked. But I am frequently disconcerted by the lack of scrutiny which still prevails on many flights.

During the last two days, for example, I have had to make four flights. On two of them there was not the slightest effort to send passengers through an electronic metal-detecting device, or to search them or their luggage in any way.

On other flights, perhaps more than 50 percent of the time lately, there has been rather careful screening. But the overall system is haphazard and inconsistent. I suppose the airlines set up screening where they and the various police authorities are able to provide personnel. Otherwise—well, board the plane anyway.

Diligent search

Curiously, the most careful screening my wife and I encountered was nine months ago when we took an Air Algerie flight from Paris to Algiers. You would have thought that to be just about the last plane in the world to be hijacked. But police authorities at Orly airport, including a matron, gave us diligent search. My wife's lipstick in her handbag was screwed up to see if it contained anything dangerous, and her can of hair spray was flizzed to see if it was real. Of course our bags were carefully searched, and our persons frisked. Nobody else, in scores of flights

since, has gone over us so thoroughly.

In this age of violence and crime, air piracy has turned out to be terribly tempting. Until the deep-seated conditions which have brought about this state are remedied, emergency measures will be needed. Thus I am sure the airlines and the government will have to take more seriously the search process.

It is also my conviction that the utmost confidence should be placed in the pilots of aircraft involved in such emergencies. These men, and also the stewardesses involved, have behaved with enormous courage and good sense. No forceful action should be undertaken without their approval.

Media involved

If there is responsibility on the government and on the airlines, it weighs also on the news media. Of course we have to tell the public the essential facts of what is going on. Some details, if we know them, can be withheld during an emergency. For example, if a reporter learns of the terms of a negotiation in process, by listening to radio interchanges, and if his disclosure might harm the undertaking, he has every right and duty to hold back until no harm will be done.

But the worst danger, obviously, is to implant the idea of hijacking in an unbalanced mind. Criminals don't have to be told; they know already. Many of the

Let's
think

hijackers, so far, have been unbalanced in some way or other. Perhaps the media can help to convince them that hijacking rarely succeeds. In very few proven cases—perhaps none—have hijackers got away with their loot. Many of the hijackers are now serving time. The notoriety they gain, and this may well be a prime motive for weakened minds, is overpowered by punishment.

Discussion urged

The actions of the Cuban Government in arresting hijackers, usually returning the ransom money, and seeking discussions of a hijacking agreement, are very responsible. The United States should welcome such a discussion, complicated as it may be by the presence of so many Cuban refugees and resources in the United States.

Air transport has made fantastic progress. It stands astride the world like a colossus, having subordinated all other forms of long-range transport. It has telescoped the world. Its openness and convenience have been among its great strengths, along with its steadily increasing factors of safety. These gains are now endangered by criminal action: sometimes mad, sometimes political. As with all crime, the best ultimate answer is to get at the causes. Meantime, precautionary measures can be made a whole lot better. They will be worth the cost.

lice in Bahia, Brazil. They arrived at 6:20 A.M. yesterday at Kennedy International Airport in the custody of five Brazilian policemen.

David, he said, had been sought for the last six years for the murder of a French police commissioner who was shot to death Feb. 2, 1966. David was sentenced to death in absentia. His criminal record includes 21 convictions.

He was taken to a hospital following Mr. Puccio's disclosure that the haggard suspect had swallowed a piece of metal in his cell in Brazil Thursday. Authorities accounted for the bandages on both his wrists, saying he had previously broken a light bulb and cut the wrists. He also reportedly swallowed pieces of broken glass.

"I have been tortured for 30 days, and I am not about to say anything without a lawyer," he said through a French interpreter. "I have no money,

they took everything."

David was said to have been personally responsible for the importation of 103 kilograms of heroin here.

Jumped \$50,000 Bail

Testimony before a grand jury indicated that Nicoli was wanted in France for armed robbery for which he had been sentenced to 20 years in prison. On March 21, 1968, he was arrested on a narcotics indictment in Brooklyn under the name of Abraham E. Goldman, also known as Miguel Dos Santos. He jumped the \$50,000 bail he had posted shortly afterward.

Another defendant, who is still a fugitive, Louis Bonsignour, 48, a French citizen, forfeited \$50,000 bail in connection with an indictment filed against him in the Southern District during 1968.

Narcotics and customs agents have been charting the activities of the ring here, in Washington and Miami, as well as in Europe and South America for

about five years. The investigation was stepped up within the last year after Federal agents obtained the cooperation of a number of alleged co-conspirators who were not named as defendants.

Characteristically, the rings were comprised of Europeans and South Americans operating from France, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela and the United States—mostly New York and Miami.

Variously Shipped

The heroin was shipped in hidden compartments in commercial aircraft, in expensive European automobiles, in fish cans, in valises and taped to the bodies of couriers.

Banks in Switzerland and Brussels were allegedly used to conceal assets and facilitate the transfer of funds.

Mr. Morse said the indictments were rooted in the 1967 arrest of a man named Ange Lucarotti, who was seized with five kilograms of heroin at Ken-

nedy International Airport. In August, 1970, he said, more information about the expanding heroin business was gathered, leading to the arrest of Argentinian-born Luis Stepenberg, Jack Grosby and Eduardo Poeta.

Stepenberg who was 44, died in his cell at the Federal House of Detention here in March last year of pneumonia after having been convicted on 15 counts of narcotics violations. Poeta, a co-conspirator, was sentenced to 40 years in prison and fined \$300,000. Grosby is awaiting trial.

All three were named in one of yesterday's indictments as co-conspirators but not as defendants, along with James Cohen, Felix Martinez, Willie Wouters, Daniel Mitnik, Christian Hysoion and Florencio Gonzalez.

Named in the indictment with David were Mario Deniz, 39, a Frenchman living in Brussels; Joannes Munoz, 40, of Boulogne, France; William Perrin, 41, in French custody; James Christian, 41, an American citizen in New York State custody, and Marcello Isaac Delgado, 46, an American citizen in custody in New Jersey.

Carlos Rojas Colombo, 47, an Argentinian, and Paul Navarro, 39, an American citizen, are

both serving prison terms in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary.

Listed as fugitives were Carlos Aparicio, 30, an Argentinian and André Hirsch, 64; Louis Brique, 46, and Daniel Vuille Dit Bille, 42, all of Switzerland. Also, Domingo Padron, 61, of New York and Louis Bonsignour, 48.

Indicted with Nicoli were Carlo Zippo, 46, an Italian citizen who lived here at the Woodstock Hotel and is a fugitive, and Guglielmo Casalini, 48, an Italian citizen living in Brazil.

Conviction on each count carries a mandatory five-year term and up to 20 years in prison and a \$20,000 fine.

Frank Monastero, associate regional director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, estimated that the two rings supplied about 10 per cent of the world's heroin market. He reported that heroin prices had risen 25 per cent recently because of a shortage on the Eastern Seaboard. This has been accompanied, he said, by a sharp decrease of pure heroin in drug pushers' packets.

The "nickle bags" now contain only about 2 per cent heroin, instead of the customary 6 to 10 per cent, he reported. He estimated the number of heroin users in the country at between 350,000

and 559,000, half of whom live in the metropolitan area, he said.

The Brazilian Government also expelled a third Frenchman, accused in Federal District Court in Manhattan of having run a heroin-smuggling ring. He arrived on the plane with David and Nicoli.

He was identified as Claude Pastou, accused of importing narcotics from Europe through Canada, and he was indicted on May 18, 1971. Co-defendants in the indictment were Jean Francois Marazzini and Paul R. Pasqualini, identified as managers of taverns in Madrid, Spain.

F.B.I. Asked for 3

Special to The New York Times

RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 17—

Three Frenchmen expelled from Brazil on charges of drug traffic connections were sent to the United States rather than France at the request of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation, a spokesman for the Brazilian federal police said tonight.

The spokesman in Brasilia said that the United States had made no formal extradition request for Christian David, Michel Nicole and Claude Pastou, but expressed interest in receiving them. Clearance for their entry to the United States was granted to the Brazilian

police.

The decision to send the three to the United States after their expulsion was ordered was made by Minister of Justice Alfredo Buzaid acting on information supplied by the Brazilian federal police, it was explained.

The expulsion order was signed by President Emilio Garrastazu Médici. Brazilian police escorted the three on a Pan-American Airways flight that left Rio de Janeiro late last night.

An official of the French consulate said that it had not been informed. He believed it was usual for expelled foreigners to be sent to their country of origin.

Three more Frenchmen who were ordered expelled will be sent to France, where they are wanted, within the next 20 days, it was expected. They are Christian Bernard Javet, Robert Bourdoulous and François Antoine Canazzil.

Tomaso Buschetta, born in Sicily, will be sent to Italy, where he is wanted on 10 murder counts.

Minister Buzaid explained that the Brazilian Government decided to expel the seven foreigners because it involved a simple legal procedure. He explained that extradition proceedings would take more time.

WASHINGTON POST
15 November 1972

Victor Zorza

Ultimate Threat: Nuclear Skyjack

THE LATEST THREAT by hijackers, to send their airliner crashing into the Oak Ridge nuclear plant, has made some of the worst forebodings expressed at the time of the Munich Olympic killings come true only too quickly. The hijackers were acting out a nightmare scenario that sends shivers down the spines of security officials.

From Oak Ridge they flew to the vicinity of Key Biscayne and demanded to speak by radio to President Nixon, but this time, when he would not oblige, they flew on to Cuba. The black-maller's inexorable logic marches on, while the speedy international action, urged at the time of Munich as the only way to arrest the chilling progression of threats, lags far behind. His target grows bigger all the time because, like Mt. Everest, it is there.

In the meantime the United States and the Soviet Union, whose joint action could set an example to the smaller nations, and whose

power could nudge some of the recalcitrants, continue to squabble in the foothills. The Soviet Union was the only major power which voted against sanctions at the post-Munich meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Nor is the United States blameless. It demands that Cuba should act against American hijackers, but rejects Castro's demand for comparable action against Cubans who hijack ships to sail them to Florida. It may take more than two to make an international agreement—but two is the minimum.

THE COMMUNIST governments put more trust in their police than in international agreements. But the Soviet Union has both airlines and nuclear plants. It is subject to the same social pressures as other technologically advanced countries.

The death sentences it has meted out to hijackers have not proved a foolproof deterrent. The shots fired at Soviet leaders during a parade for Soviet spacemen by a man who was later put away as "deranged" show that the human explosive is there. All it needs is a spark.

Nuclear explosives need more than that, to set them off, but the danger that they might get into the wrong hands is causing growing concern among scientists. Press discussion of this threat after the Munich killings was promptly echoed at the Pugwash meeting of leading scientists from East and West. Nuclear plants, said Pugwash Secretary-General Prof. Joseph Rotblat, could become targets for saboteurs, criminals, or political fanatics. "Then," he said, "they can hold the world to ransom."

But the Russians remain unimpressed. One danger is that the proliferation of civil nuclear power will make it much easier for a group of terrorists to build a crude atom bomb. At the Pugwash meeting, American scientists argued that a Mafia-type organization could develop its own atomic capability.

But the former head of the Soviet nuclear program pooh-poohed the idea. After all, he said, he had built nuclear bombs, and he knew just how difficult it was.

The U.S. Atomic Energy

Commission also maintains a calm public front, but is taking elaborate measures to avert trouble. Its own officials privately acknowledge that the AEC's open publications contain virtually all the information that a bomb-bulldozer would need.

An investigator commissioned by the AEC to make a study of the problem pointed out that the Mafia controlled a number of trucking firms, drivers, union officials, and that it could "easily" get hold of nuclear materials, which it could supply to "some foreign tyrant."

A study made for the Pentagon came to equally gloomy conclusions. Sabotage of the electricity supply, when much of it comes to depend on nuclear power, is another threat that is already causing concern.

The threat, starting with hijacking and ending with nuclear terrorism, with a whole range of threats in between, is truly international. But at the rate things are going, the threats will continue to escalate while international action remains frozen. It is so easy to be a prophet of doom.

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Sunday, Nov. 26, 1972

THE WASHINGTON POST

Energy-Starved U.S. Seeks Sustenance

First of a Series

By Thomas O'Toole

Washington Post Staff Writer

Economists say it's due to an unchecked rise in consumption, while sociologists put the blame on too many people using too much electricity and driving too many automobiles.

Businessmen blame the ecologists who want to turn their backs on technology and revitalize the land, whereas conservationists believe it's rooted in business irresponsibilities like the Santa Barbara oil spill, the sulphurizing of our cities' air and the mass misuse of the countryside.

The truth is that it has been brought on by all of these things, and that because they came without warning or outcry the United States is in the throes of what is commonly called the energy crisis.

"It all reflects the higher aspirations of America and it's all come together at the same time," said James R. Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. "That's why it's a crisis."

In a sense, the bind we are in is less an energy crisis than a fuels crisis. We can't burn coal because it's too dirty, we can't turn to gas because there's not enough of it, and while we can burn oil we have to import it and pay a stiff price to clean it up too.

Whichever name we give it, the crisis is probably the biggest long-term problem we have. So serious is the energy dilemma that the Republicans never brought it up and the Democrats never pressed them on it during the recent campaign, either because there are no immediate answers to our energy problems or because the answers are politically unacceptable.

Pessimists think the crisis has no solution, while optimists believe that it can be solved only by raising prices on oil, gas and electricity, by doubling or even tripling our imports of oil and gas, by embarking on the largest domestic financing plan in U.S. history and facing up to an endless string of unhappy compromises about the environment.

What got us into such a fix? Why and how did a fuels crisis strike the world's richest country so quickly?

It began back in the late fifties, a kind of classic domino effect. Nuclear energy was being over-promoted by the AEC and oversold by an infant industry. Their enthusiasm forced a recession on the coal industry that persists today. Not a single new underground coal mine of any importance has been opened in the United States in the last 10 years.

When coal began to slip, the natural gas industry moved into coal's markets, underselling coal to industry and electric power companies. One result of that move is that the cleanest fuel we have is now the most scarce. Geologists figure that when Columbus landed in America there were 1,760 trillion cubic feet of gas in the ground, which at present consumption rates will be drained by 1988.

Even before this happened, an insatiable appetite for energy was building

up. The U.S. population has doubled in the last 50 years, while energy use has grown almost four times, largely because of the automobile. Per capita electricity consumption doubled five times in that period, twice in the last 15 years.

"The last doubling is always the one that breaks the camel's back," said one-time Federal Power Commissioner John O'Leary, "and this is the one that's done it to us."

Ironically, the straw that really broke the camel's back is what O'Leary calls the "environmental crunch," a nationwide movement against polluted air and water so unforeseen that one of the nation's leading futurists wrote a book five years ago that barely mentioned the environment.

The environmental movement hit the energy industries like a blitzkrieg. It brought a halt to the Plowshare program to release trapped oil and gas by nuclear explosions, delayed the Alaska pipeline and forced a near-moratorium on dam building in the United States.

Ecologists forced power companies to abandon scenic river and lake sites in more than 10 states and have caused more than 20 delays in the construction of nuclear power plants. The Hudson Institute's Herman Kahn has said that the electric power industry has failed to win an environmental court case anywhere in the United States in the last seven years ever since conservationists blocked Consolidated Edison Co.'s attempt to put a pumped storage plant into scenic Storm King on the Hudson River.

Disagreement runs rampant over the changes wrought by the environmental movement. The AEC's Dr. Schlesinger believes the environmentalists focused the country's attention on the fuels crisis, while O'Leary (now with the AEC) and others think the ecologists have gone too far.

"My own view is . . . that we're seeing an analogue to the overtaking of the civil rights movement by the extremists several years ago," O'Leary said. "This extremism could create a very sharp reaction, if it causes a real energy shortage."

Despite their disruptive ways, ecologists have caused no shortage of energy in the United States so far. It is true they forced electric power companies in more than 30 U.S. cities to abandon coal for low-sulfur oil, but there is no shortage yet of plants to take the sulfur out of oil. Besides, public health authorities welcomed the change from coal, which pumped nine million tons of sulfur oxides into the air as recently as 1970.

Vast Waste of Energy

Other changes in our energy ways would be just as welcome, such as a halt to energy waste. By one estimate, the United States wastes 25 per cent of the energy it produces. In effect, 205 million Americans squander as much energy as 105 million Japanese consume.

Today's standard American car goes only 12 miles on a gallon of gasoline, not as far as it went 50 years ago. The

nation's 100 million cars are run by engines that average 175 horsepower, twice the size of European auto engines and with twice their fuel consumption.

"Nothing drives me wilder than the guy driving his 250 horsepower Cadillac to the oil spill protest," is the way it's put by former White House Energy Adviser S. David Freeman, now director of the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project. "Every time he turns his ignition key, that guy spills oil on somebody's beach."

Heating American homes and buildings is no less wasteful than driving American cars.

Boom in Electric Heating

Six per cent (96 million kilowatts) of all the electricity produced in the United States in 1970 was used to heat homes, despite the fact that electric heat is half as productive as oil or gas heat. The reason is that electric heat leaves 70 per cent of its energy in the fuel that was burned to generate the electricity.

No matter how wasteful it is, electric heat is a growing trend in the United States partly because it's clean, partly because of heavy promotion by electric utilities, partly because it's cheap to install and partly because it creates more living space by eliminating ducts.

Whatever the reasons, 23 per cent of the 40,000 buildings (5,400 of them office buildings) that went up in the United States in 1969 were equipped with electric heat. The Potomac Electric Power Co. (PEPCO) estimates that half the new office buildings constructed in the Washington area in the last five years were "all-electric" buildings.

More than likely, they were also high-rise buildings with glass sides, which let the heat out in the winter and in during the summer. One of the worst examples of the high-rise energy waster is New York City's World Trade Center, which needs 80,000 kilowatts for heating, lighting and cooling. That's more than what is required for the entire upstate city of Schenectady and its 100,000 residents.

Critics contend that there is energy waste because there is no energy policy, no single federal agency riding herd on energy supply, demand, use and consumption.

Consider the set-up: The Interior Department looks after oil and coal, the Atomic Energy Commission watches over uranium and the Federal Power Commission licenses the use of water power and regulates the price of natural gas.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness keeps an eye on (but has no power over) fuels used for the White House, the same thing the Office of Science and Technology does more or less for the same boss. Sixty-one federal agencies have something to say about energy, which says something about federal direction of energy policy.

It is this scattered authority that must come to grips with some real questions brought on by the energy

crisis.

Should there be a price increase for oil and gas? If so, how much? Do we start importing Middle Eastern oil into the United States? If we do, must we subsidize construction of a supertanker fleet to bring in the oil? How much of the Gulf of Mexico do we open up to oil and gas exploration? Should we permit offshore drilling in the Atlantic Ocean?

Our fuels crisis may be so critical that all these questions will be academic. Start with prices. U.S. oil companies want a price increase of at least 50 cents a barrel, justifying it with higher costs of finding oil and drilling for it. Gas producers say they need a doubling of price, claiming that the 40 cents per thousand cubic feet they get today is so low they can't afford the luxury of looking for new gas.

Oil men fully expect their 50 cent raise by February and already are talking about \$6 a barrel (it costs \$4.50 today) for domestic oil by 1975. Gas men are even more hopeful and openly speak about a tripling and even a quadrupling of gas prices in the next three years.

Why are they so sure of themselves? Because of the energy crisis, which has left us with an unchecked demand for all forms of energy, a growing scarcity of domestic gas and a dwindling supply of domestic oil.

Go next to imports. The United States today brings in a trickle of Algerian gas, a trickle of Libyan gas, a trickle of Libyan oil and a trickle of Iranian oil. The reasons are simple. Canadian and Venezuelan oil are closer, and United States has either distrusted or been outright hostile to the Arab suppliers.

Times change. Canada and Venezuela refuse to raise their exports, it gets harder, more expensive and in some cases (like the Santa Barbara channel) impossible to produce more domestic oil at the same time that demand for oil goes right on rising.

The arguments against importing oil from the Middle East are legion. It's too far away. It will hurt U.S. relations with Israel. It will give the Arabs a huge cache of dollars. The Arabs are unreliable suppliers.

The answer heard most often to the last argument is that the Arabs are reliable suppliers, with a few maverick exceptions. Arab oil is also cheap oil, meaning that distance doesn't mean that much.

It is true the Arabs will be swimming in dollars, so the rest of it goes, but we'll get the dollars back selling them American technology for the pipelines, the refineries, the petrochemical plants they'll build. Besides, 76 per cent of the world's recoverable oil is in the Middle East. There is nowhere else to go, which makes it more urgent than ever to negotiate an Arab-Israeli peace.

Once the United States reaches this conclusion (and it already has in most high places), the question of ship subsidies also turns academic. Indeed, the Maritime Administration already has agreed to subsidies for six tankers to carry liquefied natural gas from Algeria to the United States, an agreement that most energy observers see as the forerunner to even bigger oil tanker subsidies.

Harder questions than these lie ahead. One of the toughest is whether to enforce controls to slow down or even reverse the growth in demand for gas, oil and electricity.

Some economists believe that a rising tide of prices will serve the same purpose as end-use controls, that demand will slacken when natural gas rates double, when gasoline goes to 50 cents a gallon and when electricity costs twice what it does today. Harvard University Economist A. E. Halvorson says he has studied this price-demand relationship and claims that every time you raise the price of power one per cent, the use of that power declines by 1.7 per cent.

Most economists disagree. They claim that energy is still so cheap that even a doubling in price will have no impact on usage. Experience tends to support this view, as in the case of an office manager in Los Angeles who kept the building lights burning all night because it was cheaper than installing switches to turn them off.

"We don't have an automobile crisis because they're raising car prices. We don't have a clothing crisis because they raise the price of clothes," said Irwin Stelzer, president of National Economic Research Associates. "All higher prices will mean is we'll pay more for fuel, maybe buy a Volkswagen if gas goes to 80 cents a gallon."

Beyond the question of controls, some of the hardest questions facing the nation are those dealing with offshore gas and oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Continental Shelf adjacent to the Eastern Seaboard.

Untapped oil and gas deposits lie off both coasts though nobody knows how much. The meat of this question is whether the risk of oil spills is worth drilling just out of sight of our scenic beaches from Maine to Florida.

Oil men say Yes, the environmentalists say No, and the battle that lies ahead serves to spotlight what may long be remembered as the most harmful fallout of the energy crisis.

Oil will be spilled, pipelines will break, coal will be strip-mined, refineries will despoil the land and burning fuels will continue to pollute the air. The United States needs one billion kilowatts of new power in the next 20 years, which means 400 new power plants taking up more than one million acres of land and water.

It also means that the 300,000 miles of overhead lines that today cover an area larger than Connecticut will take over new land the size of New Jersey, providing they use existing transmission corridors. An inescapable fact of the energy crisis is that the drilling, the mining, the burning and the shipping of energy cause an estimated 70 per cent of the environmental anguish suffered in the United States today.

Sharply Opposed Objectives

Will there be war between the environmentalists and the energy suppliers? Unhappily, the two groups seem light years apart these days. Environmental groups have made "zero

growth" their energy goal, while the energy industry seems more determined than ever to steamroller the opposition.

There is also mounting evidence that industrialists no longer fear the environmentalists the way they did three years ago when the movement was at its peak.

"I think the political acceptability of environmentalism is based on the fact that it hasn't hurt anybody yet," said NERA's Irwin Stelzer. "Once it starts costing jobs or interfering with lifestyles, I think it will lose its viability."

One bright ray of hope about all this is that energy experts don't think the fuels crisis will last forever. Many believe that technology will bail us out by letting us tap new, clean fuels and by cleaning up existing fuels.

Next Decade Held Critical

"The next 10 years are the critical, tough years," said Charles Zraknet, senior vice president of the Mitre Corp., which has just done an exhaustive energy study. "We believe the physical resources and technical options exist to get us out of this crisis in 10 years."

Energy experts worry not that the world will run out of fuels but that technology will help us produce an endless variety of fuels that never exhaust themselves.

Worry like this triggers a whole new concern about the earth and its inhabitants. What if the developing nations develop? What if the emerging nations emerge? They go to an energy economy, and no matter how clean the fuels they use, all will release heat.

Even now, the island of Manhattan gets two and one-half times as much heat from the fuels it burns than it does from the winter sun. Scientists speculate that in 100 years the entire United States will turn out as much heat from energy as it gets from the sun the year around.

Population Boom Predicted

The Hudson Institute's Herman Kahn believes that the growing dependence that nations have on each other for energy will eliminate war. Once that happens, he speculates, the world's population will boom and reach a total of 20 billion by the year 2100.

If that size a world population is tied to an energy economy, the earth will be putting out enough carbon dioxide to trigger a small "greenhouse" effect, where the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere serves to trap the earth's heat.

By 2100, the earth will have enough trapped heat to unfreeze the Arctic Ocean and cause some melting of the polar ice caps.

"The implications of such a transition cannot be said to spell disaster for mankind," said William W. Kellogg of the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo., "but they are very grave for some regions of the earth."

Washington Post

27 Nov. 1972

Domestic Oil Gap Expected to Grow

Mobile Society, Antipollution Efforts Boost Consumption

By Thomas O'Toole

Washington Post Staff Writer

"We feel this to be an historic occasion. Damned historic, and a sad one. Texas oil fields have been like a reliable old warrior that could rise to the task when needed. That old warrior can't rise anymore."

—Byron Tunnell,
Chairman, Texas Railroad Commission.

The date was last March 19, the occasion the announcement that the wells pumping the oil out of Texas would be allowed to run at 100 per cent capacity for the first time in 24 years.

The reason for going to what oilmen call the "maximum allowable" was sadder and more historic than the occasion. Texas oil wells ran at 100 per cent in 1948 to replenish the inventories drained by the demands of World War II. They're running at 100 per cent today because that's the only way Texas can keep up with national demands.

There are no more potent reasons for the energy crisis in the United States than our mushrooming wants for oil and our inability to satisfy those wants with a domestic product. American oil wells produce almost 10 million barrels of oil every day, which is one-fourth what the world produces. The trouble is that it's only two-thirds of what America needs.

The United States consumes one third of the earth's oil production, a trend that's likely to be followed for years to come. A big reason is the growing national concern about air pollution that has all but eliminated coal as a fuel for electric power east of the Mississippi. Ninety six per cent of

Europe and Japan are enduring the same heated demand for oil. Europe has turned to oil because it's begun to run out of coal, while both Europe and Japan need oil for growing automobile, shipping and airline fleets.

Europe already imports nine million barrels a day from the Middle East, and is likely to import 20 million barrels a day by 1980. A major concern in Europe today is that when the United States enters the Middle Eastern oil market (sometime next year) it will drive oil prices up to \$4 a barrel (from \$3 a barrel today) by 1975 and \$6 a barrel by 1980.

Some energy experts worry about conflicts that might start over who owns offshore rights or even over whether one country has the right to spill oil on another's beaches.

The head-to-head competition for the world's oil could raise the question of an energy ethic for the first time. Do developed nations tied to an oil economy have first rights to the world's oil? Do oil users have any right to pollute the world's oceans with their spills? Whose world is it, after all?

"The Greek attack on Troy was economic, as were the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage," is the way it's put by U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover. "The wars we may not be able to avoid in the future are likely to be the kind of wars they fought in antiquity."

Most energy experts think the reverse might happen, that the growing demands for oil will bring the world closer together. Japan is often cited as a perfect example of this trend, entering as it has into 25-year oil exploration and sales agreements with Canada, Australia, Indonesia and the Soviet Union.

"The Japanese are completely dependent on the rest of the world for their energy, they're learning how to live with it and they're developing a strategy around it," said Charles Zraket, senior vice president of the Mitre Corp., which just completed a year-long study of the worldwide energy situation.

"They realize more than anybody how interdependent the world really is," Zraket went on, "how any tension or warfare in any part of the world is going to hurt them in a first-order way."

There's no longer any doubt that the United States is moving into a somewhat similar position with regard to oil.

Oil production peaked in the United States two years ago, and is now down almost 10 per cent from its peak to about 10 million barrels a day. Alaska's North Slope ought to add 2 million barrels a day by 1980, but by that time the once-rich fields of Texas and

Oklahoma will have been drained enough so that domestic oil production may never again exceed 10 million barrels a day.

What happened? Well, our demand for oil grew without interruption and without being checked. For 50 years, America has pumped its oil into its factories, its cars, its trucks, its tractors, its planes and its ships.

There is no endless supply of oil in the United States. The oil we use in one year took nature 14 million years to create.

At the same time that demand kept booming, our oil fields began to dry up. This is reflected in oil exploration in the United States which has fallen off 40 per cent in the last 14 years. The oil left in the ground in the United States is so deep that it costs more to drill for it than consumers are willing to pay for it.

Then how will the United States manage to make ends meet?

Hopefully, in two ways. The first is by joining the rest of the world in possibly the most massive oil hunt in history, a search expected to cost international oil interests \$240 billion in the next eight years.

Oil companies are looking off the western shelf of Australia, in Indonesia off the coasts of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei, off the coast of South Vietnam, in the Gulf of Thailand, along the Siberian shelf, off the coast of Nigeria and along both coasts of South America.

The biggest hope of American oil companies is in the Canadian Arctic, where geologists believe the same historic conditions prevailed for oil that produced the giant fields below Alaska's North Slope.

Eighteen separate fields have already been found on tiny Sable island southeast of Nova Scotia, and geologists think there are as many as 44 billion barrels of oil trapped under the frozen tundra of Ellesmere, Victoria and Baffin Island.

Offshore exploration is also about to be stepped up right in the United States. The Interior Department has made several recent lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana, and seems sure to make sales closer to Florida Peninsula toward Yucatan.

The big question mark is the Atlantic Coast, where geologists think oil is trapped along the continental shelf from Maine to Florida. Time after time, they mention places like the Cape Fear Arc off the Carolinas and the Baltimore Canyon just outside Delaware and Maryland.

"It might take us 10 years because of environmental opposition to these sites," said one Interior department official not long ago, "but we'd never forgive ourselves if we didn't look for the oil that people think is there."

Even if oil is found along the continental shelf, it will never be enough to satisfy America's economy, whose need for energy doubles every 10 years.

"No matter how much domestic oil we develop you still come up short about 50 per cent," Interior Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton told the House Interior Committee, "and that 50 per cent will have to be made up from imports from other countries."

The only countries that can produce 15 million barrels of oil a day 10 years from now are the countries of the Middle East, where 76 per cent of the world's recoverable oil lies. There are three kinds of "recoverable" oil, the oil close to the surface that just flows out, the oil not too far below the surface

The Energy Crisis—III

East Coast power companies today burn low-sulfur oil to generate electricity.

A bigger reason is the incessant mobility of our on-the-move society. Today, 200 million Americans drive 100 million cars. By the year 2,000, an estimated 300 million Americans are expected to be driving almost 300 million cars.

Jet travel will increase even more rapidly. The Federal Aviation Administration projects for the next 10 years a 25 per cent increase in plane mileage per year, a 35 per cent increase in trip length and a doubling of passenger load per plane.

That adds up to almost three billion gallons of jet fuel being burned by 1982, more than double what the nation's airlines will consume in 1972.

The 15 million barrels of oil that America uses every day are expected to swell to 30 million in the next 10 years. This is a growth rate that can be counted on to stretch the world's oil fields, its tanker fleet, its banks and its patience.

One reason it might tax the world's patience is that the rapid rise in U.S. oil consumption comes at a time when

that must be pumped out and the oil far below the surface that must be forced out.

Most of the oil in the Middle East just flows out. Kuwait alone has a 50-year supply of such oil at present production rates. Iran and Saudi Arabia together have 60 per cent of the world's known total supply.

Not only is Arab oil plentiful, it's cheap. Middle Eastern oil costs 20 cents a barrel to bring to the surface vs \$2 a barrel for U.S. oil.

The United States may begin buying this cheap Middle Eastern oil next year, which, if nothing else, will help to keep something of a lid on oil prices. Congressmen have long charged that the fact that the United States has not imported oil from the Mideast has cost American consumers \$5 billion a year in higher prices paid for American oil.


By 1985, oil observers believe we'll be importing 15 million barrels of Middle Eastern oil every day, which at \$5 a barrel turns out to be \$75 million a day and \$27 billion a year.

U.S. policy planners have two big fears about buying that much oil from the Middle East. The first is that ties with the Arab World will disrupt our relations with Israel. The second is not that the Middle East will prove to be an unreliable supplier, but that Arab countries will use their dollar wealth as an instrument of foreign policy.

By 1980, the Arab World will have as many dollars as the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank and by 1985 it will have tripled the funds of these two banks plus the International Monetary Fund.

"They can very easily accumulate a few hundred billion dollars in 10 years' time and use that reserve to control the market any way they want," one observer said. "They could either shut off our supplies or raise the price to \$6, \$7, \$8, \$10 a barrel if they want it."

The United States is banking on that not happening, and is about to embark on a program to finance construction



of supertankers, superports, pipelines and refineries to handle Middle Eastern oil that could cost as much as one trillion dollars in the next 10 years.

Two things might hold it back. First, the United States is not at all certain that the oil and shipping industries (even with subsidy help from Uncle Sam) can raise that much money.

A more formidable obstacle is the environmental movement, which is today dead-set against plans to build superports along the East Coast, allow supertankers into U.S. ports and permit refineries to sprout up and down our coasts. It's well known that industry favors putting the East Coast refineries around the Chesapeake Bay, a plan that would be greeted with heated opposition by the citizenry.

Finally, there is the possibility that

The Washington Post

oil demand will not grow at the rapid rates that everybody expects, that opposition from environmentalists and shortages of money will slow down the growth rate.

Today, oil consumption doubles every 10 years. This doubling means that in each decade we end up using as much oil as we used in all past history before the start of that decade. Five doublings, or 50 years from now, we will have used 64 times as much oil as the whole world used up to the year 1970.

"Such a growth rate cannot continue," says MIT's Dr. Jay Forrester. "The question is not the possibility of growth forever, the real issue is when and by what process growth will be suppressed."

WASHINGTON STAR
12 November 1972

Red China and Drugs

SIR: Miriam Ottenberg's recent article on the involvement of ethnic Chinese in the heroin traffic skirted carefully the interesting question of Communist China's activity in this field. Miss Ottenberg went no further than to quote a U.S. government official as saying that "there was no intelligence to indicate that Red China has anything to do with it."

Recently the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee took extensive testimony on the world narcotics traffic from General Lewis W. Walt, retired assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, who had been commissioned to make a study for the committee. General Walt told the committee that he had learned that the authorities in Hong Kong deliberately avoid searching Communist Chinese ships and cargo for narcotics. They keep their eyes closed to any traffic that may be taking place, and, therefore, it is not too surprising that intelligence on Red Chinese involvement in the drug traffic is lacking. General Walt made the point that Red China

is in a very good position to move quantities of heroin through Hong Kong and Macao undetected if it wants. He pointed out that increasing numbers of Chinese seamen, many of them based in Hong Kong, are being apprehended in the United States and Britain with heroin. He pointed out that virtually all of the Hong Kong seamen are members of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union, which is controlled by pro-Peking Communists.

General Walt noted that Communist China has never signed the 1961 conventions on drugs and does not report to the UN on opium cultivation. It does not permit any international inspection and it does not participate in any international drug control operations. Evidence dating back to the 1950's and 1960's does indicate Chinese Communist involvement in illegal opium traffic. For example, the report of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs of May 14-June 1, 1962, reported the testimony of three Chinese witnesses on the cultivation of opium in Yunnan Province and its export to Burma.

Silver Spring, Md.

Reed J. Irvine.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Nov. 28, 1972

The Energy Crisis—III

Gas, Oversold, Is Scarce

Sellers Created Huge Market, Now Run Short

"We're using twice as much gas as we find, a trend that's continued for four years and for this year [1972] also. We can't tolerate this much longer."

—John N. Nassekas,
Chairman, Federal Power Commission

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

If we tolerate it another eight years, the United States will have half as much gas in the ground as it has today. If our tolerance extends four more years, we'll be down to one-fourth our current reserves and if we wait until 1988 we won't have any gas in the ground at all.

The U.S. gas supply is still the second largest in the world, but consumption of natural gas in this country has risen so dramatically in the last 15 years that we are suddenly faced with consuming ourselves right out of natural gas.

Time was when natural gas was no more than a stepchild of oil, with which it often is found. For years, the gas coming out of the ground was flared off the tops of the thousands of oil wells that covered Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas and Louisiana.

Two things changed that, the first of which was the large-diameter pipeline that carried gas out of the Southwest during World War II. The second was the ease with which gas flowed and was being found back in the '40s and '50s, which gave the impression that gas was inexhaustible.

A third factor served as much as the other two to trigger today's gas shortage. That was the overselling of gas ("Gas Heats Best") in the late '50s and early '60s, when gas was sold to factories and electric power plants as a boiler fuel in direct competition with coal and oil, even though gas, cheaper and cleaner than either of the other fossil fuels, was better suited to other markets.

So aggressive was the gas industry during this period that they sold gas in Florida and California to heat homes, knowing that neither residential market could support the gas pipelines coming into those states.

"I can't condemn this, it's the way we got our pipelines built," said one veteran of the natural gas business. "The only people who could take the gas then were the guys running the factories."

An ironic footnote to that is the fact that gas is almost sulfur-free, which made it an acceptable utility fuel to environmentalists at the same time that the utilities' use of gas was being denounced by conservationists. Laws banning the burning of coal and high-sulfur oil turned hundreds of power plants to gas just at the time gas was starting to run short.

Whatever the reasons, gas use grew like Topsy in the last two decades, supplying two-thirds of the growth in the country's energy production.

Fully one-third of all the energy used by America today comes from natural gas, which is the sixth largest industry in the country. Twenty-two pipeline companies sell \$9 billion worth

of gas through a \$17 billion pipeline network extending into all of the 48 contiguous states.

The smallest users of gas are those that need it most, the 80 million schools, churches, hospitals and homes that find coal too dirty, oil too expensive and can't afford the furnaces that would let them switch from gas to oil if they had to.

The big gas users are those needing it least, the power companies and factories that together consume 71 per cent of the gas sold in the United States today. These two segments of industry not only burn the lion's share of our gas, they also pay lower prices for what they burn.

Most industry buys gas at what is called an "interruptible" rate, meaning that when pipeline gas runs short in the midst of a cold snap the industry "interruptibles" are the first to be cut off. Industry puts up with interruptions because it saves money the rest of the time and often is able to switch to heating oil to prevent factory shutdowns.

The growing gas shortage has caused interruptions these last three years, some of them sizable. Factories in Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Illinois have been cut off from gas during cold snaps. The state of Washington has interrupted gas deliveries to factories a third of the year during recent winters.

It isn't only factories that have lost their gas. The University of Texas and one-third of the city of Austin were forced off gas last February when the temperature fell below 20 degrees. Brooklyn residents have had their gas curtailed the last two winters, partly because there aren't enough factory customers in Brooklyn to absorb the cutbacks.

"Things would have been worse if we hadn't had relatively mild winters," said S. David Freeman, onetime energy adviser to Presidents Johnson and Nixon. "If we get a few stiff cold spells of 10 days at a stretch this winter, we've got some trouble."

Critics claim that even though many factories buy gas on interruptible terms they are never interrupted. These critics charge that gas suppliers have told the factories that if they're ever forced to switch to oil, the gas companies would pick up the bill.

"A lot of factories in the Midwest have paid an interruptible price for firm delivery," confides a onetime member of the Federal Power Commission. "This gas was sold to keep the pipeline full, but it was gas that should not have been sold. It's only aggravated the gas shortage."

If the gas shortage is serious today, it is going to be critical in the years ahead. New gas customers could not be taken on this year in 21 states. The number turned away is expected to rise next year and again in 1974. The number of states forced to reject new gas customers is also expected to climb.

Demand for natural gas this year was a little more than 22 trillion cubic feet, and no fewer than three different forecasts say we'll easily outstrip that

in the next decade.

The Interior Department forecasts a demand of almost 28 trillion cubic feet by 1975, the Future Requirements Committee of the University of Denver predicts 34 trillion cubic feet and the New York Public Service Commission a high of 36.4 trillion cubic feet for the same year. Interior believes demand will rise to 38.2 trillion cubic feet by 1985, while the Future Requirements Committee estimates 43.6 trillion cubic feet that year and the New York body an astronomical 77.2 trillion cubic feet in 1985.

All three of these forecasts might be fulfilled, but only at the risk of telling many of the 150 million Americans using gas today that they might be shut off from gas forever after that, last forecast comes true.

Fifteen years ago, the United States had proven gas reserves in the ground equal to 21 years production. Reserves are down to less than 12 years production today and by 1975 the anticipated 240 trillion cubic feet of reserves (reserves are 270 trillion cubic feet today) will be less than 10 years production.

The gas industry is not optimistic about its own future. Many gas producers are buying up Western coal lands, where the coal is low in sulfur. One gas transmission company has calculated that it will need 250 million tons of coal for each year that it wants to stay in business after 1980.

Gas reserves are down because gas discoveries are down. The number of gas wells drilled in 1970 fell 53 per cent from 1956 and number of productive wells by almost 50 per cent. The result was less gas found, down to 10 trillion cubic feet in 1970 from almost 20 trillion cubic feet 10 years before that.

The gas industry says there are two reasons for the discovery decline. One is that the depth of wells drilled has risen 25 per cent in the last 10 years, which added more than 50 per cent to drilling costs and discouraged drilling.

The other reason is the historically low price paid for gas, which is set and regulated by the Federal Power Commission. Prices have been allowed to rise in the last 10 years, but the 20 cents a thousand cubic feet charged for wellhead gas today is said by industry not to be enough to encourage the search for new gas.

Natural gas is the only fossil fuel whose price is regulated by the federal government, but the FPC regulates only the pipeline gas that moves from one state to another. It also sets prices only for the gas when it enters the pipeline, not when it arrives at its destination. Finally, the FPC sets different prices for old gas and new gas. It has allowed price rises in new gas, but not in old gas.

The confusion is part of the reason there is pressure on the White House and on Congress to eliminate the regulations on natural gas, a move its supporters say will set off a massive search for the gas so desperately needed.

President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers has recommended "deregulation." So has Gen. George Lincoln, director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and chairman of the White House Oil Policy Committee.

Fortune magazine says that the FPC itself "inclines toward" deregulation, that two of the four present members (Pinckney Walker and Rush Moody) have "publicly declared themselves for it." Fortune argues that ending control of gas prices might relieve the short-

age in two years time, "both by making it profitable to exploit discovered but marginal gas and by curbing the demand of industrial consumers who use gas for 'low value' production because it is so cheap."

More than a few energy experts argue that the ending of controls is neither that simple nor predictable.

"They talk about a doubling and tripling in price after deregulation," former FPC Commissioner John A. Carver said before he left the FPC in June. "Nobody thinks about what kind of chaos that would follow a doubling or tripling in price."

One kind of chaos would be the charges of windfall profits that would hit the gas industry. A price increase of 10 cents per thousand cubic feet on wellhead gas means more than \$2 billion in revenues to gas producers. A doubling would mean at least \$8 billion in increased revenues.

There is also the question of whether the end of controls might upset everyday markets.

"Prices might go too high in certain cases," one industry observer said. "This would put the Midwest bidding against the Northeast, Texas bidding against Louisiana for the gas, and that would be chaotic."

"You're dealing with a product that government and industry have committed to householders with gas appliances that will be there forever," he went on. "That's why you've got to have some kind of regulation."

Regulation or not, the demand for gas is 22 trillion cubic feet per year and rising—rising to 40 trillion cubic feet in the next 13 years, which yields a domestic deficit of 18 trillion cubic feet that either must come from somewhere else or must be denied.

Domestically, help can only come from two sources. One is development of synthetic gas (Syngas) from naphtha, but even if the technology works and the right amount of money is invested, Syngas can never meet more than 5 per cent of U.S. demand.

Help could also come from underground nuclear explosions to free gas trapped deep beneath the surface, but nobody expects that kind of help for at least another 10 years.

The Atomic Energy Commission says that some 400 small explosions might dislodge 3 trillion cubic feet of gas in Wyoming and Colorado. The AEC also understands that the public will never put up with that until the gas shortage gets much worse than it is today.

Predictably, the United States appears to be turning somewhere else.

The United States already imports almost one trillion cubic feet of gas from Canada and Algeria. That can be doubled in the next 10 years. Alaska's North Slope can produce an additional 1.5 trillion cubic feet per year. Our ace in the hole is the Soviet Union, which is blessed with twice as much natural gas as the United States and nowhere to go to sell it all.

The United States is negotiating to buy more than \$30 billion worth of Soviet Union gas over a 25 year period, but even if the deal goes through the United States must amend its natural gas practices.

Gas rationing is not unlikely, especially to large industrial users who can burn oil just as easily. Modest price increases might also be in order, if only to make gas less attractive to large industrial users.

There is evidence that gas usage might already have been arrested among the big users. Several utilities in Oklahoma and Texas have said they will no longer burn gas in their boilers, but would sell it to homeowners for the higher prices they can get for the gas.

If this turns out to be a trend, it would be the first hopeful sign in the gas industry in more than a decade.

Wednesday, Nov. 29, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST

The Energy Crisis—IV

Coal for 500 Years But Too Dirty to Use

"There are two things wrong with coal today. We can't mine it and we can't burn it."

S. David Freeman,
White House Energy Adviser
To Presidents Johnson and Nixon

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

Few things illustrate the energy crisis better than the dilemma that exists in coal, at once the most abundant and abused fuel in the United States.

There's coal enough in the United States to last more than 500 years, which makes it 15 times more plentiful than oil and 25 times as abundant as natural gas. One of the most intriguing statistics to come out of the energy crisis is that coal makes up 75 per cent of our fossil fuel reserves, but oil and gas make up 75 per cent of our fossil fuel consumption.

Coal is out of step with the times. It's mined in ways that Americans no longer accept and it burns with a dark and sulfurous smoke that Americans find a sore to their eyes, a danger to their property and a threat to their health.

The sulfur oxides pumped into the air by burning coal have been linked statistically with lung and heart ailments. Sulfur in city air has been found to corrode

barged up from New Orleans and low-sulfur coal shipped from Montana that costs twice what Illinois coal costs.

Pollution laws in Tennessee have forced coal out of furnaces from Nashville and Knoxville, right in the heart of coal country. Ohio coal producers talk of being unable to sell coal in their own state, a worry also heard in parts of Indiana and West Virginia. New Jersey has placed an outright ban on coal itself, reflected in the fact that it buys more heating oil than any state but New York.

There's no question this has hurt coal. While oil and gas demand doubled in the last 10 years, coal muddled along in what has almost been a recession. Coal production is forecast this year at no more than 580 million tons, which is only 5 per cent more than it was five years ago.

"This has hurt the country and aggravated the energy crisis," says one-time White House Energy adviser S. David Freeman, who is now director of the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project. "We're draining America dry of its oil and gas, while all that coal just sits there."

Mine statistics tell the tale better than production figures. Underground coal mines have been closing in the U.S. at a rate of more than one a day for the last six years, and if anything the trend might be accelerating. Island Creek Coal Co., the nation's third largest, closed three mines in the last three months, one of

port, Ohio) a producer of one million tons of coal a year.


One reason for this skidding decline is that coal has lost many of its traditional markets to oil and gas, which are scarcer but cleaner, easier and cheaper to burn. Coal once (during World War II) furnished 70 per cent of the energy used in the U.S. It now supplies 20 per cent, having lost all the railroad and residential business and growing chunks of the electric and factory fuel trade.

Coal mining itself is a dying trade. Miners over 45 are retiring in record numbers at the same time their sons aren't going into the mines at all. Miner ranks have dwindled to 140,000, which is 30,000 fewer than 10 years ago and one third the number led by the late John L. Lewis.


The young men who do enter the mines don't seem happy to do so. Their morale is said to be low, their absenteeism high. The United Mine Workers admits that absenteeism runs as high as 18 per cent, one reason productivity is down almost 20 per cent. Another reason is the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act.

Low productivity has helped to raise the price of coal more than 25 per cent in the last three years, which has cost coal some markets. Factories in six states east of the Mississippi River have switched from coal to oil for their boiler fuels, solely on the basis of price.

The drop in deep mines has been partly offset by a



By Annela Robinson—The Washington Post.



By Joe Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

50 per cent rise in strip mines, but opposition to strip mining rose almost as fast. West Virginia has put an embargo on strip mining in 26 counties, and on Capitol Hill there are nine bills pending for the 93d Congress that would either regulate strip mining or ban it altogether.

It didn't help things when a crew of Apollo astronauts took a picture of the earth on the way out to the moon, which revealed only two distinct geographical features.

"One of them I forgot, but the other one nobody forgets," said one-time Bureau of Mines Director John O'Leary. "It was the plume that came out of the Four Corners power plant in New Mexico, which burns coal that's strip mined."

Coal's plight sounds worse than it is. First off, the U.S. has 230 billion tons of coal buried in Wyoming, Montana and North Dakota that's low enough in sulfur to burn in American cities. It's true this coal is low in heat output and far from major markets, but it's easily mined and adds up to enough energy to heat the entire country for another 130 years.

More important, the technology exists to turn coal into a clean fuel. Half this technology involves scrubbing the sulfur from coal's stack gases, the other half involves turning coal into a usable form of natural gas. Developing these technologies might mean spending \$20 billion in the next 10 years, but the nation could choose whichever is best and save \$10 billion.

The trouble is not the technology, which has been

understood for more than 30 years. The trouble is the same kind of politics-as-usual that has plagued the coal industry for the last 50 years.

Special Interests

Coal research has been dominated for years by the Interior Department, which is itself dominated by oil interests. One result of this is that the Office of Coal Research, in Interior's Bureau of Mines did not start a program of coal gasification until 1961, and the Bureau of Mines itself didn't begin a second approach to coal gasification until 1967.

The Office of Coal Research has spent \$100 million on coal gasification and is nowhere nearer its goal

WASHINGTON STAR

12 November 1972

than when it began 10 years ago. It has increased spending this year to \$30 million, but critics charge that this is confronting a \$400 million problem with a \$30 million program.

"Whether this is enough, whether it is managed forcefully enough, is another question," energy adviser Freeman told Congress earlier this year. "It is really a very, very poor record of federal support."

Lethargic as it might be, coal gasification is seen by energy experts as the nation's future. They say that turning coal into gas will not only save the coal industry but will help to carry the country out of its energy crisis.

If we spend the money and set ourselves the goal of gasifying coal, the experts claim we could have 28 plants turning coal into gas across the country by 1985. These plants might cost as much as \$5 billion, but they would be converting 500 million tons of dirty coal into six trillion cubic feet of clean gas every year.

There are no such straightforward answers for coal in the 10 to 15 years just ahead. Mines will continue to close, miners will go on leaving the mines, and tightening pollution restrictions will serve to shrink coal's markets even more.

A respite of sorts may come from the low-sulfur coal that can be mined out west, but western coal is strip-mined coal and must be transported 1,000 or even 2,000 miles to its markets.

Coal producers are largely ignoring the shipping costs, which make coal mined at \$2 a ton in Montana sell for \$14 a ton in Chicago. Dozens of strip mines are already operating in Montana, where coal production has soared from less than 1 million tons

in 1969 to 3.4 million tons last year. Mine operators project a production of 81 million tons for Montana alone by 1980.

The strippling question is more difficult, but not impossible. Strip-mined land can be reclaimed if industry puts its mind and money to the task.

An estimated 3.2 million acres of U.S. land had been strip-mined by 1965, one-third of which has now been reclaimed—either by nature or man's own efforts. A Bureau of Mines survey showed that reclamation had cost man \$169 an acre in states like Tennessee and Kentucky and \$362 an acre in West Virginia and Pennsylvania.

"There are parts of the coal country that are too steep to ever reclaim, it involves too high a price," says Brice O'Brien, onetime economist for the National Coal Association, "but it won't cost the country a great deal of coal to just leave those lands alone. Don't mine them, and reclaim the others."

Reclamation seems to be the answer since strip mining seems to be the answer. Deep mining is just too risky, too expensive and would involve too many miners, which the coal industry no longer has.

Energy experts claim that coal is worth all the effort, mostly because we have supplies of coal, and not-so-plentiful supplies of oil and gas.

By 1970, the United States had consumed one-third of its oil and gas and less than 5 per cent of its coal. Even if coal survives its troubles and demand soars in the year 2000 to five times what it is today, we'll still be left with more than a 400-year supply of coal.

Siberian Gas

The developing plans for massive American investment in the extraction of natural gas from the Soviet Union again point to the need for comprehensive planning to meet the nation's long-term energy needs. Under the proposed deals between combines of American companies and the Russians, Siberian gas would be piped to seaports, liquefied and shipped by tanker to both our East and West Coasts.

The government must carefully review all such plans from the viewpoint of national security, overall relations with the Soviet Union and the implications for American consumers and taxpayers and for the national economy.

Continuing improvement of East-West relations, aided by enlarged economic dealings, perhaps will reduce concern in coming years about over-reliance on Soviet supplies of fuels and raw materials. The contemplated flows of Sibe-

rian gas would not seem in themselves to represent a crippling threat should the Russians in a renewal of Cold War hostility decide to turn off the supply. The United States should take care, however, to cultivate diverse sources of energy, both domestically and abroad as a hedge against trouble in one quarter or another.

The country has no choice but to import much more oil and gas, because of zooming demand that is unlikely to yield much to counsels of moderation, and the fact that proportionately shrinking domestic supplies cannot meet this demand. An alternative of sorts is increasing use of the nation's ample reserves of coal, including its conversion to gas. In either case, the costs to consumers will be high, and the environmental dilemmas presented by huge new supertanker facilities and strip-mining will 30 continue to multiply.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Nov. 30, 1972

The Energy Crisis—V—

America Is Going Nuclear

U.S. Utilities Turn to the Atom for Power

"What this country needs to dramatize our energy crisis is a good twenty-four-hour blackout."

Rep. Chet Holifield (D-Calif.),
Member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

It was a blackout that first alerted the nation to the energy crisis, the now infamous Northeast blackout that turned out the lights of 30 million people for thirteen hours seven years ago.

Energy experts tell us that another blackout of that size is almost impossible, but regional blackouts of 15 to 30 minutes and brownouts where the lights flicker and dim are a growing threat to our electrified society. The reason is that electrical supply cannot keep pace with electrical demand, and therein lies another reason the United States is in the midst of an energy crisis.

Americans will end 1972 using almost two trillion kilowatt hours of electricity, twice what they used 10 years ago. The Federal Power Commission estimates that electrical use will double again in 10 years and increase sevenfold by the year 2000.

The nation's electric power companies spent more than \$15 billion last year to keep up with rising demand, an outlay that will increase to \$23 billion in 1980 and \$37 billion in 1990. The total that electric companies expect to spend on new plants and transmission lines in the 20 years ending in 1990 is \$490 billion, which will be two per cent of the gross national product accumulated during the same period.

Besides raising the money to finance this expansion, the biggest problem facing the power industry is how to generate all that electricity. There are simply not enough clean fossil fuels in the ground to produce that much electrical energy.

The answer is that the U.S. is "going nuclear."

The reasons are simple.

Nuclear plants don't belch fly ash and sulfurous smoke into the air, which means that nuclear plants can live with the restrictions to be imposed on the nation by the Clean Air Act in 1975. The other reason is that atomic power can today compete with fossil power on the basis of costs.

Nuclear plants still cost about 10 per cent more to build than conventional plants, but their maintenance cost runs no higher than fossil power plants and uranium fuel costs are today half what fossil fuel cost. The price gap is growing wider. Uranium is expected to cost one third what coal and oil will cost five years hence.

It wasn't always that way. Atomic power took a back

seat to fossil power all the way through the '50s and early '60s, partly because the costs were too high and partly because nuclear technology was still in the infant throes of development.

Two things happened to change all that. The first was the order placed by Jersey Central Power & Light Co. in 1963 for a 640 million kilowatt plant for Oyster Creek, N.J., the first nuclear plant large enough to compete with coal and oil.

The second happened three years later, when the Tennessee Valley Authority placed its first order for a nuclear plant, a one million kilowatt plant that was built at Decatur, Ala., right in the heart of the coal country.

"Utilities figured that if TVA thought the atom could compete with coal," explained onetime White House energy adviser S. David Freeman, "then by God there must be something to nuclear power after all."

Whatever they thought, electric companies took the plunge into nuclear power. There are now 30 nuclear plants across the country, 51 more being built and 72 on order.

The Atomic Energy Commission figures there will be 150 nuclear plants putting out power by 1980, 300 by 1985 and 475 by 1990. The atom's share of U.S. electrical capacity will be 22 per cent in 1980, 32 per cent five years later and 40 per cent in 1990. Dollar investment in nuclear power will be \$60 billion in 1980 and \$190 billion in 1990.

Thermal Pollution

The rush to nuclear power is not without its strife, some of it inherent in atomic energy and some of it fueled by the raging uproar over the ill effects energy production of any kind has on the environment.

Environmentalists complained about the tiny traces of radioactivity that nuclear plants leaked to the air and water, but plant requirements have been tightened up to the point that the newest plants release almost no radiation.

The Lawrence Radiation Laboratory's Dr. Edward Teller figures that an adult could lean against a nuclear plant the rest of his life and get no more radiation than he'd get sleeping next to his spouse from the potassium in her blood.

A tougher charge against nuclear plants is the fact

lake water to cool themselves than do fossil plants. Atomic plants also turn their cooling water back into the rivers and lakes as much as 12 degrees warmer than when they took the water out, which triggered the phrase "thermal pollution."

The AEC has taken some first steps toward solving this problem, but they cost money and have built-in difficulties of their own. The answer involves the use of one-step cooling towers, which re-use the cooling water and cool it before discharging it.

The trouble with cooling towers is that they add \$50 million to the cost of a plant. They also create their own fog in certain weather conditions, and in at least one case caused ice to form on a nearby road that once resulted in an auto accident.

Far more serious than the auto accident is the threat of a possible nuclear accident, where by some freak circumstance a plant's cooling pipes break, its uranium fuel overheats, its emergency shutdowns malfunction and its emergency cooling system fails.

If all those things were to happen and the uranium fuel melted through its core and caused steam explosions that broke through the reactor containment, radioactive poisons might be spilled into the plant.

How far they got would depend on wind and weather conditions, but a release of three million curies of radioactive iodine would be enough to give thyroid cancer to all the people in the plant, many of the people in a half-mile radius, and some as far away as five miles.

The AEC insists that the chance of such an accident is so remote that the odds against it are better than one million or even two million to one. The shutdown controls in a nuclear reactor alone would prevent such a mishap, by closing off the chain reaction if so much as a water pipe broke.

In its defense, the AEC points out with pride that there has never been any kind of accident in an operable nuclear power plant. The 30 plants that are operable today have produced 165.2 billion kilowatt hours in 15 years, without a single mishap.

Nuclear critics are not as easily put off. They point out that there have been as

many as 12 emergency shutdowns of nuclear reactors in the last two years. Four nuclear plants (Nine Mile Point in New York, Dresden III and Dresden II outside Chicago, and Monticello outside Minneapolis) have been shut down twice by their emergency controls, either because an electrical failure triggered the controls or because a pipe broke or a valve tripped open.

The critics also worry about things like the badly designed fuel rods that were discovered in a nuclear plant operated by Rochester Gas & Electric Co. The rods were found to be bent and bulging with knots that had been brought on by the uneven heating of the rods.

If a reactor core should overheat for any reason, rods like these might easily break and release radiation to the reactor core, a possibility that went unrecognized by the nuclear power industry and the AEC for more than ten years.

"There should have been better testing techniques," confides one AEC official. "That problem should have been solved 10 years ago, before those fuel rods were ever installed in a real-life reactor."

It's little troubles like these that raise the possibility of a more serious accident, an accident that might shut down the entire nuclear power industry if it ever happened.

"We're too committed to nuclear power to ever force a shutdown," admits Irwin Stelzer, president of National Economic Research Associates, an energy consulting firm in New York. "The lights would go out all over the country if we had a nuclear shutdown 10 years from now."

Uranium Ore

The commitment to nuclear power also bothers some critics, who feel that if the atom generates 40 per cent of all our electricity before the end of the century, then the country might be in for a repeat performance of the energy crisis we're in today.

One big reason the electric power industry has chosen atomic energy is the availability of uranium ore, costing between \$8 and \$10 a pound, which releases the heat equivalent over its lifetime of two tons of coal.

The United States has less than one million tons of uranium recoverable at that price, enough to last at projected consumption rates for another 10 years. We have a total of 1.6 million tons that is recoverable at prices up to \$20 a pound, but uranium that costs more than \$14 a pound begins to cost too much and would not be able to produce the rela-

tively cheap power promised by the atom over the next 20 years.

The AEC is counting on a new type of reactor to counterbalance any anticipated uranium shortage. Called the fast breeder reactor, it is designed to generate more nuclear fuel than it burns over a 30-year lifetime. The first "demonstration" breeder is due to be ready for operation in 1980, so the AEC is literally in a race with time to avoid a shortage of uranium in the '80s.

What disturbs many nuclear critics is that the country seems to have foreclosed its other energy options while it concentrates on developing nuclear energy.

Whatever happened to solar energy, to geothermal energy, to tidal energy or even to the generation of power from the winds?

None of these energy forms got any attention or received any financial support until the country got into an energy crisis, which even today goes unrecognized in many agencies of government and the electric power industry.

A few of these energy possibilities are now being financed, though not in any urgent way. The two most promising options are solar and geothermal energy—the production of electricity from the heat of the sun and the earth. Each of these options will get about \$1 million in federal funds this year.

Meanwhile, the country faces the growing possibility of power shortages. There have already been 424 blackouts in the country since the great Northeast blackout seven years ago. There have also been 114 brownouts since June of 1970, when the Federal Power Commission began compiling brownout statistics.

The FPC insists that the blackouts and brownouts suffered in recent years have not been sizable, but to a nation that waits for solutions to its energy crisis any blackout can be a discomfort.

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FINANCIAL TIMES, London
25 October 1972

Why U.S. energy demand could spell trouble for Europe

BY CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT

THE British Government could mark its entry into the European Economic Community by drawing attention to a potentially major new danger to Europe's oil supplies, and by suggesting how it might be averted. This time the threat does not come from the producer governments in the Middle East and North Africa. It arises out of developments in the U.S.

The U.S. is facing a shortage of energy in general, and of oil in particular. For the first time in history it will have to enter world oil markets as a massive importer. By 1980 its imports could be running at the rate of 12m. barrels a day; that is the same as Western Europe's total present-day consumption. The U.S. will have to compete with Europe and Japan for the available supplies from the main producer areas. It will be doing so just when the producers are becoming concerned about the need to conserve their reserves, and when they are determined to maximise their advantages in the market place.

From Europe's point of view the problem will be made worse by the fact that all members of the enlarged Community rely on U.S. owned companies for much of their imported oil. The companies have a fine record of keeping prices down, and of maintaining the flow of supplies regardless of the difficulties. Their record inspires confidence. But their position in future will be very different from that of the past or present.

Hitherto the U.S. companies were producing oil in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere for sale in Europe and various other markets. There was no question of the oil flowing into the U.S. in large quantities, and until quite recently the restrictions on U.S. imports were very severe. In future, however, the companies

will be producing oil that the U.S. wants just as much as Europe. By the early 1980s, imports will probably account for about 50 per cent. of total U.S. consumption. They will no longer be just a useful adjunct to domestic supplies. They will have become indispensable.

Inevitably, therefore, the question arises of whether we can continue to rely on U.S. companies to safeguard our interests so far as imports are concerned. What would happen if the U.S. Government, supported perhaps by public opinion and the companies' shareholders, made the companies put the interests of the U.S. market before those of any other? This object might be achieved through the application of direct pressures, or through the tax system and in other less obvious ways.

Such fears are quite justified. The U.S. Government used to employ its influence quite ruthlessly in order to deter the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-owned companies from trading with China and Cuba, even when the governments of the countries in which the subsidiaries were situated wanted to trade with those countries. In 1966, when the U.S. Government was at loggerheads with France, it prevented Control Data from exporting computers to France for use in the French nuclear programme. As these examples show, the U.S. Government is prepared to use its influence to persuade companies to put what it regards as U.S. interests first.

Quite apart from this, most U.S. oil companies have substantially larger markets and investments in the U.S. than in Europe. On straightforward commercial grounds they might very well feel that the U.S. has a prior claim on their resources

of foreign oil. Their shareholders, who are overwhelmingly American, their workers through the trade unions, and American public opinion would all tend to exert their influence in the same direction.

The attitude of the Middle East countries, and especially Saudi Arabia, must also be taken into account. The Middle East as a whole contains about 55 per cent. of the world's total oil reserves, and by 1980 it is expected to account for about 75 per cent. of all the oil entering world markets. The most substantial reserves within the area are those of Saudi Arabia. It has a far greater potential than any other Middle East country to increase its production and exports, and its influence will grow accordingly.

Significantly, Saudi oil production, through Aramco, is an American preserve. There is no countervailing European influence as in Iran or Kuwait.

Earlier this month, the Saudi Minister of Oil, Sheikh Yamani, proposed that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia should establish what amounts to a special relationship in oil. He asked for preferential access to the U.S. market and for permission to invest in U.S. refining and marketing in return for guaranteeing an uninterrupted flow of oil.

Bigger stake

The official U.S. reaction was cautious. It was pointed out that Saudi Arabia, like British Petroleum, is free to invest in the U.S. whenever it likes. Otherwise the State Department went no further than to describe the

proposal as "extremely important." The obstacles in the way of establishing such a special relationship are formidable. But the common interests of the two countries are also great. Europe would do well to heed the warning.

In these circumstances Europe must be prepared to build up a much more substantial position of its own in the international oil industry. It should be prepared to co-operate with the U.S. companies and the U.S. Government as much as possible, and to seek whatever means are available to ensure that a harmonious and mutually beneficial working relationship can be continued. But to succeed in that aim it will need to have a strong bargaining position. A more substantial stake in its own oil industry is the best way for Europe to achieve this, besides being the only way to safeguard its position in the event of the relationship with either the U.S. companies or the U.S. Government becoming soured in some way.

There are three principal lines that Europe should pursue. First, it must seek to establish a relationship with the producer countries through trade, technical assistance, and investment that will secure access to all the oil we need and create a much wider community of interest between producers and consumers. Secondly, Europe must do everything possible to encourage the search for alternative oil supplies, both within the European area itself and outside. Thirdly, it must finance and operate a greater proportion of the investments in refining, distribution, and marketing than has previously been

the case.

The key element in all this is money. In the past Europe has relied on the U.S. to provide much of the capital needed for its oil industry. If it is now to play a more prominent role in its own affairs it will have to supply more of the cash. The amounts are already staggering. In 1971 alone the 30 leading companies whose affairs are monitored by the Chase Manhattan Bank incurred capital expenditures of over \$6,600m. outside the U.S. Much greater sums will be needed in future just to take account of the growing demand for oil, let alone any shift in the position of U.S. and non-U.S. companies.

Environmental pressures will add still further to the costs. Reducing the sulphur content of Western Europe's oil requirements for 1980 by 1 per cent. could cost \$2,500m., and the elimination of lead compounds in petrol a further \$4,000m.

Oil prices, like those of other basic commodities, are politically extremely sensitive. Yet there is no doubt that prices will have to rise significantly above their present levels if the companies are to finance even part of the investments that will be required. This does not, of course, mean that prices to the consumer need rise by the same amount, for taxes could be reduced. Higher prices alone will not, however,

be enough. Governments are bound to become more closely involved in the financing of the industry.

One way in which they could provide tangible help without necessarily incurring great expense would be to afford some form of guarantee to the companies' investments in producer countries. This would make it easier than would otherwise be the case for the companies to raise money themselves. Another possibility might be for Europe to follow the example of the U.S. and to provide more help through tax concessions and investment incentives. Such assistance might be particularly appropriate where investments are incurred for environmental and social reasons.

These and other possibilities should be explored. But whatever happens Europe would do well to remember that oil is international. In its determination to secure a bigger stake in its own industry it should not forget that European companies have earned large profits in the U.S. in the past and have bright opportunities there for the future. For this reason alone, if for no other, it would be misguided to discriminate against U.S. companies prepared to work within the context of new European policies. Moreover, it will always be in our interest to work in harmony with U.S. companies, as distinct from relying too much upon them; and we do not want to provoke a dispute that could be avoided.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 4, 1972

U.S. BECOMING A "HAVE NOT" IN RAW MATERIALS—WHAT TO DO?

Turning heavily to foreign sources for fuel and minerals, U. S. finds terms stiffening. Balance of payments is hit. Search for relief is under way.

Of all the problems facing President Nixon in his second term, few are more pressing than this:

America—blessed in the beginning with a wealth of natural resources—is becoming a "have not" nation.

Hard facts show the U.S. is leaning more and more on other countries for the raw materials that are so vital to its status as the world's most prosperous land. These materials, Americans are being told, will not be easy to come by in the future.

Increasing U.S. reliance on foreign sources of oil, although serious enough in itself, is only part of the problem. This country also is counting on other nations to supply a good portion of the metallic minerals and other substances without which American industry could not function.

Government experts predict that by 1985 the U.S. could depend on imports for as much as half of its supplies of basic raw materials—including even iron ore.

Within 13 years, authorities say, foreign sources may be relied upon to furnish most of this country's aluminum, chromium, manganese, nickel, tungsten and tin.

Contest for supplies. Other advanced countries are pursuing the same increasingly valuable minerals.

Preston Claud, professor of biogeology at the University of California at Santa Barbara and an authority on natural resources, notes that some minerals already "are in short supply at any practicable price and are likely to engender sharp competition for their possession—conceivably even military conflict."

The U.S. is consuming a disproportionately huge share of the world's mineral resources—and shows every sign of needing still more in years to come. Although Americans make up only 5 per cent of the world's population, they use about 30 per cent of the globe's mineral output.

On a per capita basis, an American uses 20 times as much of the metallic ores as someone living in one of the world's poorer countries. The U.S., with 200 million people, burns more energy fuels than Japan, Great Britain, Germany and Russia combined, with populations totaling 500 million.

A recent report from the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production reveals that since 1940 the U.S. has consumed an estimated 260 billion dollars' worth of minerals—about equal to the amount used by the entire world in all history before 1940.

The chart at right shows U.S. use of some of the world's key resources.

Huge demands. Some authorities—such as Charles Park, former dean of the Stanford school of earth sciences—believe the enormous American appetite for minerals will not only continue but probably grow. Says Mr. Park:


"Assuming that the population is stabilized at about 300 million people by the year 2000 and that the present per capita consumption of nonrenewable raw materials is maintained, then the nation will require one third more raw materials than at present. If standards of living improve, then the demands will be correspondingly greater."

Not so long ago, the U.S. supplied much of its

needs. This country produced 40 per cent of the world's supply of key minerals in 1947. Today American mineral production makes up only about 20 per cent of the global total.

stockpile of some minerals has declined. Supplies of most items, however, are at or above the amount Government experts say are needed.

As recently as 1963, the U.S. exported more minerals than it bought



from other countries. But, in 1964, Americans began buying more foreign raw materials than they shipped overseas. By 1969, the U. S. trade deficit in minerals reached nearly 4 billion dollars.

The U. S. today depends on other countries for 22 of the 74 nonenergy minerals considered essential for a modern industrial society.

Geologic patterns. What is behind this? Examination of the distribution of mineral reserves in the U. S. explains the shortages in part. This country has never had much, if any, of certain key natural deposits such as gold, platinum, mercury and tin. Other substances—manganese, chromium, nickel, for example—are more abundant, but geologists doubt that the United States ever could be self-sufficient in their production, because demand is so great.

The U. S. has plentiful reserves of some minerals—among them, coal, salt, cement, crushed stone, potash, phosphate, copper and lead—although it is cheaper in some cases to import them.

Experts say America conceivably could meet its needs for iron, aluminum and titanium if it were willing to pay the high cost of extracting them from low-grade ore. But mining-industry spokesmen blame factors other than the whims of nature for the increasing dependence on overseas mineral sources. Among them are high labor costs, Government regulations, lack of incentives to modernize facilities, shortage of skilled manpower, outmoded transportation equipment and growing concern about environmental damage.

Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton told Congress recently that domestic mineral production fell some 8.6 billion dollars short of the nation's needs in 1970. If the trend continues, Mr. Morton said, the mineral deficit would reach 31 billion dollars in 1985 and 64 billion by the year 2000.

Threatening situation. An Interior Department report warned:

"As the United States gets into a position where a significant portion of the supply of an important mineral comes from a single foreign country—or from an aligned grouping of foreign countries—then that country or group can threaten the United States' economy with severe dislocation by suddenly embargoing shipments to the United States."


An analysis of the situation has been made by Lester R. Brown, a senior fellow with the Overseas Development Council, a private and nonprofit organization based in Washington. In his new book, "World Without Borders," Mr. Brown says that world trade channels must be kept open to facilitate exchange of raw materials. In his view:

"The growing scarcity of fossil fuels and minerals caused by rapidly expanding global consumption is generating growing competition for the control of mineral reserves. This competition exists among countries, among multinational corporations and between countries and corporations.

"Already, the terms on which countries are making some industrial raw materials available to the international community are stiffening. As fossil-fuel reserves decline and consumption climbs

Stockpile of Strategic Materials . . .

A SHRINKING SOURCE OF MINERAL SUPPLIES



Most mineral products in the national stockpile of key defense materials, built up to meet emergency needs in case of war, have been whittled down in recent years in line with revised security needs. Surplus has been sold to U. S. industry.

	Amounts of Minerals in Stockpile	
	In Mid-1965	In Mid-1972
Tin, long tons	292,000	251,000
Aluminum, tons	1,893,000	1,275,000
Tungsten, pounds	160,000,000	129,000,000
Lead, tons	1,309,000	1,110,000
Copper, tons	1,002,000	259,000
Zinc, tons	1,416,000	1,040,000
Manganese, metallurgical, tons	11,511,000	9,965,000
Cobalt, pounds	96,000,000	74,000,000
Nickel, tons	211,000	39,000
Chromite, metallurgical, tons	5,294,000	5,331,000
Quartz crystals, pounds	5,023,000	4,776,000

Source: U. S. Office of Emergency Preparedness

and the seemingly insatiable demands of the rich countries press against the earth's fixed reserves, the world energy market is being transformed from a buyer's market to a seller's market."

Wealth to be mined. As it happens, some of the world's poorest countries are the richest in the mineral reserves so critically needed by such nations as the U. S., Japan and those in Western Europe.

Mr. Brown points out that Chile, Peru, Zambia and Zaire supply most of the world's exportable surplus of copper. Bolivia, Malaysia and Thailand control 70 per cent of the tin in international trade. Some 60 per cent of all exported lead comes from Australia, Mexico and Peru. A few Middle Eastern countries have about 80 per cent of the world's known recoverable oil deposits.

Countries poor in manufactured goods but wealthy in natural resources are driving increasingly tough bargains with the economically more advanced nations that seek their raw materials.

Once it was common for the host country to get only 10 per cent of the income from oil drilled by foreign companies. After World War II, the host nation's share in most cases rose to 50 per cent. Lately, some contracts call for oil-rich countries to keep 70 per cent or more of the receipts.

Result: higher prices for fuel oil, gasoline and other petroleum products in countries that must rely on imported oil for a significant part of their needs.

Several nations have taken over mineral production and refining facilities built with foreign capital. Others are demanding and getting a "partnership" in foreign producing companies.

"A stoppage of oil," The Shah of

Iran described the trend in these terms:

"The present international oil situation could easily become critical if the oil companies think they can bluff us or put on enough pressure to force us to surrender."

"A far more dangerous crisis could develop if the industrial countries of the world back up the oil companies—a crisis which would not only cause a stoppage of oil but a confrontation between the haves and the have-nots."

G. A. Lincoln, Director of the White House Office of Emergency Preparedness, noted in congressional testimony that the U. S. depends on oil and natural gas for some 77 per cent of its energy needs. About 27 per cent of the oil used in this country is imported.

"Our security can be threatened and impaired in this day and age solely by economic or political factors," said Mr. Lincoln. "Energy supply is a central example of this reality, and energy security is central to national security. . . ."

"Oil-exporting countries, in their enlightened self-interest, do not over the long run need to meet the demand schedule of the consuming countries. They can demand a price if they do."

Can the U. S. ease its growing dependence on foreign minerals?

The National Research Council looked into the problem at the request of federal authorities and came up with some recommendations.

Chief conclusion: A major reliance on imported minerals is inescapable if the U. S. is to maintain its standard of living. But the consultants advised that dependence on for-

NEW YORK TIMES
15 November 1972

New Balance of Peace

By C. L. Sulzberger

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LONDON—There are widespread expectations of a readjustment of United States relations with West Europe and NATO during President Nixon's second term. His first term saw fruition of basic trends already discernible on the world horizon. These now require policy recognition.

Apart from the Vietnam wind-down, the new rapport with China and the successful conclusion of arms limitation and trade talks with Russia, the U. S. finds itself no longer the global giant of twenty years ago. Indeed, it cannot leave even the West alone as it once did.

Its share of global production has slipped from 50 to 30 per cent while its trade and financial reserves have steadily weakened vis-à-vis those of Japan and the growing European community. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has achieved approximate military parity with America and may soon surpass it.

As a consequence, U. S. capacity to sway events has declined. The West, without quite saying so, has accepted the status quo of a divided Europe. And, after the forthcoming European security conference, it is obvious that a diminishing American conventional army will further reduce its forces over here.

All these occurrences make it imperative that Washington and its allies negotiate long-term working relationships for the years ahead, relationships based on the new realities. But this is a tricky operation.

During the postwar quarter century, the United States was immensely fortunate. It depended for its power on an overwhelming military superiority and a constantly expanding economy. Now both these special advantages have come to a predictable and almost simultaneous end.

Yet, as America deliberately braked its economy and began to prune its military establishment, the Soviet Union continued to build an impressive navy and conventional army, although agreeing to limit its nuclear-missile establishment.

Moscow, recognizing the diplomatic implication of these changes, has carefully avoided military confrontation with America (in Indochina and the Middle East) while legitimizing its ascendancy in Eastern Europe. Maintaining direct contact with Washington on all vital matters and achieving a sensational breakthrough in trade, it undoubtedly hopes to slowly isolate the United States from Western Europe as it has to some degree done in Asia.

This is a subtle procedure and two can play at the game. While the Western alliance adjusts, the United States has shown the world that Eastern alliances are unstable: witness the Sino-Soviet alliance, the pledges to Hanoi of both Moscow and Peking, and also the Soviet-Egyptian alliance.

It has become plain since the 1962 Cuba confrontation that thermonuclear weapons systems have rendered obsolete the old-fashioned type of pact. While great powers can still help smaller ones, they will not permit them to demand atomic support with its risk of consequent disaster.

What Washington must now conclude with its European allies is an understanding of this situation on a basis that doesn't threaten to dissolve NATO. The obvious fact that American troops in Europe will be reduced and that less rather than more automaticity of U.S. nuclear response must be anticipated, presents grave problems.

Western Europe may decide in the wake of the security conference which will formally recognize the Continent's ideological division, that it must negotiate its own reconciliation with Russia—at almost any price. There has long been an undercurrent of suspicion about bilateral dealings between Washington and Moscow.

Or Europe may decide to construct its own nuclear force based on the separate British and French arsenals. But this would be costly, might weaken contributions to NATO's conventional strength, and could be risky in terms of Soviet and American reactions.

What the U.S. and its allies must remember is that, in its essence, NATO is an idea and not a country. Its borders extend from the Pacific to Europe's heart, creating the kind of notion that Rome was, rather than a nation with fixed frontiers.

If these concepts are recognized and the transitional ideas already accepted by big business can be translated into new political relationships, there is no reason why that era of peace envisioned by Mr. Nixon should not begin.

There will never be absolute peace because ideological unanimity is as impossible as religious or economic unanimity. The earth has accustomed itself to the fact that this is an inflatingly dangerous planet.

What must be devised is a system—near to foolproof—for preventing strains from breaking the structure of peace while maintaining within that peace a balance disfavoring no one.

eign sources of raw materials could be kept down if the U. S. takes steps to—

- Improve methods of finding and extracting domestic minerals—perhaps expanding the search to previously untapped areas such as military reservations, parks and offshore waters.

- Investigate use of substitutes or synthetics for some of the more rare and costly minerals.

- Increase recycling of manufactured goods.

- Provide flexible Government incentives to mining and processing firms.

The report stated:

"We believe that planned adjustment of technology to available domestic resources is essential. The alternative is progressive deterioration in the mineral position of the United States, with all that that implies.

"One can foresee within decades, failing such an adjustment, the erosion of U. S. mining, smelting, refining and mineral-based manufacturing industries, growing economic colonialism, international frictions, a steadily deteriorating balance of trade and a tarnished global image of the nation."

Others see competition for the world's mineral supplies as a truly global problem, not confined to the United States or to any other single nation.

Some geologists report that world reserves of platinum, zinc, gold and lead already are in short supply. And they predict that deposits of silver, tin and uranium may be growing short by the end of this century.

A global view. The Club of Rome, a private group of prominent scientists, businessmen and educators, published the results of its computer analysis of world population and resources in a recent book entitled "The Limits of Growth."

If present trends continue, according to this study, "the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 100 years."

A National Commission on Materials Policy, established by Congress and appointed by President Nixon, is searching for a new U. S. approach to balance the need for natural resources with the desire to improve environmental quality. The group is scheduled to make its report by next June 30. James Boyd, executive director of the Commission, summed up the problem when he said:

"In the past, our nation has paid little attention to materials. Yet, we live in a world of materials, both natural and man-made. We have been operating as though the supply were endless, the costs ever reasonable.

"Perhaps this is not so. The time has come to face up to this problem."

WASHINGTON STAR
12 November 1972

U.S. Fuel Groups Bridle at Reports Of Soviet Gas Deal

By JOHN FIALKA
Star-News Staff Writer

Reports that the United States may buy as much as \$40 billion worth of natural gas from the Soviet Union over the next 25 years have triggered angry protests from domestic fuel producers and rumbles of investigations from at least two congressional committees.

Citing press reports that a combine of U.S. companies, backed by some federal financing, would pay \$40 billion to import about 36.5 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas, the head of one oil and gas producers' group charged today that the Russian gas will cost six times more than the wholesale price of U.S. gas.

"It is disturbing that our government is willing to encourage development of the Soviet Union's gas at such cost when it is pursuing regulatory policies that are discouraging the needed capital expenditures to develop our natural gas resources at home," said Tom B. Medders Jr., head of the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA).

Carl Bagge, president of the National Coal Association, charged yesterday that the Federal Power Commission, which must approve the trade, "is incompetent to investigate the broad spectrum of international security, fiscal and other aspects of this problem."

Bagge noted that the United States currently spends only about \$20 million a year to study how the nation's vast remaining coal reserves might be cheaply transformed into gas for fuel uses.

"The reason we drift into these deals is that there is no single place that has an overview on the (energy) problem. There are so many committees and agencies that have a piece of the thing," he added.

Rep. Torbert H. Macdonald, D-Mass., who heads an energy subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee, said yesterday that his subcommittee "will be anxious to hear more" about the Russian gas deal when Congress reconvenes.

And a spokesman for a Senate Interior subcommittee headed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., said that that panel would examine "various aspects" of the proposed trade in fuel import hearings that may begin next month.

If the Russian gas trade is completed, it would, in effect, dictate a significant portion of the nation's energy policy for the next generation and amount to the largest single commercial transaction in history.

Last week, Robert Miller, vice president of Tenneco Inc., said that part of the trade, involving imports of \$10 billion worth of gas to the East Coast, might be agreed upon within the next sixty days.

Tenneco, Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., and Brown & Root Inc., are bargaining as a unit for the East Coast shipments. They and a consortium of three other companies, are also negotiating with the Russians for imports of gas to the West Coast, a project, still believed to be in the early talking stages, which may reach over \$30 billion.

The gas would be drawn from huge Soviet gas fields in Siberia and shipped to the United States through a system of pipelines, gas liquefaction plants and special refrigerated tankers that would be financed, in part, by the U.S. companies, and banks, and backed up by the federal Export-Import Bank.

The \$10 billion East Coast portion taken alone, would require huge federal subsidies. It would require the construction of 20 new supertankers, according to Miller, each worth approximately \$90 million.

Under a Commerce Department program designed to promote the shipbuilding industry, the federal government currently makes up the difference between the cost of building a tanker here and the cheaper cost of building it in a foreign country in the form of a subsidy.

The federal subsidy for the 20 supertankers, according to a variety of industry sources, would range somewhere between 25 and 40 percent of their total cost.

Several Nixon administration officials, including Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson, have pointed out that the nation's "energy crisis" could be partially solved by importing gas from the Soviet Union, which has massive, untapped gas reserves and no other substantial market in which to sell it.

Some critics have argued that it is unwise to make the nation more dependent on a

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 11, 1972

Siberian oil East or west

Tokyo

A year ago it seemed that the massive oil and gas wealth of Siberia would fall neatly into the hands of Japan. Not merely would Japan take the fuel it urgently needs from the rich fields at Yakut and Tjumen, but Russia would spend the hard currency it earned from these exports to buy industrial and consumer goods from Japan. That was the hope. But, six months ago, Gulf Oil asked to be allowed to come into the 1,800-mile pipeline that would take fuel from western Siberia to the eastern Soviet port of Nakhodka. Then Esso asked to be included too. The scramble began. This week's announcement that the United States is negotiating to drill and buy up to \$40 billion of Russian fuel has convinced the resentful Japanese that they have lost out on the bulk of Siberian oil, together with its tied trading market. They point out, bitterly, that it was American pressure that kept them from negotiating for the oil years ago.

The huge Russian deal with the United States is still early in the negotiating stage. But it now seems almost certain that the United States and Japan will share the approximate \$5 billion cost of developing and exploring the natural gas of the Yakut field—and that of building a 2,500-mile pipeline to the coast, where a \$750m liquefying plant will freeze the gas ready for shipping in a fleet of tankers. Ten of these tankers are to be built by the three countries to ship the gas to the United States and Japan. Delivery is scheduled to start in 1979, and expected to continue for 20 years.

The Japanese are even more annoyed about American participation in the crude petroleum fields at Tjumen. The original project for these was a strictly bilateral Soviet-Japanese deal. Now both Esso and Gulf Oil will be taking a share of the 40m tons of oil that will be piped from western Siberia. The Japanese government is being asked to clear a \$1 billion loan to Russia to help construct the pipeline for this field. It has run into some difficulty, as the pipeline, which would have a highway running alongside it, will skirt close to the Chinese border. Peking is indicating that it does not like that.

foreign energy source, and others, including the IPAA, are challenging the assumption that the United States does not have enough natural gas to supply itself.

Lloyd N. Unsell, one of the producers' associations' Washington representatives, cited statistics showing that the nation uses about 22 trillion cubic

feet of gas each year, but has more than 1,200 trillion cubic feet in untapped reserves.

The problem is, he added, that most of the untapped gas is believed to lie in three places where it is unusually difficult to get at: offshore; in northern Alaska; or more than six miles deep in a vast sedimentary basin under western Oklahoma.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1972

Prisoners Of Conscience

By Ivan Morris

They exist, to our shame, in almost every country of the world except a few exemplary states like Norway and the Netherlands; they represent the widest possible range of opinions—critics of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Jehovah's Witnesses in Spain, opponents of apartheid in South Africa, Catholic priests in Hungary, trade union organizers in Portugal, advocates of Formosan independence, opponents of the Communist regime in Cuba; they are men and women of all ages, races, occupations and opinions.

What they have in common is that at this very moment they are being kept in prison by the thousands in glaring contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which nearly all members of the United Nations have agreed to observe.

Frequently they are detained for long periods of time without a semblance of fair trial or even any formal charges, and many of them are subjected to revolting ill treatment, including torture—all this not because they have committed or advocated violent actions against the state but because they have refused to adopt their beliefs to the dictates of their governments.

These are "prisoners of conscience," for whose relief and release Amnesty International has been working since 1961. They are among the most ideal-

istic and valuable citizens of our world, and their persecution and imprisonment are in every case unjust. Amnesty has helped secure the release of large numbers of prisoners of conscience, mainly by publicity and persuasion. Yet thousands remain in prisons. Our organization is strongest in West Germany, England and the Scandinavian countries. It is still pathetically weak in the United States; this is unfortunate because American groups could be particularly helpful in working for prisoners in certain repressive countries.

Here are some case histories of people in prison:

Czechoslovakia: In July 1972 Milan Huebl, a historian and prominent theoretician during the "thaw" was sentenced to six and a half years in prison for "weakening the Socialist State System."

South Africa: The Rev. Cosmas Desmond, a Franciscan priest who worked mostly among blacks, author of "The Discarded People," which attacked South Africa's apartheid policy, has been confined to his house since 1971.

Cuba: Andreas Cao Mendiguren, a former professor of medicine, was arrested as a "counter-revolutionary" in 1961. After a trial held in an atmosphere of high emotion he was sentenced to twenty years and is still held today in Guanajay Prison.

Indonesia: Pramodya Ananta Tur, one of Indonesia's finest writers, had been arrested three times before he was detained on the desolate island of Buru, together with 10,000 other political prisoners. Like the other detainees he has no redress to any court; nor can he practice his profession.

U.S.S.R.: Pyotr Ivanovich Yakir, a historian active in Moscow dissident circles, was arrested in June 1972 and put into a Moscow prison. His trial, which some Soviet specialists believe to be of great political importance, has not yet been held.

Spain: Carlos Rivera Urrutia, Jehovah's Witness and conscientious objector, received a three-year prison sentence which will continue to be reimposed until he is beyond draft age, perhaps even longer. His family is destitute.

Paraguay: Dr. Antonio Maidana, former professor of history, sentenced to two years and nine months under a law "In defense of democracy," has now been held for fourteen years in a windowless cell without a bed. He is half blind and suffers from tuberculosis.

Turkey: Suleyman Ege, prominent author and publisher, is serving a 22-year sentence for "spreading an atmosphere of anarchy and Communism" through publications of books on Socialism.

Hungary: In May 1971 the Rev. Sandor Somogyi together with three other Catholic priests was charged with teaching "ideology hostile to the present political system." (He had been preaching in church, mostly to young people.) He was sentenced to four years in jail. During the trial the young churchgoers were threatened with reprisals unless they testified against the priest.

These people should be set free at once. So should the thousands of others who, like them, eschew violence yet are imprisoned because of their opinions. As long as such men continue to be persecuted and imprisoned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains what it has been until now—a mockery. In this crucial field few members of the United Nations have lived up to their obligations. Delinquent countries should constantly be reminded of their commitment to respect human rights.

Ivan Morris, professor of Japanese at Columbia University, is General Secretary of Amnesty International of the U.S.A.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 November 1972

Effect of Big Grain Purchases Worries World Aid Agencies

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Nov. 13—The impact of Soviet and Chinese purchases of American wheat is being eyed anxiously by relief organizations worried about higher prices, bottlenecks in shipping and the possibility of dwindling reserves in 1975.

The United Nations assistance program for Palestinian Arab refugees could run into similar difficulties, a spokesman said, because of the higher prices for wheat. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which has operated this program in the Middle East, last year received 105,000 tons of flour from the United States.

These relief agencies, and also private aid operations, have been following with concern the indications that 1972 world wheat production will be well below last year's record, mainly because of the Soviet crop failures. The Soviet decline prompted the \$1-billion grain deal with the United States this summer, boosting prices from \$1.63 a bushel to \$2.25.

Because of the large purchases, it is expected that American reserve stocks will drop to their lowest level in several years, but an official of the Department of Agriculture predicted that supplies would not fall so low as in 1967, when big shipments were made to India after two disastrous crop failures there.

Barring a repitition of such events and disappointing crop yields in the main producing countries, adequate grain will

not of shortage; the pinch will be in the price," the official said.

The aid agency known as CARE—Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere—and other private agencies said that the most pressing worry concerned shipping relief goods.

CARE, which operates free-lunch programs in 14 countries, including India, Turkey and Colombia, has been assured that it will continue to get wheat and other food supplies through next June 30 under Public Law 480, the so-called Food for Peace act, which provides for the sale of United States surplus foods to other nations.

However, since Soviet and Chinese purchases all may be moving out of the United States at the same time, CARE officials are worried about bottlenecks in railway freight yards and higher shipping costs. "Here's where we see our problem—not in the commodities," Fred Devine, deputy executive director, said.

Roman Catholic Relief Services, which also depends on supplies donated under Public Law 480 for its assistance in 82 countries, also was seeking assurances from Washington. The agency has been told that it can more or less count on

it" through June 30, according to Anthony Foddai, director of program and supplies.

Under the same law, 20 to 25 countries purchase American food under liberal terms; among them Indonesia, Pakistan, Korea and Israel.

The agreement with Israel was signed in October after the Soviet sales. An official of the Agriculture Department pointed this out to show that there had been no change so far in policy.

On the other hand, there have been reports from Washington that the Department of Agriculture intended to propose a cut of 50 per cent or more in the funds appropriated under Public Law 480, which amounted to \$1-billion for the current year.

Both the programs for donated foods and for sale to governments on liberal terms would be affected by the cutbacks.

Herbert J. Waters, who was assistant administrator for the Agency for International Development until 1967, has written to the Secretary of Agriculture, Earl L. Butz, saying such a cut would be a "terrible mistake" leading to a storm of disapproval in Congress and aid agencies.

Far East

THE SUNDAY STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., November 19, 1972

Neither Disengagement Nor Peace

By I. F. STONE

The pending cease-fire agreement, as so far disclosed by Hanoi and Washington, is like a delicate watch, intricately fabricated to make sure it won't work.

The fragility of the agreement to end the second Indochinese war is put in better focus if one compares it with the cease-fire which ended the first, at Geneva in 1954. The only signed document that emerged from the Geneva conference was a cease-fire agreement between the military commands on both sides. It was accompanied by a final declaration which nobody signed and to which the United States and the separate state the French had created in the south objected; then as now the puppet was more obdurate than the master.

The first Indochinese war ended, as the second seems to be doing, with a cease-fire but no political settlement. The prime defect, the "conceptual" flaw, to borrow a favorite word of Kissinger's, lay in the effort to end a profoundly political struggle without a political settlement. A cease-fire then, as now, left the political problem unresolved and thus led inevitably to a resumption of the conflict. It will be a miracle if the new cease-fire does not breed another, a third, Indochinese war.

A political solution was left to *manana* and "free elections." But the Geneva cease-fire agreement, disappointing as its results proved to be, was far more precise in its promise of free elections than is the new cease-fire. It set a firm date—July, 1956—for the balloting; specified that the purpose of the elections was "to bring about the unification of Vietnam" and provided for the release within 30 days not only of POWs but of "civilian internees", a term which, it was made clear, meant political prisoners.

NOBODY KNOWS how many thousands of political prisoners are in Thieu's jails. The most famous is Truong Dinh Dzu, the peace candidate who came in second in the 1967 presidential election, the first and only contested one. Thieu's most notorious instrument for these round-ups was Operation Phoenix, which the CIA ran for him. A Saigon Ministry of Information pamphlet, "Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace and Prosperity," boasts that Operation Phoenix killed 40,994 militants and activists during those years. These are the opposition's civilian troops, the cadres without which organizational effort in any free election would be crippled. Arrests have been intensified in preparation for a cease-fire.

The fate of the political prisoners figured prominently in the peace negotiations. The seven-point program put forward by the other side in July of last year called for the dismantling of Thieu's concentration camps and the release of all political prisoners. The eight-point proposal put forward by Washington and Saigon last January left their fate in doubt. It called for the simultaneous release of all POWs and "innocent civilians captured throughout Indo-

china." The ambiguous phrasing seemed designed to exclude political prisoners since these were neither "captured" nor, in the eyes of the Thieu regime, "innocent."

The new cease-fire terms do not bother with such ambiguity. Dr. Kissinger in his press conference of Oct. 26 seemed to take satisfaction in the fact that the return of U.S. POWs "is not conditional on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in the Vietnamese jails." Their future, he explained, will be determined "through negotiations among the South Vietnamese parties," i.e., between Thieu and the PRG. So the political prisoners will stay in jail until Thieu agrees to let them out. This may easily coincide with the Second Coming.

This is only one of the many built-in vetoes by which Thieu can block free elections and a political settlement. The new cease-fire agreement gives him far more power than he would have had under the proposals he and Nixon made jointly in January. Under Point 3 of those proposals, there was to have been "a free and democratic presidential election" in South Vietnam within six months. One month before the election, Thieu and his vice president were to resign. The president of the senate was to head a caretaker government which would "assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the elections".

Administrative responsibility for the election, according to those Nixon-Thieu terms, was to be taken out of the hands of the Saigon regime and put in those of a specially created electoral commission "organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement."

Finally the joint proposals of last January indicated that the electoral commission would be free from the inhibitions of the Thieu constitution, under which communist and neutralist candidates can be declared ineligible. According to those proposals, "All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates."

HOW MUCH WEAKER is the setup under the new cease-fire agreement. There is no provision for Thieu's resignation before the election. The existing government is no longer excluded from responsibility in holding the elections; no clear line is drawn between what the Thieu government can do and what an electoral commission will do: what happens if the latter is reduced to observing the irregularities of the former? Thieu will continue to be in control of the army and the police, and there is no way to keep him from using them to harass the opposition and herd the voters.

Instead of an electoral commission, the new agreement would set up a tripartite Council of National Reconciliation and Concord for much the

same purpose; indeed this council looks like the wan remains of a proposal for a coalition government but so whittled down and dependent on what powers Thieu consents to give it in negotiations as to make its future dubious.

The Hanoi broadcast of October 26 said that the council would have two functions. The first would be "to promote the implementation of the signed agreements by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the PRG) and the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam." But until Thieu negotiates and signs any such agreements, there will be nothing for it to implement, indeed there will be no council until he is ready to name his representatives so that it can begin to function.

The other purpose of the council, according to the Hanoi broadcast, would be "to organize the general elections." This is all Hanoi said on the subject. But Kissinger at his press conference phrased this differently. He said its task would be "to supervise the elections on which the parties might agree." What this means, Kissinger went on to explain, is that "the two parties in Vietnam would negotiate about the timing of the elections, the nature of the elections, and the offices for which these elections were to be held." This description was not contradicted in the press conference which Nguyen Thanh Le, the North Vietnamese spokesman, held in Paris next day in reply to Kissinger.

NOW WE CAN SEE how regressive the new agreement is. Instead of elections within six months, the timing depends on negotiations with Thieu. He can delay them as long as he chooses. The key office is that of the president but the offices for which elections are to be held again depend on Thieu; under South Vietnam's constitution he can claim that his mandate does not expire until 1976. Most important of all is Kissinger's phrase about the need to negotiate with Thieu on "the nature of the elections." For under this Thieu can block a new constitution.

To understand this last point fully it is useful to go back and look at the PRG statement of last February rejecting the Nixon-Thieu proposals of January. The PRG felt that free elections would be impossible unless Thieu resigned and his repressive apparatus was "dismantled." The PRG proposed the establishment of a tripartite coalition "to organize general elections to name a constituent assembly which will write a new constitution and set up a definitive government in the South."

Without a new constitution free elections are impossible. Under Thieu's constitution, as under Diem's, communists and neutralists have been outlawed, freedom of the press severely curtailed, rule by decree instituted, thousands of oppositionists interned on trumped-up charges or none at all. To leave the nature of the elections to be determined by negotiation between Thieu and the PRG is to give him the power to block any election for a constituent assembly.

The noncommunist opposition is a stepchild of the cease-fire, as it has always been the stepchild of U.S. policy: There are no guarantees of democratic liberties in the agreement and no provision for an independent third party in the three-tiered council. Each side will pick its own quota of "neutralists," so one half will be beholden to Thieu and half to Hanoi. This is a sour commentary on our long struggle to make South Vietnam "safe for democracy."

To top it all, if the council should be set up, it can operate only by unanimous decision. Each side thus has a built-in veto as a last resort. This is a machine built for deadlock. And the deadlock would maintain Thieu in power.

IF SUCH ARE the terms, why does Thieu balk at them and the other side insist that we

sign? The answer I believe is that the Vietnam war has been bypassed by the detente among Washington, Peking, and Moscow. Peking has been promised U.S. troop withdrawal from Taiwan once Southeast Asia is "stabilized." Moscow is being bailed out of the worst food crisis in years by Nixon. Hanoi's patrons are tired of the war, and each seems somewhat miffed by the much too independent Vietnamese. In short, Nixon can pretty much write his own terms and has.

The disclosure of the agreement by Hanoi was intended to produce headlines here that Nixon had thwarted an agreement for a cease-fire, that his broken promise to sign had set up a last minute block to a POW release. Instead, by quick and clever action the White House blanketed the country with headlines that peace was near—all except a few little details that needed to be ironed out. This was the greatest PR coup in years. It made it look as if Nixon had delivered on his promise of peace in four years when, in fact, he was again gambling with more lives and the POWs for better terms for Thieu, i.e., the "honorable"—the Korean—solution so long sought by Johnson to keep our satellite regime in power in the South.

Once the election is over—so all sides must have estimated—Nixon would be under less pressure to end the bombing, to remove the residual force, to bring the POWs home. So Hanoi gave as much as it felt it could—and more—to get a deal before the election. Nixon figured he didn't need the Oct. 31 signing to win the election. He took the concessions and decided to wait and ask for more. The other reason Thieu balked and Hanoi wanted these terms signed is that Thieu has little confidence in his regime and fears a U.S. withdrawal, while Hanoi may hope that if the United States really withdraws, Hanoi's forces will ultimately force Thieu out of office and install a neutralist or coalition regime.

ONE CYNICAL WAY to look at the provisions of the cease-fire agreement we have just been analyzing is to dismiss them as legalistic eyewash designed to keep Thieu happy while Nixon brings the POWs home and after "a decent interval" stands by and lets the other side take over. Hanoi may comfort itself with the thought that this agreement, unlike the one in 1954, leaves some 100,000 of its forces in the South, instead of regrouping them to the North, and that—on paper—the PRG is given recognition as a rival government.

But this rests, in my opinion, on a serious misreading of Nixon. His main problem in maintaining Thieu in power with the threat of renewed bombing was the POWs. A protracted war, even if it ultimately "faded away," would still leave him without a cease-fire or peace agreement, and without these he could not hope to get the prisoners back. By this agreement he gets the prisoners back and his hands are freed for further action if the cease-fire breaks down. If bombing then resumes, a new crop of U.S. POWs may begin to turn up in Hanoi jails.

When Kissinger was asked at his press conference of Oct. 26 what recourse the other side had "if the negotiations for the elections break down," he replied cryptically, "The agreement provides that the cease-fire is without limit." The cease-fire stays in effect even if the promise of new elections and a new regime is never fulfilled; the other side cannot take recourse in renewed war without the prospect of renewed bombing and shelling from the Seventh Fleet and our bases in Thailand and Guam.

Kissinger's siren song to Hanoi of "a decent

interval" before Saigon falls was for the birds. There is no sign that Nixon is preparing to get out of Southeast Asia. The latest reports seeping out of the State Department on its current Cambodian and Laotian negotiations indicate that we hope to keep both Lon Nol and Souvanna Phouma under our wing; the cease-fire agreement limits neither military nor economic aid to either regime.

As for aid to Thieu, no limit is set on economic aid. Military aid will continue to be substantial under the provisions allowing replacement of "armaments, munitions and war materiel that have been worn out or damaged after the cease-fire on the basis of piece for piece of similar characteristics and properties." What military metaphysics we shall see in that little comedy!

THIS IS the Nixon Doctrine in action, the old Dulles dream of letting Asians fight Asians on the ground while we, the supermen, maintain the Pax Americana from the skies.

And in the background, already becoming visible, are plans to do in South Vietnam on a large scale what we have done for so many years

in Laos in violation of the agreements there. That is, the CIA "civilianization" of military advisers and technicians to keep this big military establishment—and especially its air force—going.

Nixon, I think, would feel like a fool to pay so high a price to Moscow and Peking in trade and political favors and then let South Vietnam go down the drain. There is no reason to believe that he has any intention whatsoever of doing so.

The POW's may have to wait. The pending cease-fire, if signed, seems almost bound to breed recriminations and outbreaks of fighting. The experiment of a cease-fire "in place" in a guerrilla war promises to be bloody and destabilizing. What is shaping up threatens years of U.S. involvement.

This is neither disengagement for us nor peace for the people of Southeast Asia. It is a continuation of the same effort which began more than a quarter century ago under the French to stifle by force a political struggle for independence. We are imposing a new period of foreign-supported dictatorship on South Vietnam in the name of "self-determination."

I.F. Stone is contributing editor of the *New York Review of Books*, from which this article is reprinted.

WASHINGTON POST
19 November 1972

Settling the War on Hanoi's Terms

By Nguyen Tien Hung

The author was born in Thanhhoa, North Vietnam, later lived in South Vietnam, and is now an associate professor of economics at Howard University.

AS WASHINGTON AND Hanoi hold further secret peace negotiations in Paris, it is important to examine the extent of "compromise" by each side up to this time. In particular, the current draft agreement should be critically viewed in light of past proposals by the Communist side.

In his Oct. 26 news conference, presidential aide Henry Kissinger said: "This settlement is a compromise settlement in which neither side achieves everything... We do not consider this a coalition government, and we believe that President Thieu was speaking about previous versions of a Communist plan and not about this version of a Communist plan..."

But a careful examination of the Hanoi-Washington draft agreement reveals that, contrary to Kissinger's remarks, the Communist side has not only made almost no compromises in their original demands but, as the agreement now stands, they may have scored important gains.

The lack of Communist concessions includes the question of the fate of South Vietnamese President Thieu. In its original 1969 proposal, the Communist side did not demand Thieu's ouster. This demand was made only later, as American forces began withdrawing from South Vietnam. Hanoi was employing the bargaining tactic of raising its price two or three times above what it was really prepared to settle for, a practice as common in Vietnam as elsewhere.

Not only do the contents of the draft agreement bear a striking resemblance

to the original version of the Communist plan, but the language does as well, suggesting that the essence of the draft actually was presented to Kissinger by Hanoi, rather than resulting from a step-by-step joint effort.

Although there have been several proposals from the Communist side over the past few years, Hanoi's original and basic position was contained in a 4-point plan proposed on April 8, 1965. The National Liberation Front's basic position was contained in its 10-point plan proposed on May 8, 1969. Since the NLF plan was derived directly from the Hanoi plan, comparison here is made between the 1969 NLF plan and the current Hanoi-Washington draft pact.

The English version of the 1969 NLF ten points cited here was the one provided by the NLF delegation itself in Paris, so there is no possibility of misunderstanding caused by translation difficulties. The text of the Hanoi-Washington draft accord is from Hanoi Radio's broadcast of Oct. 26, 1972.

NLF POINT 1: "To respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, i.e., independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam."

Article 1 of the Hanoi-Washington (H-W) draft is virtually identical.

NLF POINT 2: "The United States must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, arms and war material, and all troops... of the other foreign countries of the U.S. camp without imposing any condition whatsoever."

H-W Article 2 stipulates: "The United States will stop all its military activities, and end the bombing and mining in North Vietnam. Within 60 days there will be a total withdrawal

from South Vietnam of troops and military personnel of the United States and those of the foreign countries allied with the United States and with the Republic of Vietnam." The present draft thus gives the Communist side more than their original demand by specifying the period of withdrawal as 60 days.

H-W Article 2 also adds: "The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops... armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam. The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodical replacements of armaments, munitions... after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece for piece of similar characteristics and properties..." This article leaves North Vietnam completely free to accept new armaments, munitions and war materials within its own borders to rebuild its military strength.

NLF POINT 3: "The question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves."

H-W Article 4 states: "The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties..."

NLF POINT 4: "The people of South Vietnam... decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam through free and democratic general elections. Through free and democratic general elections a constituent assembly will be set up, a constitution worked out, and a coalition government of South Vietnam installed reflecting national concord and the broad union of all social strata."

H-W Article 4 says: "The South Viet-

name people shall decide themselves the future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision . . . An administrative structure called the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments will be set up to promote the implementation of the signed agreement by the PRG and GVN and to organize the general elections . . . Only the term "international supervision" is added to the election provision; however, "international supervision" was already included in NLF Point 10, as will be seen.

The most important change here is from the term "coalition government" to "administrative structure," a change that will also be discussed later. And it is significant to note that H-W Article 4 adds the "formation of the Councils at lower levels" of the government to the NLF's Point 4.

NLF POINT 5: ". . . neither party shall impose its political regime on the people of South Vietnam . . ." All factions "that stand for peace, independence and neutrality" are allowed to enter into talks to "set up a provisional coalition government."

The "no imposition" clause is contained in H-W Article 4: "The United States . . . does not seek to impose a pro-American regime in Saigon." The inclusion of the other factions is explicit in provision for the "three equal segments" composition of the Council of Reconciliation.

NLF POINT 6: "South Vietnam will carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality."

H-W Article 4 commits the United States "not to impose a pro-American regime in Saigon." The neutrality of

Laos and Cambodia, also included in the NLF's Point 6, is provided for by H-W Article 7.

NLF POINT 7: "The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means . . ."

H-W Article 5 repeats the same sentence.

NLF POINT 8: "As provided for in the 1954 Geneva Agreement . . . the two zones North and South of Vietnam undertake to refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries . . ."

Provisions for "no military alliance" and related matters are contained in H-W Articles 2, 4, and 7, as previously noted.

NLF POINT 9: "To resolve the aftermath of war: a) The parties will negotiate the release of the army men captured in the war. b) The U.S. government must bear full responsibility for the losses and devastations it has caused to the Vietnamese people in both zones."

H-W Article 4 provides for the "return of all captured and detained personnel," while H-W Article 8 specifies that "the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction in the DRVN and throughout Indochina."

NLF POINT 10: "The parties shall reach agreement on an international supervision about the withdrawal . . ."

H-W Article 6, as noted earlier, provides the framework for international supervision of the agreement.

Two Main Conclusions

FROM ALL THIS, two principal conclusions can be drawn. First, all of the NLF's original 10 points are contained in the current Hanoi-Washing-

ton draft pact, either explicitly or implicitly. And, second, the contention that Hanoi has dropped two demands—one on "coalition government" and another on "veto over the personality of the existing government"—is highly questionable.

On the coalition question, it is apparent that the "National Council of Reconciliation" in the Hanoi-Washington draft text is similar to the "Provisional Coalition Government" in Point 5 of the 1969 NLF plan. Granted, the functions of the Provisional Coalition Government are specified in the NLF plan, while they are not explicit in the current draft accord. But North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van Dong, in an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave of Newsweek, specifically referred to the current plan as a "three-sided coalition of transition."

Regarding Hanoi's supposed concession of its veto over personalities of the present government, the demand for resignation of President Thieu, as previously noted, was not in the original NLF plan and was added later only for bargaining purposes.

It can be concluded, then, that in addition to getting all the NLF's original ten points in the current draft agreement, the Communist side scored new gains, the most significant one being Hanoi's ability to leave inside South Vietnam a large number of North Vietnam's best troops, most of whom came to the South since the invasion which began last Easter. Thus, even if the United States succeeds in the new round of talks to remove most of the Northern troops, South Vietnam would not gain anything new compared to the position that existed prior to April, 1972.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1972

Doctors' Trip to Hanoi Reported Put Off

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—Secretary of State William P. Rogers reportedly urged Senator Edward M. Kennedy today not to send a team of five prominent United States physicians to North Vietnam "at this time."

Senator Kennedy reportedly pledged that if the team went it would involve itself solely in humanitarian and not in "political" matters. He is said to have promised Mr. Rogers that any information gathered concerning the condition of United States prisoners would be immediately furnished the State Department.

Mr. Kennedy is also said to have argued that the Administration should encourage—not discourage—a bipartisan approach in Congress to the vast future task of binding up Indochina's wounds.

Nonetheless, according to Congressional sources, Mr. Kennedy agreed to defer sending his medical group until Mr. Rogers had conferred further with other key Administration officials. The two men are expected to communicate again tomorrow.

Mr. Rogers reportedly warned the Massachusetts Democrat that the planned visit—in response to an invitation from the Hanoi Government on Aug. 22—would complicate delicate cease-fire negotiations. The two men met alone for a half hour at noon in Mr. Rogers' office.

Mr. Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, was reported last Sunday to have accepted the invitation and recruited the doctors, although he was not going himself.

It was reported that Mr. Kennedy intended to dispatch the medical group the day after the elections. However, the State Department then issued a statement warning that "it would be unwise and inappropriate for any such group to undertake such a mission at this time."

The doctors who have agreed to participate in the mission are Nevil S. Scrimshaw of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Joseph English, president of the Hospital Corporation of New York; David French, a pediatric surgeon with the Boston University School of Medicine; John M. Levinson, a gynecologist and population expert

Michael J. Halberstam, a Washington physician and cardiologist.

Mr. Rogers is said to have stressed that the Administration would have no objection to the visit at a later unspecified date.

Sources close to Senator Kennedy said later that there were indications that the White House had privately indicated less vigorous objections to the visit than had Mr. Rogers.

State Department officials conceded that there was no way in which the department could legally block the departure of the team other than by persuasion.

Mr. Kennedy was reported to have insisted to Secretary Rogers that the team's planned visit to North Vietnam—as well as eventually to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—would be apolitical and humanitarian. He is understood to have stressed that the team's departure had already been delayed until after the elections

to avoid enmeshing it in politics.

He is also said to have asked why the visit of a group of doctors investigating Indochina's health and relief needs would be more embarrassing to the Administration now than in one or two or three weeks.

State Department officials pointed out later that the team would be the first group officially invited to North Vietnam representing the United States Congress—an arm of Government.

By contrast, these officials said, American peace activist groups and individuals as well as journalists who have been visiting North Vietnam in recent months have done so unofficially and with their own funds.

Peace Activists in Hanoi

Currently, for instance, a group of seven American peace activists are visiting Hanoi. The group entered North Vietnam last Saturday and is due to depart this Saturday.

WASHINGTON STAR
12 November 1972

A Dim View of the Cease-Fire

By FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM

Amidst the widespread sense of relief and euphoria over the promise of peace in Vietnam, it may be suggested that the cease-fire terms—or what we know of them nearly three weeks after the original Hanoi broadcast—do not constitute "peace with honor and not surrender" and do not usher in a "generation of peace."

On the contrary, considering the circumstances under which they became known, and stripped of Dr. Kissinger's obfuscating rhetoric, these terms amount to nothing less than a thinly disguised surrender to terrorism and aggression. They are surrender on the installment plan, the most shocking betrayal of its kind since Britain and France—with President Roosevelt's indirect support—agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938.

To understand the full significance of the cease-fire settlement, it is necessary to recall how the struggle in Vietnam began in earnest in the early 1960s. The war was the direct result of the determination of Viet Cong guerrillas, supported by Communist North Vietnam, to undermine and overthrow the Republic of South Vietnam. At first that effort was carried on largely by terrorism and insurrection, but when this effort proved insufficient Communist North Vietnam sent its own forces into South Vietnamese territory to assist the Viet Cong in overthrowing the South Vietnamese government.

THANKS LARGELY to American assistance—initiated by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, greatly expanded (in response to rapidly growing Communist infiltration and aggression) by President Johnson, and continued by President Nixon—the Communist attempt to take over South Vietnam by force seemed to have been defeated. Now, after the second massive Communist offensive in four years has ended in failure, the United States appears to have agreed to a cease-fire whose result is almost certain to be a Communist victory and the destruction of an independent South Vietnam.

If the manner in which the cease-fire agreement first became known was not sufficiently disturbing, it is appalling to note that the American people have still not been told by their own government the specific terms of that agreement, and strangely enough it seems not to have occurred to any journalist or newspaper to demand that these terms be made public fully and immediately.

THE TERMS of the agreement that have already been disclosed, however, are bad enough. In the first place, the large number of North Vietnamese troops, who crossed the so-called "demilitarized zone" set up by the 1954 Geneva Conference, are to be permitted to stay where they are, with not even a pretense that they are to be withdrawn at some future date. All American troops and advisers, on the other hand, are to be withdrawn within 60 days of the signing of the agreement, and so are all South Korean and other allied forces still in South Vietnam.

Since the Nixon administration has issued no maps or statistics, it is not known how large an area or how many people will be left under Communist control, but we may be sure that both are considerable—living proof that aggression does indeed pay.

Second, although South Vietnam is and remains largely dependent on continued American logistic support, the United States has apparently

agreed to send South Vietnam only replacements of weapons previously supplied. What will the United States do if the North Vietnamese—and other Communist states including China and Russia—illegally reinforce and resupply the Communist forces remaining behind in South Vietnam, and what assurances—or paper promises—has the United States obtained that there will be no such illegal logistic reinforcement on the other side?

Third, while the cease-fire agreement establishes a so-called "Council of National Reconciliation and Concord" for the avowed purpose of conducting "free and democratic elections," that body seems highly unlikely to accomplish its assigned task.

Since the proposed "Council" can act only by unanimous consent—that is, the Communists are from the beginning given a veto on all its decisions—what will happen if, as may be expected, the "Council" soon becomes deadlocked and unable to function? "The most likely prospect," the anti-war New York Times editorialized over the weekend, "is for a period of political chaos after the last G. I. departs." Recalling what happened in East Germany, Poland, and various Balkan countries after 1945, do President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger really believe—and can they ask the American people to believe—that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese will permit "free and democratic" elections in the areas remaining under their control?

Fourth, at his press conference Dr. Kissinger suggested that, once a cease-fire had gone into effect, the United States would "contribute significantly" to the reconstruction of North Vietnam, and, in a widely circulated analysis of the latest Vietnam developments, Victor Zorza, a well-known commentator on Communist affairs, has gone so far as to compare such promised assistance—and its likely glowing results—with the assistance the United States extended to Germany and Japan after 1945. "Not only," he writes, "did the United States finance the recovery of Germany, and of Japan—a fierce enemy, more hated and distrusted in the United States than North Vietnam ever was... American money poured into both countries. Could something like this happen in Vietnam? It could—and will."

Mr. Zorza appears to have forgotten, however, that the United States did not extend economic aid to Hitler and to the Japanese government that gave us Pearl Harbor. And one wonders what American reaction would have been if, say, in 1944 or early 1945 Radio Berlin announced that President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins had secretly negotiated a standstill cease-fire agreement with Hitler and Hirohito, to be followed by large-scale American economic assistance to their governments?

FIFTH, since the Vietnamese war—it should be remembered—was the direct result of the determination of successive American Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—that South Vietnam should be permitted to decide its own destiny, it seems incredible that the United States should, in effect, have agreed to cease-fire terms with the enemies of South Vietnam behind the back of South Vietnam and largely against the wishes of that government—a government which, it should be recalled, rightly refused to sign the 1954 Geneva agreements, which provided for the initial partition of Vietnam and set the stage for renewed Communist terrorism and aggression.

If the South Vietnamese government should now refuse to sign the proposed cease-fire agree-

ment, among other things, on the ground that North Vietnamese troops will continue to occupy parts of its territory, will the United States find ways and means of coercing its ally into signing, will the United States sign alone, or will the United States recognize the justified objections of the South Vietnamese?

It should be added that with Dr. Kissinger now referring to the North Vietnamese Communists as the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam", and the United States secretly agreeing to extend massive economic assistance to the same government whose forces have killed and maimed tens of thousands of young Americans over the past 10 years, it is hardly surprising that the governments of South Korea and the Philippines are becoming increasingly concerned about their future internal security, and that Japan and other Pacific states are turning increasingly toward Communist China, much as various European powers began to seek an accommodation with Hitler once it became clear that the Western democracies were not standing up to Nazi Germany.

Sixth, it seems apparent that the cease-fire agreement — or what we know of its terms up to this time — makes no provision for what is to be done in the not unlikely event that the cease-fire

breaks down. Suppose, as seems not unlikely that after a respectable interval, Communist-backed subversion, terrorism, and open aggression resume against what remains of South Vietnam? Obviously, the proposed international control commission — including as it probably will two Communist countries — can be counted upon to do nothing. In that event, will the United States stand by and watch South Vietnam be destroyed much as the Western democracies watched helplessly as Hitler took over what remained of Czechoslovakia six months after Munich?

LOOKING AT the diplomatic Trojan horse Dr. Kissinger has brought back from Paris, we might do well to recall an aphorism adapted by the late Somerset Maugham from a reflection of Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War. "If a nation values anything more than freedom", he wrote, "it will lose its freedom, and the irony of it is that, if it is comfort and money that it values more, it will lose that too."

* * * * *

Francis L. Loewenheim is associate professor of history at Rice University. He has edited and contributed to a number of volumes, including "Peace or Appeasement? Hitler, Chamberlain and the Munich Crisis" (1965).

WASHINGTON POST
21 November 1972



Tom Braden

Are America's Young Men Fools?

IN DAVID HALBERSTAM'S new book, "The Best and the Brightest," there is a quotation at which Halberstam pokes great fun. It is from a speech delivered by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk during the Korean war. Reading it, I could not avoid the following questions: Are the young men fools? Or are we? Here is what Dean Rusk said:

"Our foreign policy has been reflected in our willingness to submit atomic weapons to international law, in feeding and clothing those stricken by war, in supporting free elections and government by consent, in building factories and dams, power plants and railways, schools and hospitals, in improving seed and stock and fertilizer, in stimulating markets and improving the skills and techniques of others in a hundred different ways. Let these things stand in contrast to a foreign policy directed toward the extension of tyranny and using the big lie, sabotage, suspicion, riots and assassinations as its tools. The great strength of the United States is devoted to the peaceful pursuits of our people and to the decent opinions of mankind."

To which Halberstam adds, "It was vintage Rusk and he believed it. What Rusk said was an expression of his real views."

To which I find myself saying, "Why not? What's wrong with those views? What is so funny about them? Were they not—at the time—a fairly accurate statement of the difference between U.S. foreign policy and that of the Soviet Union?"

"AT THE TIME," I remind myself. The distinction is important. The worst thing about Vietnam—as bad or worse than all the dead in Vietnam—is that what an American could say about his country in 1952 can be cited as a funny joke 20 years later; that a lot of bright and able Americans have grown up to believe that the foreign policy their country has demonstrated in Vietnam—a policy based upon self-deceit and using techniques of assassination, indiscriminate bombing and the brutal and not always accidental shooting of civilians—is, quite simply, what their country stands for.

Which is more damaging? What we have done to the Vietnamese? Or what we have done to ourselves? The

first is visible. Sen. Edward Kennedy's staff counts the civilian dead to date at 400,000, at least half of them killed by American air power; the refugees at 8 million. Those who delude themselves that invading North Vietnamese armies drove these simple people from their villages are guilty of failure to imagine the weight of 7 million tons of American bombs.

But the second is equally horrible, and Halberstam's book is an example of the horror. Vietnam has raised an entire generation of Americans who simply do not believe that their country ever did stand for the decent objectives Dean Rusk could talk about in 1952.

OF COURSE, Dean Rusk believed what he was saying, because what he was saying was true. It was true in Germany and Japan and England and France and Italy. It was true in India and in African nations; and not only was it true, but the fact of Mr. Rusk's saying it expressed an equally important truth: namely, that Americans could be proud of themselves.

Maybe Mr. Nixon will shortly stop us from further

injuring Vietnam. The peace talks hint of some attempt on our part to repair the damage we have done. But we are getting out without ever admitting that we were wrong to get in; we are still pretending that we were right to get in; our weakness, Mr. Nixon seems to be telling us, was not in our policy but in our will. So long as an older generation maintains this fiction, so long will the younger generation scoff at a past they ought to hold dear.

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WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1972

Amnesty Complains To Seoul on Arrests

LONDON, Nov. 13 (AP)—Amnesty International, an organization concerned with political prisoners throughout the world, expressed grave concern today to the South Korean government about the reported arrest of four Amnesty representatives in South Korea, including a Roman Catholic bishop.

Amnesty said it learned during the weekend that Bishop Daniel Tji of Wonju had been placed under house arrest. Amnesty said no reason had been given for the detention order, adding that the bishop and three others were refused visitors and their telephone calls were being tapped.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
8 November 1972

The war and the wherefore

FRANCES FITZGERALD, author of 'Fire in the Lake', talks to Rosemarie Wittman

WHAT do you say to a girl, hardly older than yourself, whose book on one of the most complex wars in history, Vietnam, has been described by Arthur Schlesinger Junior as "superb," by John Kenneth Galbraith as "with the best," and by others as "the most sensitive, the most ambitious, and the most eloquent book ever to examine American intervention in Vietnam against its historical setting."

Having read "Fire in the Lake" one has to stand back and admire, and wonder, how she did it, and why. Frances Fitzgerald is 32, a tall girl with long blonde hair and a diffident manner. She speaks softly but intensely about Vietnam. She is not the arrogant Great Lady Reporter. She could be a young college lecturer.

It is her cool, lucid, analytical mind and a way with prose that makes her special. When she first went to Vietnam in 1966 she spent most of her time in Saigon. While other reporters were flying off covering day-to-day battles, Frances was interviewing Government officials, colonels, advisers, bureaucrats, and then going home to ponder and then analyse what they thought, and did, and why.

"When I first arrived in 1966 there was this Buddhist crisis and the Government disappeared and everything fell apart. It occurred to me that nobody knew what was going on. The Americans didn't understand their allies, much less their enemies! I felt I just had to find about that. My question was always, what exactly are we doing here?"

For her writing on politics and the social and economic conditions of Vietnam under the Americans, Frances won the Overseas Press Club Award in 1967. She had gone to Vietnam at the age of 25 with just a year's experience in journalism, intending to stay a few weeks and write freelance articles for American magazines. But she became so fascinated with the war that she decided to stay and she stayed a year. The book developed over the next five years.

"When I got back to America I did a piece for Atlantic Monthly called 'The Maze of Vietnamese Politics,' which turned out to be a sketch for the book. Then I started trying to do research into Vietnam, which is difficult in America. I spent a long time talking to Paul Mus, at Yale, who was really the only source. He provided a basic reading list.

"Then I did a series of essays, on certain political aspects. Why it was the Diem regime didn't work out, for example. I found I had to read an enormous amount of history because nobody knew any Vietnamese history. So I was writing history backwards and because I started writing in 1967 I found myself writing history forwards, too. We are now in 1972 and that's a

good span of war history."

"Fire in the Lake" is not all history. It is remarkable because for the first time an American has taken the trouble to look behind the war into the factors that influence Vietnamese attitudes. The first two chapters of the book outline the intellectual background of the Vietnamese and describe how their Eastern, partly Chinese, culture cannot conceive of the way Americans think or behave... and vice versa.

Another key chapter describes how Confucianism and Marxism have blended and merged in Vietnamese thinking, at all levels. "I start from the premise, which none of these counter-insurgency people do, that this is a revolution we are dealing with. That, to me, is the only explanation for how long it has gone on."

One of the most fascinating chapters, with direct quotes from members of the National Liberation Front, is about the Vietcong and how they infiltrate and gain the loyalty of peasant villages in North and South, even apparently "pacified" villages. How did she get this material?

"The Rand Corporation did a series of interviews with prisoners. Thousands and thousands of them. I got hold of about 50 of these. At the same time a lot of Rand people and systems analysts were doing particular features of the NLF for themselves. And Douglas Pike wrote a book called 'Vietcong' which has a wealth of material, and a simply nonsensical interpretation, so I would use all of these people who themselves were doing primary research with documents that were classified. Many said that the NLF simply consisted of cadres of men who come in and organise the villages. But I say organisation is there but it represents an ideology, a way of thinking, that must come first. They say they have none. I say without it the NLF could not succeed."

Frances says she first got into the question of culture when she was studying at Redcliffe, and thinks she really should have studied anthropology instead of history. She never went to graduate school. "In a way writing this book was like doing a PhD, only much better because I didn't have to stay within the obedient academic world. I'd be much too good as a graduate student, much too impressed by authority."

The book is dedicated to Paul Mus and her father, who, she says, influenced her a lot. He worked for the CIA, and though her parents were divorced when she was very young, she saw a great deal of him as she grew up. "I adored him. I really did. I dedicated the book to him because he had very much the same ideas about people's politics being part of their history. And thinking that something

quite profound is happening when societies become transformed by ideology. That's really what gave my father a clue that we wouldn't be winning the war in Vietnam."

She has very little interest in Women's Lib in America. "I'm more interested in Vietnam than in American women. I am concerned with political oppression. They are concerned with psychological repression, which is an important problem but not quite like ending the war!

"Basically Women's Lib is a lot of upper class, well-educated women making their own fight. It's not something that affects large parts of this country. There's no connection with working-class women and that's what's wrong with it. If they don't make a political connection they're going to trickle out."

She says that writing about Vietnam has taught her that individual character, however different, is largely created by political forces. "It teaches you that professional definition is the answer to almost everything. The CIA is a very good example. The CIA has been right about Vietnam for a long time. It has been very wrong about Laos. Nobody listens to the CIA in Vietnam, it is simply reporting. But in Laos it's really operating these huge secret armies and its interest is in getting the job done, not reporting what's going on. The same is true of the military in Vietnam and various civilian agencies. They're writing their own report cards all the time and it's very difficult to report your own failure."

She says she started out as a liberal and is now fairly radical about Vietnam. When I spoke to her last month she was very depressed about the possibility of Nixon winning the presidency again, assuming that this means four more years of war.

When the book was published she was made an honorary fellow at Harvard and she is now going to turn her attention to the US. She says she would like to write intellectual history.

"Vietnam has been a very important experience for people in my generation and younger. Exactly what they will do now is something else. All those people who drop out and live on farms, they don't change anything, though it's nice for them. There's so little analysis of what's wrong. We're such a consensus race, people don't ask. There's a terrific amount of unease, a feeling that things are going wrong. You see this enormous executive power which is completely out of control, by Congress or the people.

"Maybe there are no solutions, but I'm an analyst and I want to find out exactly what it is that's wrong."

"Fire in the Lake," is published tomorrow by Macmillan, £5.50.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Nov. 20, 1972

Amnesty Group Warns on Prisoners

LONDON, Nov. 29 (AP)—Amnesty International said today it has told President Nixon and Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam that it is concerned over safeguards to be provided for 200,000 civilians held in jail in South Vietnam when the war ends.

Sean MacBride, chairman of Amnesty's executive committee and a former Irish foreign minister, has written to both leaders expressing fears that the prisoners might be massacred unless adequate arrangements are made for them in the current peace negotiations.

Sunday, Nov. 26, 1972

THE WASHINGTON POST

What Split in North Vietnam?

By D. Gareth Porter

The writer, who two months ago challenged the Nixon administration assertion that the North Vietnamese massacred half a million people while imposing land reform in the 1950s, is a research associate at Cornell University's project on the International Relations of East Asia.

WITH THE SHIFT in North Vietnam's position on negotiated settlement, some analysts are suggesting that a struggle between contending factions of the party leadership has ended in a victory for those who favor a strategic retreat from the war in the South. This is only the latest version of the old claims of disunity in the North Vietnamese politburo, which has been argued by Victor Zorza and P. J. Honey for many years.

Since the Paris talks began nearly five years ago, and especially since the death of Ho Chi Minh in September, 1969, Zorza has consistently maintained that Hanoi's leaders are divided between "hawk" and "dove" factions on the war in South Vietnam. His latest analysis, in the Oct. 15 Outlook, claims to see the final defeat of those who have for so long advocated a heavy military commitment in the South.

The argument that the politburo has been divided by opposing factions has also been pushed for at least a decade by the University of London's P. J. Honey. And Prof. Nguyen Tien Hung of Howard University supports this interpretation in his Oct. 29 Outlook article.

The idea of a power struggle behind the scenes in Hanoi has so enchanted Western observers over the years that it has lured them away from the path of careful scholarship. The methods of Kremlinology used successfully to pinpoint the issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute as well as those dividing Soviet and Chinese leadership groups—interpreting the political significance of differing formulations of ideological principles, changes of emphasis and even omitted phrases—have not been the basis for this interpretation of North Vietnamese politics. On the

basis of a misunderstanding of North Vietnam's agrarian policy, some analysts had decided by the early 1960s that there was a split in the politburo between a faction led by Truong Chinh, the party secretary-general until 1956 and now chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and one led by Le Duan, who became secretary-general in 1960.

False Dichotomies

FOR MANY YEARS, it was accepted as fact that Truong Chinh was "pro-Chinese" because of a land reform program which supposedly imitated the Chinese model and used Chinese advisers. Because of their alleged opposition to the land reform, Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap were categorized as "pro-Soviet." On the basis of this supposed cleavage in the politburo, P. J. Honey even claimed in his book, "Communism in North Vietnam," that Truong Chinh's pro-Chinese group had taken over while Ho Chi Minh was in Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in October and November of 1957. The Hanoi press and radio, he said, refused to mention Ho's activities in Moscow, and politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh insulted his Russian guests by quoting extensively from Mao Tse-tung at a meeting marking the Russian Revolution.

A more careful examination of the documents relating to the land reform program and the 1957 observance of the October Revolution in Hanoi, however, would have dispelled the popular notion of a power struggle between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions of the politburo. The land reform was not an imitation of the Chinese model but was specifically tailored to the Vietnamese political and economic conditions. Nor is there any evidence that it was pushed through over the objections of a "pro-Soviet" faction. Truong

Chinh had to step down as secretary-general because of a failure to exercise strict enough supervision over the implementation of land reform and party reorganization, not because he had been responsible for a "pro-Chinese" policy.

As for the 1957 takeover by the Truong Chinh faction, it appears to have been a figment of Prof. Honey's imagination. In fact, the Hanoi press carried full reports of Ho Chi Minh's activities in Moscow almost every day, and Nguyen Duy Trinh's "Maoist" speech on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, the full text of which appeared in Nhan Dan a few days later, did not quote Mao at all.

The foundation of the factional interpretation is thus a series of misconceptions about the North Vietnamese leadership. On the assumption that Truong Chinh and Le Duan are fundamentally at odds with each other, Zorza, Honey and others have attributed to each of them policy views which are not supported by an objective reading of their speeches and writings. These analysts have constructed a series of false dichotomies of strategy where none exist.

One of the alleged dichotomies is between a "big war" or "quick victory" strategy, which the analysts have associated with Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap, and a "guerrilla warfare" or "protracted war" strategy associated with Truong Chinh. The same dichotomy is portrayed by both Prof. Honey and Prof. Hung in terms of Truong Chinh's emphasis on "political struggle" as opposed to the emphasis by Le Duan and Gen. Giap on "military struggle."

Zorza has written that Truong Chinh's August, 1968, report in which he exhorted cadres to "grasp the motto of the 'long drawn-out' fight and relying mainly on one's self," was an implicit rebuff to Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap, whom Zorza holds responsible for the Tet offensive. But the same report formulated the tasks of the revolution in the South in such a way as to rule out a defensive strategy: "Strive to wipe out as much of the enemy's strength as possible; powerfully develop our people's armed forces and political forces; cause the disintegration of the puppet army."

In fact, neither Truong Chinh nor anyone else in the politburo has ever asserted that "protracted war" means the repudiation of a general offensive with big-unit warfare. North Vietnamese military theory has never regarded the concept of the "offensive strategy," under which main force units have been committed to battle in the South, as incompatible with the principle of "protracted war."

The complementary relationship between the two principles was discussed in a letter said to have been written by Le Duan in 1966 and captured by U.S. troops in 1967. The author declared that the command was "firmly adhering to the principle of a protracted war, at present and in the future." At the same time, however, he explained that the party's central committee had

endorsed the concept of achieving "ultimate victory in a relatively short period of time." The two concepts, he concluded, "are not in the least contradictory with each other," because "at present, we are on the offensive and not on the defensive."

The conflict has remained "protracted," according to Vietnamese military doctrine, not because the balance of forces in the South has been favorable to the South but because the Americans have refused to recognize the fundamental weakness of their strategic position. Although the Tet offensive failed to cause the disintegration of the Saigon army or to hold urban objectives, Hanoi military theorists never admitted going back to the strategic defensive; instead the concept of the "offensive strategy" has become more complex.

Gradual Steps and Leaps

NOTHING SHOWS MORE clearly the error of viewing the North Vietnamese politburo as divided between advocates of "protracted war" and "quick victory" than the analysis written by Le Duan for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Lao Dong Party in 1970. The essay reaffirms the "offensive posture" of the revolutionary forces in the South, analyzing the strategy as one of "ever fiercer assaults which assume higher and higher forms, alternating gradual steps with leaps." At times, it concedes, the military struggle "may take on a defensive character, but this is only a temporary tactical move aimed at clearing the way for continuation of the offensive."

The strategy did not emphasize either guerrilla operations or main-force units over the other. On the one hand, the author embraced the motto, "to fight a protracted war, gaining strength as one fights"; on the other hand, he called for the combining of military attack and political struggle to "make very important leaps apt to change the relation of forces and the face of the war."

What is most interesting about this analysis is that it represented, according to the party newspaper, *Nhan Dan*, the "collective ideas" of the politburo, which discussed and gave full approval to Le Duan's draft before it was presented to the public. The consensus of the North Vietnamese leadership has thus supported a strategy which combines the two principles alleged by Western observers to be polar positions.

It is equally misleading for Prof. Hung to cite Truong Chinh's 1972 essay, "On Current Front Efforts," as evidence that he was opposed to a new military offensive and supported primary reliance on political struggle instead. For, although he called for urban political struggle, Truong Chinh also formulated the military task in a way that is hardly compatible with a retreat to low-level guerrilla fare. The liberation forces, he wrote, "must annihilate as much of the U.S. puppets' potential as possible, especially their mobile strategic forces." It was Saigon's mobile strategic forces,

of course, which were among the major objectives of the country-wide military offensive that began two months later.

The "Great Rear"

THE SECOND QUESTION on which Le Duan and Truong Chinh are said to have been at odds is the relative priority to be given to socialist construction in the North and to the prosecution of the war in the South. Prof. Honey characterizes Truong Chinh as fearing that the socialist system of North Vietnam is endangered by the "subordination of everything to the prosecution of the war," while Le Duan "maintains that priority No. 1 must be winning the war in South Vietnam." This description of the alleged argument is also supported by Prof. Hung, who suggests that Le Duan wants to use the country's "entire resources" to reunify the country by force. Similarly, Zorza cites documents which he says show Truong Chinh has long led a faction that puts primary emphasis on "socialist construction" in the North as against those who favor major military campaigns in the South.

Ever since the country was divided into two zones, the relationship between the socialist revolution in the North and the liberation of the South has been a central theme, reflected in North Vietnamese theoretical documents for more than a decade. These documents have invariably repeated the substance, if not the words, of the resolution of the Third Party Congress of September, 1960.

That resolution stated that each zone had its own distinct task: The North was to "carry out the socialist revolution," while the South was to carry out the "national democratic revolution," liberating itself from American control. The two tasks were conceived as being "closely related" and having a positive influence on each other. Socialist construction would make the North "more and more powerful in every field," thus aiding the revolution in the South, which would in turn help defend the North from possible American attack.

The resolution also established the principle that the "most decisive task" for the revolution as a whole was the socialist revolution in the North, insuring that progress toward the building of socialism would not be reversed in the course of the struggle to liberate the South. This remained the guiding principle even after the American intervention in South Vietnam and the massive bombing of the North created what the party called "the new situation."

Party leaders began to refer to North Vietnam as the "great rear" giving "active support" to the "great frontline" in the South. But it was Gen. Giap, the man alleged to have favored military involvement in the South over socialism in the North, who reminded his compatriots of the primacy of the socialist revolution in 1965. In the October, 1965, issue of *Tuyen Huan*, Giap wrote that it was necessary to "clearly realize that the

responsibility to build socialism in North Vietnam is the most decisive to the overall revolution in our country."

A United Leadership

SO WHEN TRUONG CHINH or any other party spokesman or publication emphasizes the primacy of "socialist construction" for the North, he is not taking one side in a fierce struggle for control of policy but merely restating a generally accepted principle. Contrary to Zorza's claim, Truong Chinh's August, 1968, essay did not declare a shift in emphasis to socialist construction; on the contrary, his discussion of socialist construction emphasized that it had to take place in the setting of continued war. He referred to the people of North Vietnam as "continuing the socialist transformation and socialist construction," but he made it clear that the "central task" of the socialist economy was to "meet the growing requirements of the resistance of all the people."

Nor did his speech announce a new policy on negotiations with the Americans. It merely referred to the Hanoi statement of April 3, 1968, some five months earlier. Truong Chinh did not indicate any hope for substantial results from the Paris talks, nor did he "juxtapose" them with a "socialist construction." There was, in short, nothing in this speech to suggest that he advocated any lessening of the military pressure in the South for the sake of economic and political stability in the North.

Moreover, Truong Chinh's 1972 essay, already cited, gives no support to the notion that he regards socialist construction and the military campaign in the South as mutually exclusive. "If we do not fight and defeat the Americans," he wrote, "they will not let us peacefully and successfully build socialism." It may well be, of course, that major statements by Truong Chinh, like those of Le Duan, actually represent the consensus of the politburo rather than his individual views. But that would merely underline the mistake of trying to find deep cleavages in the Hanoi leadership on its basic strategic problems.

The negotiated settlement which the North Vietnamese are now prepared to accept would indeed represent a major retreat from the struggle in the South if it were the result of a victory within the politburo of a group which had always opposed the heavy commitment of North Vietnamese regular units in the South. The evidence points, however, to the opposite conclusion: The North Vietnamese concessions are the result of the careful weighing of all factors — military, political and diplomatic — by a leadership which remains united in its objectives.

Hanoi may well believe that the 1972 general offensive, which regained large areas of central Vietnam and threw even more territory into contested status, puts the revolutionary forces in a stronger position to defeat the Thieu regime under a cease-fire arrangement than at any time since the American military buildup reached its peak in 1968. But

that does not mean that Hanoi's leaders will shrink from more heavy fighting if and when they believe it is necessary.

NEW YORK TIMES 16 November 1972 U.S. VIETNAM AIDE QUITS IN 'DISGUST'

Sees No Chance of Success
for Pacification Effort

DANANG, South Vietnam, Nov. 15 (AP) — Willard E. Chambers, a senior official in the American pacification program in South Vietnam, has resigned his \$42,000-a-year job "in sheer disgust with the leadership and the philosophy being applied" to what he calls a much maligned cause.

Although protest resignations have occurred occasionally during the Vietnam war, rarely if ever has a United States official as senior as Mr. Chambers quit under such circumstances.

After more than six years as a civilian official in South Vietnam, Mr. Chambers said in his final report to the pacification agency:

"I am no longer willing to remain patient with the parade of overranked nonentities whose actions reflect their own ignorance of Vietnam, of the peculiarities of a people's war and of the requirements of counterinsurgency."

Retired Army Officer

Mr. Chambers, 55 years old of Columbus, Ohio, holds the title of assistant deputy for CORDS—"civil operations and rural development support"—in Military Region I, meaning he is the second-ranking official in the pacification program for the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.

Mr. Chamber, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, said in an interview that he had always supported the United States policy of trying to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. "But we just don't know how to do it," he said.

Both politically and militarily, he said, the Americans have been unable to carry out policies capable of defeating the insurgent forces.

It is disturbing, he said, to contemplate the future because "your enemy always poses for you that type of war where he figures you will be at the greatest disadvantage, and having demonstrated how inept we can be at this kind of war here in Vietnam, certainly our enemies will give us the chance to be equally inept somewhere else."

There were three things that had to be done to achieve victory in South Vietnam "in any acceptable time frame at all,"

A Reply From Victor Zorza:

DR. PORTER deplors the lack of scholarship of those with whom he disagrees but at the same time reveals his own inability to comprehend the analytical method which he criticizes. He argues that the continuity of Hanoi's political line, and the unity of its leadership, is shown by the fact that party documents have repeated since 1960 "the substance, if not the words," of the party resolution of that year.

But it is in fact the differences in emphasis between the various renderings of this resolution, as quoted by different speakers and writers, that makes it possible to trace some of the disagreements in the Hanoi leadership. The differences are usually minute, and it is only the detailed comparison of a large accu-

mulation of departures from pattern that makes it possible to draw any conclusions. Thus, the quotations which Dr. Porter cites cannot really settle the argument, which will be resolved only when the Hanoi leadership publicly reveals the debates it has long pursued in private.

These debates always are revealed in the end. Many eminent Western scholars disputed, with arguments similar to Dr. Porter's, the evidence which pointed to conflicts in both the Soviet and Chinese leadership, and between Moscow and Peking, but in the end they were persuaded by events. Some of the present events surely confirm those parts of my analysis which related to the imminence of a Vietnam settlement, and the rest must be left to the future.

BALTIMORE SUN
17 November 1972

Discouraging Words on Vietnam

Willard E. Chambers, who is described as a ranking official in the American pacification program in Vietnam, has resigned his post on a note of discouragement and disgust. Mr. Chambers' remarks serve as a splash of cold water on the surge of optimism with respect to American accomplishments which now accompanies the prospects of an early cease-fire. Mr. Chambers, a 55-year-old retired Army officer who has put in six years on his job in Vietnam, was the second ranking official in the pacification program for the five

northern provinces of South Vietnam. He was one of a large number of United States civilians trying, in brief, to help the South Vietnamese people toward a politically independent and economically viable future—this in the midst of war.

Mr. Chambers apparently is not sure that much of anything has really been accomplished. He has a feeling that things keep happening over and over again: "After all these years of war I read the newspapers and think: 'This is where I came into the war.' . . . We're bombing the same places all over again." Further: "We

have inflicted upon the South Vietnamese people an army created in our own image and an army even more inept than ours in dealing with their present threat." Mr. Chambers said he has always supported the United States policy of trying to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam, "But," he said, "we just don't know how to do it."

This is a sorry, but in our view quite accurate, commentary on the United States' long struggle to help the people of South Vietnam. We just didn't know how to do it.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1972

Hanoi Again Accuses U.S. Of Counterfeiting Currency

HONG KONG, Nov. 10 (Reuters)—Hanoi has again accused the United States of flooding North Vietnam with counterfeit banknotes of various denominations, the Chinese agency reported.

The agency said Vu Thien, director of the distribution department of the Vietnam State Bank, said at a news conference in Hanoi yesterday that the United States introduced millions of forged banknotes of the 1 dong denomination two months ago.

The United States has "continued to bring false banknotes of the 2 and 5 dong," Mr. Thien said.

He said this was a "monstrous war crime," which should be stopped immediately.

Mr. Chambers said, and none of the three has been accomplished.

"The first is you've got to give the people a dream, something to fight for; the second is military reform, and the third is you've got to give hope," he said.

He said the only dream or ideology offered by the Saigon Government had been "in the negative terms of anti-Communism." "And to the uncommitted," he said, "a negative value isn't a very good sales pitch."

In terms of hope, he said, "The only thing that we offer the soldier out there in his outpost is, 'If you'll fight hard enough and aggressively enough, someday, somehow, the other guy is going to get tired and go home.'"

Finds Reform Frustrated

"The soldier is not dumb, and he knows that what that really says to him is that if he keeps on fighting, sooner or later he's going to get his."

Efforts at military reform have also been frustrated, he said.

"We have inflicted upon the South Vietnamese people an

army created in our own image and an army even more inept than ours in dealing with their present threat," he said.

Mr. Chambers said he had spent years, both in the Army and out, trying to convince the United States Government of the need not just for firepower but for increased mobility if Americans were going to become involved in counterinsurgency warfare. But, he said, his efforts had been frustrated by military planners.

Although the helicopter has "kept us alive in Vietnam," Mr. Chambers said, the helicopter alone in inadequate and does not increase the mobility of troops after they have reached the battlefield.

"The job that had to be done here," he said, "was to sponsor a social, economic and military revolution. But we had to entrust it to an entrenched bureaucracy made up of the American civil service and the Vietnamese civil service."

"A civil service is by definition the direct antithesis of revolution. It is designed to provide for the orderly functioning of government, while revolution is the change of that government."

Houston Post

1 NOV 1972

Indochina scorecard

Tallying the POWs and missing

By Donald R. Morris

Post News Analyst

Although the wildly soaring hopes that our prisoners of war may be home in the next few weeks may yet be dashed by Hanoi's increasing evidence of bad faith, the Department of Defense is preparing for all eventualities.

A glance at the tabulation shows the size of the problem, as the negotiations move into the final phase. There are minor discrepancies between the Defense Department figures and those announced by Hanoi; these are due to bookkeeping systems. The Defense Department regards as "captured" any airmen who reach the ground alive; Hanoi will not list them as POWs until they are actually checked into the prison administrative system in the vicinity of Hanoi.

Since men who reached the ground alive may be evading capture, may die of wounds, may be killed while resisting capture or in any event face a journey to Hanoi by foot and truck that may extend several hundred miles, there are always a few in this limbo.

The most encouraging figure is the 108 held by the Viet Cong. The National Liberation Front (NLF) has no organized POW structure; men captured are simply held by the unit that picked them up, and the NLF, which refuses to discuss the subject, probably couldn't give a total headcount if it wanted to.

Over the years, a variety of intelligence operations conducted by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) in Saigon have determined that 48 to 50 POWs are still alive in Viet Cong hands. In the last three months, this figure has jumped to 108, boosted by a batch of mail forwarded from men previously carried as "missing," and giving hope that even

© A small number of men "missing" in South Vietnam are deserters.

© A small number of U.S. civilian officials are also carried as missing.

more of the 498 men missing in South Vietnam may yet be found alive.

Also encouraging was Hanoi's acceptance of responsibility for recovery of POWs from the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Rouge. These organizations, little

more than bandit gangs backed by Hanoi, are too amorphous to establish official contact with.

The Department of Defense, in any event, is satisfied that the 543 captives are alive and well, and when the time for their release arrives getting them home is virtually a routine administrative task, for which detailed plans have long been laid.

Of far greater import are the 1,266 missing men, whose fate is still unknown. A major effort is already underway to prepare the search.

Plans are now firm for a new Joint Information Center (JIC) which will be established in Bangkok in the near future. It will be staffed by U.S. military personnel, civilian experts and by cadres drawn from the cease-fire supervisory establishment.

The JIC will replace the former JPRC (or in effect absorb what is left of it), and will support the search teams consisting of personnel drawn from the neutral nations supervising the cease-fire, who will spread out over all of Indochina, including, it is hoped, North Vietnam itself.

These teams will visit the site of every known air crash to recover, if possible, the craft's registration plate and to determine the fate of the crew.

The work, directed from Washington by Dr. Roger Shields, may last for years. Hundreds of sites in remote areas are involved; in many cases aircraft crashed in uninhabited areas, under circumstances where the wreck is not visible from the air and must be searched out on the ground.

The work will continue until a final determination can be made for each of the 1,266 men still carried as missing. In many cases the news for families that have been waiting for eight years and more will be good — some military sources feel that as many as 250 may yet turn up alive. But for the bulk of the 1,266 families, the JIC will at best be able to offer confirmation that no hope remains.

U.S. POW/MIA box score

	Captured	Missing
North Vietnam (held by North Vietnam)	429	471
South Vietnam (held by Viet Cong)	108	498
Laos (held by Pathet Lao)	6	237
Totals	543	1,266

In addition:

© Fourteen men are currently known to have reached the ground alive in North Vietnam and were subsequently in radio contact. They are no longer in contact and have not been reported as POWs by Hanoi.

© The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is believed to hold perhaps a dozen men, as well as some of the score of missing correspondents.

© Three deserters are known to have defected.

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Nov. 27, 1972

Bats, Bolts Bode Ill In Jittery Cambodia

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, Nov. 26—This has been a busy autumn for Cambodia's seers and soothsayers.

The bats in the National Museum flew out in midafternoon. A cantankerous elephant at the Royal Palace stables died. A tourist from

News Analysis

Taiwan ran naked through a rehearsal of the National Ballet. Someone decapitated the squat, ugly statue of the "Leper King" in front of an important pagoda—an act of vandalism quickly repaired by what one resident American calls "the government's anti-omen squad."

Then, while superstitious Cambodians—which is to say nearly all Cambodians—were consulting their astrologers and fortune tellers to find out what it all meant, lightning hit the wat, or temple.

The royal tombs and temple atop the phnom, or hill, that gives the city its name were blasted by a bolt of lightning one recent night. The top of the wall, which had stood for 107 years, was blown off, and a jagged crack now runs down the spire, which is still in place.

Clearly, these were all signs of something important. The prevailing view, endorsed by pro-government seers, is said to be that the damage to the temple means the final end of Cambodia's monarchy because the tombs on the hill contain the royal remains of the ancestors of deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Another view is that the decapitation of so important a monument was a bad sign for the present government, the republic headed by Marshal Lon Nol, who led the coup that overthrew Sihanouk in 1970.

Even non-believers recognize that this is a serious time for Cambodia, in which the good luck amulets and faithful offerings of a superstitious and peaceable people have not warded off the misfortunes of involvement in a war the country cannot win.

If reliance on the spirit world for guidance and help seems quaint to outsiders, it is an integral part of the Khmer spirit—Lon Nol and other prominent figures consult astrologers regularly—and perhaps provides a measure of solace for a people that is in control of its

own destiny.

Like South Vietnam, Cambodia is trying more or less energetically to prepare for a possible end to the Indochina war, and its conditions for peace are much the same: A total withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops, a political solution worked out internally rather than imposed by other nations, and a return to the principles of the 1954 Geneva peace accords for Indochina.

The Cambodians are well aware, however, that they are the tail to the Vietnamese dog. Devoid of bargaining power and unable to influence in Paris in any substantial way.

Diplomatic sources here say that White House negotiator Henry A. Kissinger's visit to Lon Nol last month was a palliative that dealt in general reassurances, and the Phnom Penh government is making no pretense of being a partner in the peace talks. Instead, the government is counting on a peace agreement in Paris to do what the Cambodians cannot do on their own—get the North Vietnamese out of their country. Cambodia's limited resources are being devoted to its internal problems: food supply, corruption, and the domestic insurgency of the Khmer Rouge.

The infusion of 70,000 tons of rice from the United States and 60,000 tons from Thailand for which the United States is expected to pay, have prevented a recurrence of the riots that broke out during a food shortage in Phnom Penh in September. Highway 5, which links the capital to the rice-producing region around Battambang in the northwest, has been reopened after being cut by the Communists since mid-August.

The United States continues its accelerated deliveries of airplanes, equipment and weapons, substantially increasing the size of Cambodia's air force and the firepower of its army.

The overall military situation is less gloomy than it was in early October, when the war appeared to be not only unwinnable but also unending. "At that time there was a real question," senior diplomat said last week, "about whether this government could sustain an indefinite war in which the North Vietnamese were participating. Now at least they

see a little light" in the possibility of a North Vietnamese pullout.

Even the optimists in the government and the U.S. embassy, however, acknowledge that the army remains undertrained, sometimes poorly led, incapable of regaining control of the vast stretches of the country held by the Communists, and tainted by corruption.

The arrest last Wednesday of a lieutenant colonel on charges of collecting money to pay 1,444 non-existent soldiers in his infantry brigade pointed up the common Cambodian army practice of drawing funds for phantom soldiers. Each commander recruits his own troops and control the payrolls, so it is difficult to tell just how many troops the army actually has, or whether the commander is paying the soldiers who are on duty.

Among the Americans, who are paying most of the bills, the prevailing attitude seems to be that the government is less than zealous in its anti-corruption campaign, but that this is not the time to do much about it.

"You have to tread lightly," one high-ranking source said. "You don't want to turn your first line of defense against you by angering the officers."

Corruption is a way of life in Cambodia, as it is elsewhere in Asia, but the Khmer Rouge are making it an issue in their propaganda campaign against the government.

Whether the government's efforts to put its house in order will be enough to conduct an effective counter-campaign against the Khmer Rouge is an open question. There is considerable disagreement here about the strength and cohesiveness of the Khmer Rouge insurgency, take out all 3 words and about the sincerity of the government's claims to be seeking a genuine accommodation.

In some instances, the government has seemed to be protecting the reputation of the Khmer Rouge. The government blamed the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for an attack on the town of Trapang Kraleng, 40 miles west of Phnom Penh on Highway 4, in which several civilians were killed and wounded and at least two Buddhist monks killed. Eyewitnesses said, however, that the town was leveled by the Khmer Rouge.

Blaming the Vietnamese appears to serve the government's current policy in two ways. It contributes to the official assessment that the Khmer Rouge are not an important fighting force but are only disorganized, non-

ideological bands of dissidents with whom the government is fully capable of dealing once the North Vietnamese go away. It is also helpful to the government's current conciliatory approach to the insurgents, to whom it is promising legitimacy and freedom of political action if they will live within the system.

"If there is a rally by the Khmer Rouge," Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak said in an interview, "they can have a political party, participate in elections, work for any changes they want in a legal way... If an international detente keeps them from being rearmed, they'll see after a while that it is a good thing to enter into the life of the republic."

A National Committee of Action for Peace and Concord, was created by the government Nov. 3 to carry out the government's preparations for a cease-fire. Many of the influential political figures in Phnom Penh, including former Premiers Sisowath Sirik Matak and Son Ngoc Thanh, have lent it at least their nominal support, in a show of Khmer unity.

Lon Nol issued a proclamation on Nov. 4 in which he said that "circumstances are favorable for a union of hearts and spirits in the republic... Let all Khmers know that our National Committee for Peace and Concord was born to welcome everyone."

To his critics, who include many foreign diplomatic observers as well as his domestic opponents, this is typical of the lofty pronouncements and ineffectual appeals that characterize the Lon Nol government, and does little to cope with the reality of the Khmer Rouge.

In their opinion, the chief obstacle facing the Khmer Rouge is its own lack of cohesion and failure to unite behind a single leader, not anything being done by the Phnom Penh government.

As viewed by these analysts, the Khmer Rouge is not a single force but consists of Sihanoukists seeking his return from exile in Peking, dedicated Marxist ideologues trained in Hanoi, some genuine idealists and anti-corruption reformers, and just plain bandits.

Nevertheless, many observers here believe the government faces a formidable task in putting down the insurgency and regaining its control over the country side, even after North Vietnamese troops leave. For one thing, there are large areas of the country, well organized and following new economic models after years of Communist occupation. Accommodations, if not alliances, have been made be-

JAPAN TIMES
12 November 1972

By Sol Sanders



A Sense of Asia

Ties Between Asians, Americans Not Likely to Lessen

tween the rulers of these areas and persons in government-held areas who find such arrangements useful.

Rubber and tobacco, for example, are being produced on farms in the Communist-controlled areas and marketed in cities under government control.

In addition, the Khmer Rouge have developed, by some accounts, an effective fighting force that may be capable of challenging the Cambodian army on its own.

Reliable troop strength figures are difficult to obtain, but generally the Americans estimate the Cambodian army at 170,000, a figure regarded by other Western analysts as too high. Khmer Rouge armed strength is put at about 40,000. But the government's figures include support troops, such as transport and supply units, some analysts point out, while those for the Khmer Rouge do not, so the fighting strengths may be more nearly equal than the figures indicate.

"Some of the biggest operations of this war have been mostly Khmer Rouge," one American said. "The question is whether they could keep it up without direct North Vietnamese support."

One thing on which there is general agreement here among government officials, opposition politicians and foreign observers is that the prospects for a return by Sihanouk dwindle with each day the republic remains in power. But Sihanouk continues to operate a government in exile, based in Peking, and to shop around the world for support for his claim to be the legitimate ruler of Cambodia.

This has forced the Phnom Penh government to open a kind of third front, the diplomatic front, to go with its political and military efforts.

Representatives of Lon Nol's government, particularly Foreign Minister Long Boreat, have been making intensive efforts to establish diplomatic relations with countries that have no intrinsic importance to Cambodia but do have votes in the United Nations.

Costa Rica and El Salvador recently agreed to set up relations with the Lon Nol government, the official news agency announced last week, and negotiations are going on with Guatemala.

Gabon, on the other hand, recently recognized Sihanouk, an event attributed by an informed diplomatic source here to the fact that "Sihanouk's man got there first. Lon Nol had a man on his way when it was announced."

HONG KONG — There is an intimate relation between the American presidential elections this year and developments in Asia — seemingly, more portentous than in past elections over almost two decades.

It is not that the choice for the American voters between Mr. Nixon and Mr. McGovern involved a make-or-break decision. Even were the outcome in less doubt than seemed apparent, the long-term implications of American policies and events stretch out far beyond the difference between the two candidates discussed in the heat of a highly partisan debate.

Truth is that Mr. McGovern would have found, as all opposition candidates for power in any society or political system, that his alternatives once in the saddle were a good deal narrower than when viewed by a dismounted rider. That, in part at least, explains much of the increasing conservatism of Mr. McGovern's statements as the election deadline neared.

What is crucial for Asia is the direction, and drift, of American policies which is unlikely to be more than modulated by the American President after the election. And it is on that theme — where American policy in Asia is headed — that the election milestone gives us occasion to pause and reflect.

Perhaps one should begin with the obvious: The relations of Asians and the Americans are not really likely to lessen in the coming decades.

Controversial Position

That may come as an extremely controversial position against the backdrop of the Nixon Doctrine and the almost universally held thesis, both in Asia and the U.S., that America is withdrawing from the Asian scene.

I say that American-Asian relations will continue to be extensive and intensive because of two situations which are virtually apolitical in origin if not in result.

The U.S. economy, still growing at an enormous clip (in concrete terms) despite its problems of balance of payments

and reordering of priorities, is likely to continue to be all important for most Asian producers. The American maw will, in fact, chew up even more of the world's raw materials and other produce in the years ahead.

It is hard to see how given any scenario in the next decade or so — except total economic paralysis or nuclear holocaust — this factor will not be a major determinant in the Asian scene.

More debatable, but I feel equally important, is the role the U.S. plays as the avant-garde of modernization in the Asian scene.

China may continue to wear the blue suits of Communist orthodoxy for years to come. But for most of the Asian world, U.S. fashions — from clothing to intellectual fads — is likely to be the pacesetter.

Hidden Persuaders

The Americans with their vast resources and weight in world attitudes, for better or for worse, are "hidden persuaders" on the world scene. It is the U.S. news magazines who have set the pattern for much of what is printed today. American food processors are — for better or worse — changing the diets of the world. Jeans are almost as popular in Indonesia as in Tokyo as in Dallas. American TV techniques, book publishing, physical mobility, and even methods of education (the explosion of institutions of higher learning, textbooks, audiovisual aids) have when not been the pattern, the antithesis toward which foreign educational and cultural programs have worked.

The U.S. is swinging into one of its periods of intended isolationism — in a cycle as old as the country itself. It is reinforced by a profound and naive disenchantment — with 25 years of international economic aid giving which has produced relatively so little, — with the bitter wars in Korea and Vietnam — with criticism which fluctuates from venomous hatred to boisterous raillery from "the outside world."

Whatever else George McGovern's candidacy was, it was profoundly the expression of this mood. His program comes out of those strains of American history that produced the periodic populist explosion, the know-nothingism, the Bryanism, the isolationists of the 1930s. It is a full blown emotional retreat from dealing with the cares of the non-American, an attempt to return to home-spun virtues of a less complicated world. Alas! That world no longer exists — either for the Asians or the Americans.

U.S. Activities

Underlying all this emotional withdrawal is the hard fact of the U.S. balance of payments which I believe is with the world economy at least until the end of this decade. It is producing the kind of constraints and restrictions on American overseas enterprise and cultural activities that have inhibited every other country (save Switzerland) for most of the post-World War II period.

The days of American openhandedness for foreign cultural subsidies, however self-serving, are probably over — at least for a while.

That means that Asia's problems are no longer the U.S.' — except as solutions are products of the pursuit of exclusively American goals. Studies of problems of population control, agricultural productivity, remedies for pollution and traffic congestion, may lap over and help those Asian cultures which can absorb them. The U.S. will not play a role relative to its size and power.

It could be said that it was ever thus. Certainly, the results of many of the American intended solutions to Asian problems were often less than fruitful.

Yet, at least for this observer, it is a sobering thought that with the enormous problems ahead, Asia will be facing them with at best limited access to American resources — whatever their shortcomings have been in the past.

The urgency of these negotiations for Cambodia was underscored last week when Sengcal challenged the credentials of the current government's U.N. delegation. The resolution failed, but its

very introduction was a reminder to Cambodia — which is heavily dependent on U.N. assistance in several fields — that the omens can still be read either way.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 November 1972

Reds Regain 1970 Strength

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—

The war in Cambodia is going well for the North Vietnamese, who have succeeded in completely restoring their Vietnam war sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, informed military sources say.

The sanctuaries are now at the same level they were in 1970 when they were invaded by American and South Vietnamese forces, the sources say, and the North Vietnamese military position is even better than at that time. This leads to the belief that the North Vietnamese are not presently interested in a Cambodian cease-fire.

Since the allied invasion of Cambodia the North Vietnamese have gained control of Cambodian towns such as Stung Treng and Kratie on the Mekong River and now control all of the east bank of the Mekong River in Cambodia apart from one or two small towns such as Svay Rieng where the Cambodians are bottled up and kept inactive.

The North Vietnamese also hold the border areas of South Vietnam contiguous to Cambodia, a bonus from this year's communist offensive in South Vietnam.

'Going Full Blast'

"The military situation here is bad," an informed military source said "I don't like to be pessimistic but it's difficult to find anything good. The sanctuaries are going full blast. The stuff is moving out of the big rubber plantations at Chuop and down Highway 15 into the Seven Mountains and other places in South Vietnam. It is coming from Laos down the Mekong by Kratie."

Some communist supplies are moving even onto the Mekong's west bank, bypassing

Kompong Thom, swinging west around Phnom Penh, then east again across the Mekong into South Vietnam.

Informed military sources say the North Vietnamese are drawing on the Cambodian countryside which they and their Cambodian allies control for food to keep Cambodian sanctuaries and the North Vietnamese First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth divisions now mostly in South Vietnam going.

The North Vietnamese exert almost total control of East Cambodia while the Cambodian communists in western Cambodia feed and support them with fuel, batteries and other commodities, informed military sources said.

Trail Terminus

"Eastern Cambodia is just a staging area, rest and recreation center and trail terminus for Hanoi again," sources said. "All they have to worry about are further South Vietnamese incursions and the South Vietnamese are too hard pressed to do much in that line," sources said.

North Vietnam has also been successful in building up the Cambodian communists in the countryside to the point where they can carry on much of the war against the Cambodian government, informed military sources say.

It is no longer North Vietnamese or Viet Cong units which are cutting Cambodia's highways, Cambodian and other informed military sources admit. Now the units are mostly Cambodian communist units operating in battalion strength for the first time with a few Viet soldiers seeded amongst them and supported by Viet Cong heavy weapon platoons and sappers.

Informed military sources say the communist strategy

for Cambodia is to harass roads and towns bottling up Cambodian government forces in the towns or forcing them to engage in useless road opening operations keeping them away from the countryside. Meanwhile in the countryside the North Vietnamese are building up local Cambodian forces to fight the government.

Military sources said Communists succeeded in doing this because the Cambodian government forces are poorly led though composed of some excellent fighting material. "They just will not get off their butts and go out there, get out of the towns," informed sources said.

Fighting this week in Cambodia has reflected this pattern. Cambodian communist forces cut highway 4 leading from Phnom Penh to its seaport Kompong Som. Cambodian reds are in a good position on the heights overlooking the road passes and are now tying down a considerable Cambodian government force trying to winkle them out.

Communist forces are shelling the towns of Takeo and Angtassom south of Phnom Penh pinning in their Cambodian garrisons from interfering with communist traffic moving around them toward the Seven Mountains area of South Vietnam and tying up Cambodian relief forces.

Garrison Encircled

This weekend a mixed Cambodian Vietnamese communist force encircled and entered the town of Oudong 20 miles north of Phnom Penh. From what I saw they could have encircled Phnom Penh itself just by driving down the highway.

Just south of Oudong a Cambodian villager, wet and muddy stumbled out of a swamp. He said he had escaped from a village just outside Oudong

and that communists encircled the garrison and there were no Cambodian troops between the communists and where we were about 1,000 yards further back on the highway.

The villager said communists had arrived about one o'clock in the morning that day and about half were Cambodians and half were Vietnamese. They were led by a Chinese who the villager judged from his accent lived in Cambodia. They told the villager to move to the "liberated areas" but he didn't want to go and dodged into the swamps.

Coming from Phnom Penh there were only three small outposts on the road which communists could probably have bypassed. Cambodian armor and reinforcements did not move in to reinforce the area till late afternoon 12 hours after the attack. Cambodian garrisons in Oudong apparently fought back well and by late Sunday an elite paratroop unit arrived and broke the communist encirclement. All these actions, however, are achieving their objective of keeping the Cambodians tied down to defending roads and towns, informed military sources complain.

This pattern is likely to continue, sources say, till Hanoi is able to boost the Cambodian communists up to regimental size and to integrate the various groups of Cambodian communists, pro-Prince Sihanouk, anti-Prince Sihanouk, and Hanoi organized forces into a single central force united against the Lon Nol government. Once Hanoi has achieved this—a strong single Cambodian communist force able to defeat the Cambodian government and hold most of the territory then North Vietnam will be interested in a cease-fire in Cambodia.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1972

BANGKOK SAYS AIDES SOLD MILK FROM U.N.

BANGKOK, Thailand, Nov. 10 (Agence France-Presse)—Thai officials responsible for the distribution of skimmed and powdered milk donated by a United Nations agency were accused today of selling it on the open market.

The charge was made in a circular issued by the Government Health Division, informing more than 30 clinics in Thailand that they would no longer be receiving the milk

"because it is the only way to prevent health officials from selling it for personal profit."

The milk, which is donated by Unicef, the United Nations Children and Emergency Fund, totals two million pounds annually. The bulk of it goes to municipal clinics and health stations in provincial areas.

The milk is channeled through the United States Operation Mission, an arm of the Agency for International Development, for distribution through the Municipal Health Division.

A spokesman for Unicef here refused to comment pending an inquiry.

NATION
27 NOV 1972
PYRRHIC PLOY

REMEMBER CAMBODIA?

E. W. PFEIFFER

Mr. Pfeiffer is professor of zoology at the University of Montana and a co-author of Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Indochina (Free Press/Macmillan). He visited Cambodia in 1969 and 1971 and was in Hanoi in 1970.

While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1970 my two companions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's invasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month earlier. His answer was straightforward: "It makes things very favorable for the success of our revolution." By "our revolution" I supposed him to mean the revolution of the Indochinese people against foreign invaders.

How well does Premier Rham Van Dong's 1970 evaluation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972? Recent dispatches from Indochina suggest that he knew what he was talking about. According to the A.P. (September 1), only one-third of Cambodia is still under "Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the tanks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area (only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These are the very areas that President Nixon characterized in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be cleaned out.

Two factors have been principally responsible for the failure of Nixon's Cambodian policies. First, the President was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian-Vietnamese relations and about the situation on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border prior to the March 1970 change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. invasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Mr. Nixon stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Mimot as he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal, for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about four months before the U.S. attack, and knew it to be controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests. Many Europeans were working there, and some of them (e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam. These Europeans were living with their wives and children in an environment of complete tranquillity. We asked many of them whether they had seen any sign of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all answered no.

My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the region to inspect the damage done by a clandestine defoliation raid carried out in April-May of 1969 over almost 200,000 acres of eastern Cambodia. According to a letter I received some months later from Sen. Frank Church, the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline, for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid, the Sihanouk regime asked that American officials visit the region, with a view to making reparations for the damage. Although the U.S. Government to this day offi-

cially denies having carried out this operation, it did send a team of experts, including Charles Minarik of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot region shortly after the raids. This team's report describes how they were flown over the region, driven through it, and how they walked in it—just as Westing and I did some months later. It is inconceivable to me that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Nixon controlled the area, would have permitted an official U.S. Government team to wander through what Nixon called "the headquarters for the entire Communist military operations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it was widely reported that no key control center could be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did not greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the main occupation, in addition to tapping rubber, was harvesting rice.

When speaking about the Cambodian "Communist sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal Cambodian Army had in fact swept these areas about three months before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince Sirik Matak, a loyal American protégé and one of those later involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered Matak to search out and destroy all Communist-Vietnamese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennett of the Cam-

bodian desk of the State Department informed me in an interview, March 22, 1971: "A Cambodian Army operation began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province at approximately the time when Sihanouk left for France and when Prince Sirik Matak was Acting Prime Minister. They sent up a number of additional battalions, among the better troops in the Cambodian Army, and carried out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and destroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively small campsite, but there was no major contact with the main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thousands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had occupied the area for five years?

Besides being mistaken about the nature of the so-called Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts when he stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . . . North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality." The defoliation of vast sections of the rubber plantations, mentioned above, was one blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality, and there are many others. During my first visit to Cambodia we inspected what was left of Dak Dam, a little town in the central highlands just across the border from the special forces camp at Bu Prang, South Vietnam. Six weeks before our visit this town, which was about a quarter mile from a Royal Cambodian Army antiaircraft position, had been savagely attacked by U.S. fighter bombers. The antiaircraft positions were destroyed, as well as a school, a hospital and an ambulance. Twenty-five Cambodians were killed and several wounded in this attack, reported by the American military in Saigon as having been carried out against a North Vietnamese gun position in Cambodia.

Once again the government of Sihanouk invited Amer-

icans to see for themselves what they had done in violation of the agreements signed to respect each other's neutrality. American and International Control Commission officers visited the site and learned that all twenty-five killed had been Cambodians and that the attacks had damaged only Cambodian installations. Westing and I were able to verify these conclusions. The Americans did not correct the original Saigon assessment and the report on the Dak Dam incident is still classified. The State Department later apologized and paid \$400 for each Cambodian killed. This brutal attack occurred because the Cambodians had dared to open fire on American aircraft that were continually violating the air space around Dak Dam. The Cambodians had hit one of the American airplanes, as they had every right to do, and the Americans retaliated, falsely calling it an attack upon a North Vietnamese position.

This sort of activity had been repeated many times over the years by the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. A white paper published by the Royal Government pointed out that "all of the very serious incidents of the past years committed by the American-South Vietnamese aggressive forces have been the subject of detailed inquiry by the International Control Commission. They underline the fact that the victims of these attacks have always been only Cambodians, almost always peasants at work. . . . No Vietcong body has ever been recovered on the sites of these ground attacks nor in the frontier villages machine-gunned or bombed by American aviation."

In addition to Cambodians and the International Control Commission, former American officials have reported American violations of Cambodia's neutrality. For instance, a Captain Marasco stated on a 1970 NBC television documentary program that he had frequently sent teams into Cambodia from a base near the Parrot's Beak. Marasco said, "I'm sure that the CIA and the South Vietnamese counterpart of the CIA had intelligence agents inside Cambodia." When I asked Mr. Bennett of the State Department if operations of this sort did not violate the neutrality of Cambodia, he answered: "I have no comment on measures that we take to insure the safety of our troops by finding out what threats exist." The United States could, however, have called upon the International Control Commission to determine what threats existed in Cambodia to its forces in Vietnam.

Nixon, when affirming U.S. respect for Cambodian neutrality, failed to mention the part played by the United States and its Cambodian friends in the March 18th coup against Sihanouk. The official U.S. line was that it was "very surprising" when Sihanouk was deposed. I learned something about the coup when I interviewed the present Premier of the "Republic of Cambodia," Son Ngoc Thanh, in August 1971 at his house in Phnom Penh. (He had been Prime Minister of Cambodia once before—when the Japanese occupied the country during World War II.) Thanh sees himself as a devoted Cambodian freedom fighter who began his struggle against the French. That led him to collaborate with the Japanese, and he now collaborates with the Americans in an attempt to destroy the Cambodian monarchy and set up the so-called "Republic." Thanh organized a group of expatriate and ethnic Cambodians living in South Vietnam and Thailand into a movement called the Khmer Serei. This movement began, according to Thanh, as part of the struggle against the French, but in the late 1950s in Thailand and in South Vietnam these groups began to receive American support. Again according to Thanh, U.S. special forces began in 1958 the military training of Cambodians living in Vietnam

and these Cambodians, many of them recruited from the Khmer Serei, were organized by General Harkins in what was called "Mike Force," a highly trained mobile strike force. Thanh says his Khmer Serei received some U.S. money and all of its weapons from the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1965 the Khmer Serei openly announced that it was carrying out a struggle against Sihanouk. Despite this, Sihanouk on January 5, 1969, granted an amnesty to all Khmer Serei. Shortly thereafter, Thanh told me, some 200 Khmer Serei soldiers crossed the border from Thailand and supposedly surrendered to the Royal Army. On June 12, 1969, a second contingent of several hundred soldiers also crossed into the northwestern part of Cambodia and were incorporated like their comrades into the Royal Army. One can imagine that it was through the infiltration of the Royal Army by these U.S.-trained Cambodians that the CIA maintained contact with the forces involved in the coup. These men, actually natives of Thailand and South Vietnam, formed the chief line of defense for the Lon Nol regime in the early days of the coup.

President Nixon stated that one reason for the American invasion of Cambodia was that the North Vietnamese had carried out a massive invasion after the overthrow of Sihanouk. He did not mention that thousands of ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam, organized as "Mike Force," were flown into Phnom Penh within days of the coup. It is important to realize that these men were actually Cambodian-Vietnamese, just as foreign to Cambodia as the North Vietnamese. This is proved by the following situation about which I learned during my visit in August 1971. In the days immediately after the coup these mercenaries were paid in Cambodian money, but their families and ancestral homes were in South Vietnam where the Cambodian money was worthless. U.S. Embassy officials in Phnom Penh told me that this caused considerable trouble.

It is obvious that the Americans had anticipated and prepared for the overthrow of Sihanouk for years, and had developed a highly trained and mobile Cambodian military force in South Vietnam that they could use quickly to support the new regime. In the NBC program featuring Marasco, the captain was asked, "Do you think it is possible that a man like Sihanouk could have been deposed by his own generals just on their own, or have you ever thought there was some other thing involved in what happened to Sihanouk?" Marasco: "I don't doubt that there was some other thing involved in his being deposed. I don't doubt that some other people have had something to do with it." NBC: "Like who?" Marasco: "Like other governments, other intelligence organizations." NBC: "American, South Vietnamese, or both?" Marasco: "Both." In my interview with him, Bennett of the State Department said: "There were so-called

Khmer Serei groups headed by Son Ngoc Thanh in both Thailand and South Vietnam operating along the borders. There was a group of about 100 people captured in Battambang province just over the Thai border in Cambodia about June or July of 1969 who were allegedly Khmer Serei and recruited, as far as I know, into the Royal Army, conceivably even into the police as well. . . . The special forces have for years helped train, organize and lead irregular forces used, among others, in areas along the Cambodian border. Many of the Cambodians recruited for this may have had Khmer Serei affiliations."

On April 6, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* published an account of an interview with Prime Minister Thanh, which confirmed what he had told me the previous year. According to the *Inquirer*, "Beginning in 1965 the U.S. paid millions of dollars to train, arm and support his

[Thanh's] forces, most of whom were recruited from the Cambodian minority living in South Vietnam's delta. Large-scale Khmer Serei defections to the Cambodian Government were reported in 1969 and may have been part of Thanh's invasion plan to overthrow Sihanouk. According to reliable sources, the repatriated Khmer Serei units were serving in the Royal Army under Lon Nol and spearheaded political demonstrations in Phnom Penh just before the coup. After checking with his American friends, Thanh committed his U.S. trained and financed forces to the Lon Nol coup. The CIA, he said, had promised that the U.S. would do everything possible to help."

Nixon's assertion that the United States practiced complete respect for Cambodian neutrality does not accord with the facts. And these inaccurate interpretations of U.S.-Cambodian relations led to incorrect predictions of what would happen after the coup and the American invasion. Three major factors upset the Administration's game plan for Cambodia. These were described to me at length in a June 1970 interview in Hanoi with Xeng An, the Ambassador from Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union, which now controls most of Cambodian territory. Mr. An pointed out that the peasants had had a great loyalty and respect for Sihanouk because he had kept war from their lives. They had known perfectly well what the war was doing to the people across the border in Vietnam. Secondly, the Americans guessed wrong on Sihanouk's behavior. They had expected him to retire to France, as did the Emperor Bao Dai, the last Royal Vietnamese ruler. Instead, the Prince joined his former

enemies—the Indochinese Marxists—and set up the United National Front of Cambodia and the Royal Government of National Union which he now heads. Thus American actions forced a devout Buddhist and anti-Communist ruler, Sihanouk, into the hands of Nixon's Indochinese enemies; and the Prince brought with him the support of the vast majority of Cambodian peasants. If the Nixon Administration had left Sihanouk's Cambodia alone, I believe it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the revolutionary forces of Indochina to launch the massive offensive with tanks that erupted from the so-called sanctuaries that Nixon had sworn to clean out.

The third factor that the Americans failed to predict correctly was the effect of inciting anti-Vietnamese feelings among Cambodians. Xeng An, during his interview, discussed this point at some length, saying that it poses irreconcilable contradictions for the American policy in Cambodia. He stressed that, in order to arouse the Cambodians against the so-called Vietcong and North Vietnamese, the U.S.-supported Lon Nol clique had needed to argue them against Vietnamese in general. To expect then that they would welcome the Saigon Vietnamese as liberators from the Communist Vietnamese was quite irrational, as events of recent months have shown. Pitched battles have been fought between Cambodian troops and their so-called South Vietnamese-Saigon allies. And the relationship between the Saigon regime and the Phnom Penh regime grows increasingly strained.

All of this must now be known to the Nixon Administration, and that, probably, is why we hear so little today about Cambodia.

NEW YORK TIMES

28 November 1972

The Vietnam Handshake

One month has elapsed since that dramatic White House briefing by Dr. Henry Kissinger. "We remain convinced that the issues that I have mentioned are soluble in a very brief period of time," President Nixon's negotiator said. "We have undertaken, and I repeat it here publicly, to settle them at one more meeting and to remain at that meeting for as long as is necessary to complete the agreement." This undertaking to the people of the United States and of Vietnam has now been broken. Perhaps the reasons are technical, but there are ominous signs that more profound considerations may be promoting ruinous second thoughts.

White House spokesmen now stress the quest for "a settlement that will last, not just for the short term but for the long term." This smacks dangerously of the inflated war aims that kept the Johnson and Nixon Administrations fighting so intensely in Vietnam long after knowledgeable strategists had concluded these aims were unattainable.

Far from envisaging a disengagement of American personnel from Vietnam, the Administration is revealed to have embarked on a secret build-up of "civilian" personnel under Defense Department contract to "advise" the South Vietnamese military establishment. And four weeks after the White House declared that "peace is at hand," the United States carried out two days of what was officially described as the heaviest B-52 bombard-

ment of North Vietnam of the whole war.

Pressing the advantage which he has apparently gained in the past month of jockeying, President Thieu has sent a special envoy to meet Mr. Nixon this week, after which he is to accompany Dr. Kissinger to the renewed dialogue with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho next week. Among the "clarifications" the United States is reportedly seeking from North Vietnam is a specific pledge to withdraw some of its troops from the South after the cease-fire, thus soothing one of President Thieu's deepest fears. From the start, Dr. Kissinger's critics and supporters alike spotted the absence of any visible concession by Hanoi on this point as a critical element in the give-and-take that had gone into the basic accord; if it is being injected as a new element at this stage, what is left of the whole tissue of understanding?

It seems impossible to doubt, from the statements of both sides, that Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a handshake agreement a month ago to end ten years of war in Vietnam; the White House disclosed this tentative accord just before the American Presidential election. As every collective bargainer knows, the whole concept of negotiation is built on mutual respect for the integrity of such agreements, whatever minor difficulties may attend their translation into formal contract language. If a veto by President Thieu is leading to United States insistence on renegotiation of one or more of the most fundamental clauses in the agreement, the promised light at the end of the tunnel may once again be receding into dim shadow.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Nov. 26, 1972

Peace Talks Hastened Park's One-Man Rule in South Korea

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL—Two decades after American troops fought and died to save it from Communist domination, South Korea has taken a sharp turn toward one-man rule and an authoritarian political system.

President Park Chung Hee's decision, formally validated this Tuesday by 91.5 per cent of the votes cast in an elaborately organized and orchestrated national referendum, was motivated by a large number of elements aside from Park's desire to stay in power.

The decline of American involvement in Asia, the high-level negotiations between North Korea and South Korea, declining patience with the political opposition and the National Assembly, an economic scare due to a recent recession and his own spartan view of what South Korea should be like—these factors all appear to have had a part in Park's decision to take the political system into his own hands through martial law and push through fundamental constitutional changes.

Park calls the new system "Korean democracy." But just as GI's of 1950-53 would hardly recognize today's Korea as the threadbare and woebegone country they knew in those days, they would probably blink and scratch their heads at the political setup being labeled "democracy."

As sketched out in pronouncement and proposal, the new order is a split-level affair. Foreign businessmen and tourists, whose investments and purchases are essential to the swiftly developing economy, are promised unimpaired and even enhanced freedoms.

As one of the innumerable handouts for foreigners, printed in English and Japanese, put it this week: "Dear visitors: Please feel free wherever you travel in the country under martial law. The warmer welcome and the better service await (sic)."

South Korea is, and probably will continue to be, heavily dependent for its prosperity and growth on interaction with the world outside.

At the same time, the theoretical and constitutional underpinning of the previous system of limited democratic government has been abandoned. Park can be elected forever by an easily-

controlled "National Reunification Council" of more than 2,000 supposedly non-political persons. Moreover, he can appoint one-third of the National Assembly and name a supreme court to decide the most important cases brought before the judiciary.

'Efficient Rule'

In the opinion of knowledgeable sources, Park has been actively considering the scrapping of the old constitution and the creation of a stronger and more "efficient" rule since at least the middle of last year, shortly after his inauguration for a third term in office. Quiet study missions are said to have been dispatched to Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam and the Philippines to look over their constitutions and political systems.

Park's decision to move on Oct. 17—instead of in December as the U.S. embassy had expected—was evidently precipitated by two major events: the draft of a Washington-Hanoi peace agreement and North Korea's anger at South Korean criticism of the high-level talks on reunification between the two governments.

On Oct. 8, North Vietnam presented a drastically altered peace proposal to presidential assistant Henry Kissinger in Paris, and by Oct. 12 the substance of a Vietnam peace agreement had been virtually agreed to. It is quite likely that South Korea, with some 40,000 troops still on duty in Vietnam learned of the developments within a day or two.

The implications for Seoul would have been two-fold: first, that the U.S. troop withdrawal from Indochina—and ultimately from Korea as well—would come even earlier than anticipated; second, that U.S. policymakers and the American public would be much too consumed with the Vietnam peace issue—in addition to the presidential elections—to pay much attention to goings-on in Korea.

The second important event took place on Oct. 12 at the truce village at Panmunjom, where South Korean CIA Chief Lee Hu-Rak met North Korean Deputy Premier Park Sung-Chul for the first high-level North-South talks since the dialogue between the two Ko-

rean governments was made public July 4.

Acrimonious Meeting

According to a source who has seen the still-secret transcript of the session, it was a very acrimonious meeting "a very heated argument went on for just about the entire session," the source said.

The North accused the South of fomenting anti-Communist propaganda in the South Korean press, and the South accused the North of anti-Park broadcasts and editorials in official organs.

Ironically, in view of later events, CIA Chief Lee contended that the government in the South had no authority to tell the press what to report under a limited constitutional system. North Korea wasn't buying this.

There is no indication, according to the same source, that the South Korean side informed the North Korean side at the Oct. 12 meeting that martial law and a political change were close at hand. While the implications of this meeting are still unclear, the conclusion in some sophisticated circles is that Park and his aides realized future progress in the North-South talks probably would be slow indeed, and that the talks might even break down.

The governments' main selling point for the new "Korean democracy" has been the need for strength to compete with the North during the quest of unification. Should the North-South dialogue lose its lustre, the new martial law regime would be harder to justify to the people in the South and to the world.

Once Park and his small inner circle of advisers had made the decision to move quickly, the organs of government planning went into high gear. Military plans for martial law were dusted off and changed to fit the occasion. The working draft of the proposed new constitution was quickly reviewed and prepared for publication. Even Park's address to the nation announcing martial law, the suspension of the old constitution and the other sweeping measures was pre-recorded on tape.

Elaborate Scenario

An elaborate scenario of who was to be told what and when was drawn up and put into effect. U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib was called in 25 hours in advance to get the word. At the same time,

the Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff gave the word to the U.S. military commander in Korea, Gen. Donald Bennett.

The move from an American-oriented constitutional democracy (at least in theory) to an autocracy with democratic trappings was to take place in stages between mid-October and the end of the year. The critical period would be between the Oct. 17 announcement and the Nov. 21 referendum to approve the constitution, and every precaution was taken to insure a good result.

All political activity was theoretically banned under the martial law decree, and for the opposition this measure was strictly enforced. Ordinary citizens were tried and convicted at publicized courts-martial for spreading "rumors" against what the government designated the "October Revitalization" plan.

Even the green-and-white wrappers of "Eunha Su (Galaxy) cigarettes produced by the state cigarette monopoly were imprinted with the slogan—"October Revitalization—Let's Plant Korean-Style Democracy In Our Soil."

Under these circumstances, the question was not whether the referendum would pass, but how big a margin it would command. The 91.5 per cent margin of last Tuesday was about 6 per cent more than the 85 per cent target mentioned in advance by some government officials. The turnout of more than 90 per cent of the eligible voters, beyond most expectations, was aided by a massive campaign to get out the vote.

"The National Conference for Unification" to pick the president will be elected by mid-December, with agents of the state playing an important screening role. This group in turn will elect Park for a six-year term before Christmas. Park is scheduled to be inaugurated about Dec. 27 as president for a six-year term under the new regime.

The United States, which had been projecting a gradual withdrawal of troops from South Korea in line with a Korean army modernization program, has yet given no hint of a change in schedule. The Park government wants the 40,000 U.S. troops to remain as long as possible.

Nor is there a sign of

JAPAN TIMES

10 November 1972

Vietnam Under Coalition Gov't

By ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Los Angeles Times

SAIGON— The war in Vietnam will end shortly, but the struggle will continue — the struggle to unite all Vietnam under a totalitarian regime. The struggle the Communists have waged for 27 years.

Hanoi has just reaffirmed its determination to fight in its comments on the secret talks that led to the North Vietnamese-American draft agreement.

The Communists have invariably used "united front" or "coalition" governments as the first, decisive step toward seizing all power. No less an authority on revolutionary strategy than Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China laid down the tactics in one of his most widely read works, "On Coalition Government."

The United States is withdrawing from direct involvement in Vietnam. The decision is wise from the American point of view — and probably unavoidable.

If America has not attained every last one of its national objectives, it has equally not acceded to Hanoi's long-standing demand that America make itself responsible for delivering South Vietnam to harsh, authoritarian rule. But America would be unwise if it deluded itself that the draft agreement accomplishes more than ending American intervention with relative grace, while starting a new phase in the unrelenting military and political battle for control of the South's 17,500,000 people.

Hanoi declared recently its intention of "accelerating the struggle on the military, politi-

cal, and diplomatic fronts until the lofty objectives — liberating the South, protecting and building the socialist North, and advancing toward peacefully uniting the country — are achieved."

In Hanoi's lexicon, liberation means imposing its own rule, after destroying "decadent, bourgeois democracy." Clearly, the objective has not changed, only the means.

Hanoi no longer demands that, as President Nixon put it, "we withdraw and destroy the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as we go."

A "coalition government," excluding the present Saigon regime, will not be created simultaneously with the ceasefire. Instead, Saigon will rule its areas and the Viet Cong theirs, while a council on national reconciliation and accord plans elections to choose a new government. The tripartite council will represent Saigon, the Viet Cong, and the amorphous "neutralist" faction.

The term, "coalition government," anathema to Saigon, did not appear. Nonetheless, Mao's "On Coalition Government," a report to the seventh congress of the Communist Party in April 1945, is the surest guide to Hanoi's strategy and objectives. Despite differences between Peking and Hanoi, Mao's revolutionary manuals are read avidly in North Vietnam.

The political conditions Hanoi faces in 1972 closely resemble the conditions Mao faced in 1945. Besides, the negotiating tactics and even the language Hanoi now employs are almost identical with Chinese tactics and language 27 years ago.

As the war in the Pacific was ending, Mao faced the challenge of winning political victory in China. The Nationalist Government ruled much larger territories and commanded much more powerful armies than did the Communists. Mao's solution was a coalition government—which would shortly become a Communist government.

As the the big war in Vietnam draws to a close, Hanoi must win political victory over a regime that controls 90 per cent of the population and deploys troops outnumbering the Communists several times. The North Vietnamese have chosen the same solution.

In 1945, Mao made almost the same proposal Hanoi has now advanced. The Nationalist Government was to join a tripartite, united-front alliance that would prepare for a coalition government.

But Mao told the secret party session: "The politics of new democracy . . . consists in overthrowing external oppression and internal feudal, fascist oppression and then setting up not the old democracy but a political system which is a united front of all democratic classes. . . . This is our minimum program, against our future or maximum program of socialism and communism . . . (every Communist will fight for two clearly defined objectives) the new democratic revolution now and socialism and communism in the future. . . ."

Mao's proposal was not accepted. Instead, he fought almost five years longer to win military victory.

must be re-established at the 17th parallel, and the role of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord —envisioned in the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho draft accord—must be more clearly defined. These are merely the central issues of the war; if they have to be settled before Saigon agrees to a cease-fire, then it follows that on Oct. 26 the Nixon Administration did not really have an agreement for a cease-fire that depended only on the working out of a few details.

As another example, Dr. Kissinger said that the release of American prisoners of war by Hanoi was not dependent on the release of political prisoners by Saigon. This seemed to be confirmed in a statement by Xuan Thuy, a principal North Vietnamese negotiator. Yet, since then, the North Vietnamese Communist newspaper, Nhan Dan, has asserted just the opposite view, and the North Vietnamese summary of the draft accord (with which Dr. Kissinger said he had "no complaint") declared that "the return of all captured and detained personnel

of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with the U.S. troops' withdrawal."

Since many political prisoners held by Saigon would be an important part of the so-called "third force" supposed to be included in the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, is it realistic to suppose that Hanoi agreed to leave them to the mercy of Saigon? In any case, it is a legitimate question whether Dr. Kissinger was entitled to speak as specifically on the matter as he did on Oct. 26.

By far the major question concerns the status of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. The summary of the draft accord with which Dr. Kissinger had "no complaint" on Oct. 26 does not mention a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces; every commentator pointed out that this was a major American concession. Yet, Saigon patently is unwilling to accept this arrangement; and some informed Government sources insist that Dr. Kissinger's failure to secure an agreement for North Vietnamese withdrawal

major change in the military-economic aid, credit concessions and GI spending which brought South Korea aid and earnings of more than \$650 million from the U.S. government last year—a major chunk of the country's \$8 billion Gross National Product.

As Korean sources close to Park tell it, the government was well aware that U.S. troop strength and U.S. aid would be declining over the months to come, and that the United States would be moving into a passive rather than an active role in Asia.

NEW YORK TIMES

28 November 1972

Was Peace
At Hand?

By Tom Wicker

No matter what happens after the Indochinese peace talks resume on Dec. 4, it now seems reasonably clear that Dr. Henry Kissinger had little basis for his statement on Oct. 26, twelve days before the election, that "peace is at hand," subject only to a few minor details of negotiation. He had, it is clear, no real agreement with Hanoi and Saigon on ending the war; no such agreement seems to exist a month later; and it is highly questionable whether either Dr. Kissinger or President Nixon could have believed on Oct. 26 that they actually had reached an agreement that would bring what Mr. Nixon called that night in Ashland, Ky., "peace with honor and not peace with surrender."

Quite obviously, there can be no cease-fire in South Vietnam until the Saigon Government agrees to a cease-fire, for the simple reason that that Government has in its army a million men, armed to the teeth by the United States. In the final analysis, the only way Washington can impose a cease-fire on that Government and that army is by threatening to cut off their military supplies.

Is that a serious proposition? After having for four years maintained the war, at a cost of 20,000 American deaths, billions of American dollars, and incalculable Indochinese casualties, all for the stated purpose of giving the Saigon regime a "chance" to survive, is it really conceivable that Mr. Nixon is now prepared to ask Congress to shut off military support to that regime—thus throwing an "ally" to the Communists, even though Mr. Nixon has said repeatedly that if he did that, a gigantic bloodbath would ensue and world peace would be threatened?

Yet, as recently as this weekend, President Thieu's controlled newspaper, Tin Song, said in Saigon that before there can be a cease-fire, North Vietnam must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, the demilitarized zone—in effect, a national border—

WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1972

Only Japan Remains

Dominoes Toppling,
One by One

By Richard Holbrooke

HONG KONG—Where have all the dominoes gone? Toppled rightward one by one, climaxed in the last two months by the proclamation of martial law in Korea and the Philippines.

In September President Marcos moved in the Philippines. A month later, President Park, feeling restricted by his own constitution, which limited him to three terms as

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President, suspended the National Assembly, rewrote the constitution, and last week had the people of Korea certify his decision in a referendum.

Korea and the Philippines—two countries where the American role has been enormous in the last twenty years—thus joined Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Indonesia as members of that growing group of nations that are coming under stronger military rule. In the entire East Asian area, only Japan retains an essentially democratic government.

AND ALL THIS, of course, as Asians view what they believe is an historic turning point in America's role in Asia—its impending withdrawal from Indochina, and its opening of China. Where once we stood in Asia for the gradual building up of strong "democratic institutions" to combat Chinese and Russian Communism (hence the perennial bureaucratic rhetoric about "nation-building"), now America is seen differently: far less concerned with building a certain type of government in Asia, much more interested in creating mutually acceptable arrangements with its prime adversaries.

This perception seems correct, and is related to the striking decline of democracy in East Asia. In Vietnam's wake, we have lost most of our unfortunate missionary zeal in Asia, our feeling that we had a responsibility not only to undo colonialism but also to build democratic societies. And, at the same time, our ability to influence events also declined.

Thus, when Marcos moved in Manila, we restricted ourselves to an official statement which amounted to "no comment." When Park acted in Korea, we "disassociated" ourselves from his action.

But what could we have done?

Intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, which was once an American commonplace in East Asia, has acquired a bad name in recent years in the U.S. Although there are still some people who advocate U.S. action to promote democracy in such countries as Korea, our track record has been spotty at best and includes the old intervention that makes new intervention almost impossible. Our competence at that sort of thing is not proven; on the contrary.

FURTHERMORE, the potential American influence (which was never as large as Asians, who saw the CIA in every rumor and

plot, believed) is declining rapidly. Ironically, in the case of Korea, our earlier successful aid efforts have made it far easier for their chief beneficiary, President Park, to ignore any suggestions we might want to make. American aid, once virtually the sole support of the Korean economy, has dropped off sharply, and is no longer necessary to the continued viability of that country. Nor do they even need our troops at this time, although their continued presence has some value in the larger game going on between North and South Korea.

For many years, it was a standard liberal belief that we should support democracies and oppose dictatorships. Our supportive role in right-wing countries, like Spain and Taiwan, and right-wing causes, like the covert support to the 1958 revolt against Sukarno in Indonesia, understandably upset American liberals, and became serious political issues in the years before Vietnam. Yet at the time we tended to overlook or at least underestimate the risks involved in strong action taken to promote democracy in countries of different traditions. Those risks, we ultimately learned, could lead us into impossibly complicated roles in the obscure and incomprehensible politics of countries like Laos, South Vietnam, and Korea.

And once into such situations, where we had influence but not control, the problems would multiply, and extrication would become constantly more difficult.

Also, we could reap grave disappointment when men like Park and Marcos, and even Thieu, refused to play any longer by the rules of the democratic game that we had urged on them.

For the concerned American liberal, all this has posed very difficult problems. On one hand, we have supported and promoted democracy in Asia, sometimes with success. Its decline, even if accompanied by a rising economy, will certainly mean a loss of personal freedom for many Asians.

ON THE OTHER HAND, our influence, and our competence in restoring or preserving democracy are extremely limited. Our entire value system, in which we presumed to know what form of government was right for other countries, seems now a product of another age. No one who has served in Asia should feel comfortable again when considering the value of American advice, particularly political advice. And our national interest, whatever that is—does not seem directly threatened by the unfortunate events in Thailand, Korea, the Philippines.

So the classic liberal position of the last 20 years—support democracy and oppose rightwing regimes—a position over which great domestic debates were once fought, has been swept aside by the harsh new realities in Asia, and elsewhere. Intervention in support of democracy would have very limited success in Asia, and virtually no support at home.

Yet open embrace of such distasteful events and regimes is unacceptable. So we seem reduced to private lamentations, public "no comments," and a search for a better definition of our role in post-Vietnam Asia. It will take time—and I hope a genuine national debate—to define that role. No one should view the recent setbacks to democracy in this part of the world without concern, regret, and alarm. And yet it seems clear that American intervention is no longer possible, and, what is more important, not at all desirable.

WASHINGTON POST
22 November 1972

Victor Zorza

Reports of Rift Interest Soviets

THE KREMLIN is trying to find out what truth there is in the Washington stories of a falling-out between President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger over the Vietnam peace settlement. Soviet agents in Washington have been making discreet inquiries about the report, which first appeared in an ultra-conservative Washington weekly, Human Events, and was then briefly reproduced in The Washington Post.

Human Events said that Kissinger had tried "to foist" the Paris agreement on Mr. Nixon. There followed "a bitter dispute" among top officials and second thoughts "even in the White House," about the agreement Kissinger had negotiated, the paper said. The Washington Post, however, reported that White House officials had scoffed at such rumors.

Faced with a White House mystery, Soviet analysts would attempt the kind of exercise that the CIA makes to find out what goes on in the Kremlin. Only Soviet officials call it Washingtonology, not Kremlinology.

KISSINGER HAD SAID that only "minor" issues remained to be resolved. But Mr. Nixon spoke later of "central" issues. Kissinger had said that only one more negotiating session would suffice. But the White House spokesman later spoke of several. Was there a genuine disagreement in the White House, the Kremlin would ask, or had Mr. Nixon simply changed his mind?

Washingtonology, when practiced from a Soviet vantage point, has one advantage. It is not limited to Washington information, but can be supplemented with insights from the other side of the fence. Why, for instance, did Hanoi press for an immediate cease-fire some time before the election? "You'll have to ask Hanoi," said Kissinger.

The answer is not simply that Hanoi thought it could get better terms before the election than after. Once Hanoi had decided, by late summer, to accept Mr. Nixon's major demands, it concentrated its efforts on the next most important negotiating objective: to prevent

the rearming of the South Vietnamese forces to the point where they could become a threat to the regime in the North.

Mr. Nixon called it "Vietnamization," but a Saigon army made strong enough to defeat the Communists in the South might also, Hanoi would have reason to fear, be capable of marching on the North. Mr. Nixon kept telling Hanoi that it must choose between "Vietnamization," thus subtly redefined, and a "negotiated settlement," also redefined to include major Communist concessions.

MOSCOW AND PEKING got the message, and kept urging it on a reluctant Hanoi. After the election, they would have argued, even this choice might disappear, because Mr. Nixon would no longer be under pressure to seek a settlement. Hanoi accepted the bargain. The Paris agreement stipulated that the flow of American arms was to end on November 1—and, with it, the threat of Vietnamization.

So the reason why Hanoi had been pressing for an immediate cease-fire, even before the election, was to avert a massive last-minute surge in the flow of arms which would nullify its concessions. When Mr. Nixon rejected the Paris draft, and used the time thus gained to do the very thing which Hanoi had paid so dearly to avert, the Communists claimed that they had been cheated out of the bargain they made in good faith.

The reason why Moscow wants to know whether Kissinger intended this all along, or was overruled by Mr. Nixon, or whether, perhaps, it was a last-minute twist forced on the White House by a genuine change in circumstances, far transcends in importance the immediate issue of peace in Vietnam, important as that is.

What Moscow is asking is whether it can trust Mr. Nixon in the "era of negotiations," and whether it can really march arm-in-arm with him toward the "generation of peace." The White House cannot afford to leave the Kremlin with the wrong impression.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
A 22 Friday, Nov. 24, 1972

China Lifts Limits on Books Read

By Jean Leclerc du Sablon
Agence France Presse

PEKING—After protesting to university authorities, students at Shanghai University Teachers' College have obtained the right to read foreign books, including European and American literature of the 18th and 19th centuries, the People's Daily reported.

The newspaper said that professors of the Chinese department of the college had requested 18th and 19th century European and American novels for the college library, and this request prompted "serious discussions" in the university.

After the discussions among students and professors, however, the People's Daily said the conclusion was reached that "it is acceptable that readers should read certain ideas that are erroneous or contain poison seeds."

Observers in Peking said this thirst for reading among Chinese students seemed to mark an important new stage in university life after the Cultural Revolution. They added that, during the last two years, university libraries had seemed to concentrate on lending political and technical books, and that access to classical or foreign literature had seemed to be more limited.

During the past year, however, foreign classics have been reappearing on library shelves. This was seen as part of a general trend toward more cultural freedom, and the fact that the right to read such books was reaffirmed in the People's Daily gives it an official sanction.

The report in the People's Daily on the discussions was carried on a page devoted to university problems. "Certain comrades suggested that the books should be acquired; oth-

ers resolutely opposed this, arguing that the reappearance of those books would be a sign of restoration," the newspaper said.

"Restoration" appeared to refer to the previous policy of allowing students access to Western literature, a policy dramatically changed by the purge of Western books and ideas during the Cultural Revolution.

It said that "leader comrades were very worried" by the fact that new students—young workers, peasants and soldiers enrolled in the university through reforms applied after the Cultural Revolution—"were formulating new readership requests at the library."

It described the library officials as "indecisive," and said some "even tried to hide the books."

Protesting students said that "the activities of the library must be actively placed in the service of the proletarian revolution in teaching. Not to open books, or to run away from contradictions, is the same thing as refusing to eat for fear of choking," the newspaper said.

"University and library authorities were profoundly surprised by the students' criticism," the paper said.

They cautioned that "On the one hand, we must trust most of the worker, peasant and soldier students—they are capable of judging for themselves. But at the same time, we must understand that they are still young and some of them are in danger of being influenced or corrupted by poison seeds."

The reforms adopted at the university were aimed, the newspaper said, at guiding students' reading and making those who borrowed books "haphazardly" realize that "reading books is not a form of mental recreation." Students are also encouraged to write commentaries on what they read, the paper said.

The University library contains more than 400,000 volumes, and the average daily borrowing rate is 500 books, according to the People's Daily report. On some days as many as 1,500 books will be borrowed. The newspaper described these figures as higher than before the Cultural Revolution.

Eastern Europe

BALTIMORE SUN

13 November 1972

By-Product of Detente

The Nixon Thaw: U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe

By JOSEPH R. L. STERNE

Under the protective cover of American-Soviet detente, relations between the United States and Eastern Europe are relaxing and improving.

This is a delicate diplomatic business, given the Kremlin's hypersensitivity about political developments within the Warsaw Pact area. On all too many occasions, the world has seen how the Russians react if they feel their hegemony is threatened in the satellite states on their western border.

Therefore, the fact that American ties with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and even East Germany are on the upgrade, right across the board, must be rated one of the quieter achievements of President Nixon's foreign policy.

To create the right atmosphere for this relaxation required more than a one-shot journey to Moscow and a series of American-Soviet accords that gave Eastern European regimes added room for maneuver. The Russians first had to be convinced how much Mr. Nixon's approach to East-West affairs had evolved since the rollback, liberation posturing of the early Dulles years.

In successive State-of-the-World messages and no doubt in private communications, the President signaled the Kremlin that he was willing to accept the *status quo* in divided Europe. This did not mean he would condone the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event that chilled East-West relations five months before he took office. Nor did it imply he would cold-shoulder Romania's attempts to improve its links with the West

much faster than the Kremlin desired.

But it did show that Mr. Nixon, like Chancellor Willy Brandt in Bonn, had come to accept the paradox that the Iron Curtain could become more permeable only through acknowledgment of Soviet dominance to the east of it.

In this context, it is interesting to note how the President dealt with Eastern European affairs in his 1971 and 1972 foreign policy reports.

"While the countries of (Eastern Europe) are in close proximity to the USSR, they also have historic ties to Western Europe and the United States," he said in the first of these messages. "We will not exploit these ties to undermine the security of the Soviet Union. We would not pretend that the facts of history and geography do not create special circumstances in Eastern Europe. We recognize a divergence in social, political and economic systems between East and West."

It is difficult to imagine a statement that could have been more reassuring to the Russians. It came at a time when the Russians were stalling on the Berlin accord, the ice-breaking document in East-West relations that had been signed one year later when Mr. Nixon gave his 1972 foreign policy assessment. As a result, the President evidently felt he could direct his calls for accommodation more pointedly toward the Eastern European capitals.

Listen to these remarks in his message of last February: "We do not want to complicate the difficulties of East European nations' relations with their allies; neverthe-

less, there are ample opportunities for economic, technical and cultural cooperation on the basis of reciprocity. The Eastern European countries themselves can determine the pace and scope of their developing relations with the United States."

In May, only three months after those words were uttered, Mr. Nixon made the first presidential visit in history to Poland as he headed home from the Moscow summit.

His appearance coincided with the signing of a consular agreement that the U.S. had sought for 10 years as a protection for American citizens. While no specific trade deals were completed, a bilateral commission was set up and negotiations were launched that could, in time, bring Poland the U.S. credits, trade and technology it so eagerly desires. The Warsaw regime has made a good-faith gesture by opening talks on the partial repayment of bonds sold by the non-communist government in pre-war Poland to hundreds of Americans of Polish origin.

The Nixon trip to Warsaw was followed by Secretary of State Rogers' July journey to Hungary, where relations have been grim since the 1956 uprising, and by Mr. Rogers' conversations last month with the foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

The U.S. made headway with all three governments in its quest for consular treaties and, in return, opened trade talks that could lead eventually to the granting of most-favored-nation commercial arrangements—a top-priority matter for these economically deficit nations.

Hungary responded to Washing-

ton's efforts by agreeing to negotiate on a settlement of American war-damage and nationalization claims. Bulgaria, a nation long content to stay deep in the Soviet shadow, agreed to send a deputy prime minister to the U.S. next year. Washington is watching for a less repressive political mood in Prague.

American relations with East Germany will have to remain in official abeyance until Bonn normalizes its relations with East Berlin and the two Germanys enter the United Nations. However, it is now only a matter of time before the United States and East Germany recognize one another and begin the process of developing political, cultural and trade arrangements. In the meantime, both countries are exchanging visitors at a cautiously faster pace.

While American-Soviet detente is the major factor in Mr. Nixon's policies toward Warsaw Pact nations, there are other influences as well.

One is the approach of a Conference on European Security and Cooperation where the West will try to encourage independent impulses on the part of Eastern European nations. Another is the concern Washington shares with Soviet bloc nations about restrictive trade policies of the Common Market.

Finally, there has been a change, a two-way change, in the feelings between the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and millions of Americans of Eastern European ethnic origin. While ideological hostility remains, it is gradually being overtaken by a resurgence of national sentiment that cannot fail but make reconciliation easier.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 November 1972

Balance of Humanity

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, Nov. 17 — The Russian State Choir performed the other night in the Queen Elizabeth Hall, London. On the pavement outside there was a counter performance: Victor Yoran, a Soviet Jew in exile, played works for unaccompanied cello by Bach and Ravel.

Mr. Yoran was protesting the refusal of Soviet authorities over the last three years to let his wife, his son and his mother join him in Israel. Others with him carried signs condemning the treatment of Jews in the U.S.S.R., for example the dismissal of 24 Jewish musicians from the Moscow Radio Orchestra after one sought a permit to leave for Israel.

The incident evoked a disparate memory. One of the most bizarre moments in the 1972 Republican convention came during a film on the accomplishments of President Nixon. When he was shown with Leonid Brezhnev of the U.S.S.R., the hall in Miami burst into the loudest applause of the evening.

The applause was doubtless for the idea of détente rather than the person of Brezhnev. Still, it was remarkable to see thousands of Republicans applauding at the burly image of the Soviet Communist party leader, the imposer of a head tax on Jewish emigrants, the author of the formal doctrine that the Soviet Union may sup-

press freedom in any Socialist country. The delegates' enthusiasm for friendship with the most powerful of Communist countries contrasted with their equally strong support for continued American air and naval assault on one of the smallest, North Vietnam. Then Mr. Nixon, in his acceptance speech, made a tender reference to little Tanya of Leningrad, whose family died during the German blockade; he said nothing about the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese Tanys and other innocents killed, wounded and made homeless by his bombs.

How does one explain the difference in American attitudes toward Communism in Moscow and Hanoi?

Has Russian Communism been smoothed into something more congenial? Hardly. The persecution of dissenters, more cruel than of Jews, is too well known to need rehearsing—the punishment in mental hospitals and labor camps. One savage recent example is the death of the 35-year-old poet Yuri Galanskov in a camp this month. He was known to have severe stomach ulcers; but when his mother brought honey for him last June, camp authorities barred it, saying he was not sick but was "just a hooligan who shirks his work."

Or perhaps we could say that the Soviet Union does not invade other countries, as North Vietnam did the South in the spring offensive. But that "invasion" was part of a war in what had been one country for many hundreds of years and is still regarded as such by most Vietnamese. The Soviet Union only a few years ago brazenly invaded a totally foreign country, Czechoslovakia. Have we for-

gotten already?

No, the reason for the difference in attitudes is plain enough. The Soviet Union is big, powerful and dangerous to the United States. North Vietnam is small, weak and no danger whatever—a country we can afford to abuse.

Power is a reality in the world, and it is necessary wisdom for the United States to recognize that. We have no effective power to help the Czechs and would not improve things by delusions to the contrary. Détente with the Soviet Union, as in the SALT agreement, serves important purposes whatever the nature of Soviet society.

The question is whether the reality of power excludes more human concerns in foreign policy. Henry Kissinger might well say yes; he might indeed regard anyone who asked such a question as a sentimentalist. But Americans still do have to live with their foreign policy, so they ought to understand its human consequences.

A world balanced among the strong may have grave consequences for the weak. That is because the balance is essentially an agreement by the powerful to let each other have their own way in their own spheres.

Andrei Sakharov, the great Russian dissenter, said in a recent interview that things had grown worse in the U.S.S.R. since Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow: "The authorities seem more impudent because they feel that with détente they can now ignore Western public opinion." Limits on American influence in Soviet affairs may be an inescapable part of great-power agreement. But it does not follow that we must cease to care about what we do ourselves, in our world.

WASHINGTON POST
11 November 1972

Rostropovich: The Discord of Detente

On Nov. 1, on the basis of his personal reply, Thiel College in Greenville, Pa., announced that the great Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich was to perform there on Nov. 16, and to receive an honorary degree. But yesterday the Soviet Embassy in Washington, offering the patently phony excuse that Mr. Rostropovich's schedule was full, told Thiel that the cellist and his wife, soprano Galina Vishnevskaya, wouldn't come. Obviously, he is being humiliated and caged by his government for his long and honorable record of standing up for human rights in the Soviet Union. His statement in defense of Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn a year ago is perhaps the best publicized part of that record.

There is, to be sure, nothing new in the Kremlin's treating its most distinguished citizens in this barbaric fashion. However, there is something new, and something extremely disturbing, in the context of this latest repression. Within the last year, Soviet-American relations have notably improved: They are "the best yet," the Soviet ambassador observed the other evening. President Nixon campaigned effectively for re-election on his contribution to this advance in Soviet-American relations. Political and strategic dialogue is proceeding, trade is expanding, the atmosphere is bright. The question forced by the Rostropovich ban is whether all of these considerable advantages are to be gained by a scuttling of the values in which this nation, at least, supposedly believes. Does Moscow intend to use Soviet-American détente to blunt

American concern for violations of human rights in the Soviet Union? The issue, we submit, goes to the heart of the purpose and meaning of détente, and of American public support for it.

At the May summit in Moscow, furthermore, Mr. Brezhnev agreed with Mr. Nixon on a set of "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations." Principle No. 9 states: "The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges." A case can be made that the leash on Mr. Rostropovich does indeed familiarize the United States with official Soviet cultural values, but this can hardly be what the Nixon-Brezhnev declaration had in mind. If Mr. Nixon means to have the "Basic Principles" regarded as more than a scrap of paper, then he can hardly fail to take appropriate official cognizance of an act which is in transparent violation of them.

We would prefer to believe that the Rostropovich affair is the result not of a personal intercession by Mr. Brezhnev but of one of those bureaucratic tradeoffs—something for Moscow's ideological hardhats—that are not entirely unknown in American politics either. Fortunately, there is still time and political room for the rather low-level and informal Soviet Embassy ban to be set aside. Mr. Nixon, himself an earlier recipient of a Thiel honorary degree, by the way, and Mr. Brezhnev, by all administration accounts a broad-minded man intent on détente, surely have a common interest in assuring that Mr. Rostropovich goes to Thiel.

Western Europe

WASHINGTON STAR
12 November 1972

CARL T. ROWAN

25 Years for Transition From Madness to Sanity

Out of Bonn comes the almost incredible announcement that West Germany and East Germany will treat each other civilly, and as two separate, respectful states.

This is especially astonishing to anyone aware of the many times during the last quarter-century when rivalry between the two Germanies threatened to plunge the world into nuclear war.

I remember a badly shaken John F. Kennedy returning from a Vienna meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, rushing desperately to beef up U.S. conventional military forces after the Russians jolted him with an ultimatum about Berlin.

Kennedy would not have believed that passage of another decade could bring the kind of detente we now see.

Then there are the Koreans. Talking to each other for a change. Making noises suggesting that, despite the obstacles of willful, power-loving men at the top of each government, the same kind of thaw is in the cards for them.

After the investment of scores of thousands of U.S.

Chinese and Korean lives and many billions of dollars in that fratricidal conflict, the passions now wane somewhat.

Then there is the People's Republic of China. In the first years of this last quarter-century even a word or gesture of civility by an American was political suicide. The United States was caught up in mean recriminations over "who lost China" to the Communists. Emotionalizing over China's involvement in the Korean war replaced any logical thinking about what must be the ultimate place in world society of a country inhabited by more than a fifth of the world's people.

Only after more than two decades, when only rabid American conservatives were still spleenful in their view of Peking, was it possible for a Republican president to open a new dialogue and set about normalizing relations with China.

We look back at the hours wasted in angry rhetoric hurled at China in the United Nations, in Congress, in U.S. political campaigning, and recall how the bitter insults were

duplicated in Peking, and we shake our heads in sardonic laughter.

Now there is Indochina. Another of those quarter-century-long abominations. Peace may not be nearly as close at hand as the American people have been led to believe, but it seems clear that "reconciliation and concord" among the people of Vietnam is under way.

And once again we shall shake our heads in wonderment that we sacrificed so many American lives, helped snuff out so many Asian lives, dropped so many bombs and destroyed so many people and things, only to see the principals to the conflict shake hands and take the more rational route of negotiations.

Maybe there is a lesson in all this. Perhaps, just as nature establishes a nine-month gestation period for humans and a 645-day period for elephants, a 25-year period is required to convert international madness to sanity.

The lesson, then, would be that utter restraint is called for by the rest of mankind

while combatants are given time to come back to their senses.

You think of the many times when the U.S. and Russia could have gone to war over the Germans—and shudder.

You think how inviting it was for the United States to take rash action after the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, or North Korea's shooting down of our EC-121 aircraft, or the many periodic outbursts of violence in the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. And you sigh in relief.

This is not to suggest that there will not be more killing in Indochina or more crises in Europe. An observation of the current state of mankind suggests that it is folly to expect lasting peace—or even a generation of it.

But it may be that if the great powers keep their cool, these regional and internal squabbles need not blow up into massive conflagrations. And who knows but what man might cut the period of transition from madness to sanity from 25 years to 20, or even to 10?

WASHINGTON STAR
13 November 1972
RAY CROMLEY

Europe's Plans for Trade Bloc Bother Nixon

There is growing alarm within the Nixon administration over the economic programs of our West European allies.

What bothers the Nixon men deeply is a program now being worked out in the European Common Market which aims eventually at a bloc of 60 countries, each giving the others trade preferences and discriminating against the products of the United States and other nonmember lands.

The first step aims at bringing in a group of Mediterranean lands. Quiet behind-the-scenes talks are going ahead on this first-step program now despite some concerned effort on the part of special U.S. trade representatives to stem the tide.

This system of protection and discrimination would, of course, put the United States at a severe trade disadvantage. Worse yet, the Nixon economic-trade specialists here fear, it would set off a race

worldwide to set up competing protectionist trade blocs. This development would knock the props out of the free trade policies which American Presidents—Republican and Democrats alike—have pushed for the past two decades. However inconsistent our other policies from time to time, both political parties have united on the necessity for cutting trade barriers as a stimulus to prosperity.

The growth of these protectionist blocs might make it very difficult indeed for the United States to recover from its unfavorable balance of trade unless Washington too resorted to stiff import controls and set up an international preference bloc of its own.

The Europeans tell Nixon's protesting representatives that the rising tide of U.S. technology is forcing them into this protectionism.

The U.S. technology base is too strong, and growing too rapidly, they claim, for Europeans to compete. First

there's the vast U.S. market itself, which sparks new technology and offers the opportunity for profitable exploitation of new developments. Then there's the worldwide spread of U.S. companies which enables this country to learn quickly, and to rapidly take advantage, of technological improvements wherever they're developed. The financial strength of these international U.S. concerns provides them with the necessary capital to put these advanced technological discoveries into use with amazing speed, the European Common Market men say. As a result, they claim, Europe must in self-defense expand its own base. Thus the plan for a 60-country alliance.

But the Europeans are increasingly worried about American countermeasures. They've urged Washington to end the war in Viet Nam and to build relations with the Communist lands and thus ease the cold war. Now that President Nixon is following this advice, they're worried

their plans for discriminating against the United States may drive this country into economic alliances with Russia and China, and cause Washington to direct U.S. investment and development aid emphasis to Southeast Asia and the Far East in the next decade, leaving West Europe (with its heavy need for advanced technology investment) somewhat out in the cold.

The dilemma of the Europeans is clear and sharp. They need U.S. advanced technology, yet they want to be free of this dependence. They want to discriminate against the United States economically, but not so sharply the United States will react strongly enough to injure their economies.

These European fears give the U.S. negotiators some leverage. This problem has no solution so dramatic as the Moscow and Peking visits. But it will occupy Nixon for some years to come.

Newsweek, November 27, 1972

Europe: Bumpy Weather Ahead

For once, Henry Kissinger's timing was off. Even as the President's national security adviser was deeply immersed in a final round of Vietnam peace talks, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was about to shift its attention to a different part of the world. "Nineteen seventy-three will be the year of Europe," Administration officials say—and to prove it they have scheduled a mind-boggling series of European negotiations that, in a quieter way, promise to have as great a global impact as Mr. Nixon's dramatic trips to Peking and Moscow in 1972.

It all begins this week when the U.S. will join 33 other nations in Helsinki for a preliminary round of talks on the question of European security. At the same time, the U.S. and Russia will meet in Geneva to begin the second phase of talks on limiting strategic weapons. Then, after the first of the year, East and West will tackle the thorny problem of how to reduce military forces in Central Europe. And to cap it all off, next summer will usher in the vitally important "Nixon round" of meetings on European trade. "Fasten your seat belts," one Western diplomat said last week. "It's going to be a bumpy Europe for the next four years."

Indeed it is. During his second term in office, Mr. Nixon is widely expected to pursue a radically new kind of policy toward Europe. Essentially, there will be two major themes. First, the President intends to treat both his old adversaries in the East and his old friends in the West with equal toughness. Second, he plans to use the economic might of the U.S. as his chief weapon in dealing with Europe—East and West. What all this means is that the U.S. is ready to launch its most ambitious diplomatic offensive in Europe in the past two decades. Below, NEWSWEEK examines the main issues and the likely outcome of this European strategy:

DEALING WITH OLD ADVERSARIES

Since 1964, the Soviet Union has been clamoring for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Moscow's hope is to obtain the seal of diplomatic approval on the postwar status quo—a divided Europe in which Russia can exercise hegemony over the Eastern portion while penetrating the West politically. The West has been wary, but some months ago—after the Soviets offered concessions guaranteeing Western rights in Berlin—the U.S. gave its nod. Still, there was one hitch. The Nixon Administration insisted that separate talks be held simultaneously on mutual and balanced reduction of Eastern and Western forces in Europe (MBFR)—a hard-nosed bit of bargaining that Moscow reluctantly accepted.

The opening of the Helsinki talks on European security represents something of a diplomatic victory for the Russians. But the Western delegations, and particularly that of the U.S., have no intention of letting the Soviets get their own way in the Finnish capital. The major

wrangling will come over the agenda of the full conference. The Russians would like the preliminary session in Helsinki to do no more than establish a vague agenda and set a date for the conference. But the U.S., with the support of its NATO allies, means to hold out for a meaningful agenda that could lead toward concrete agreements. "We don't want to spoil their party," said an American diplomat in Moscow. "But we do want it to produce something more tangible than pious propaganda declarations."

Along with its Western allies, the U.S. will make it plain that the "inviolability of European borders," about which the Russians are expected to make much fuss, should also apply to the countries of the Eastern bloc—a slap at the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" that permits Moscow to interfere in the internal affairs of its satellites. The West may even demand that the Russians discuss such embarrassing questions as the free flow of information and people and exit visas for Soviet Jews. And while the Russians hope to drive wedges between the U.S. and its allies, Washington believes it can encourage a certain degree of independence on the part of the Eastern Europeans. In exchange for support in the agenda battle, the U.S. is said to be preparing to offer huge American investments to the Eastern Europeans. "In the end," remarked one American official, "the Soviets may kick themselves for having thought up such a conference."

Balanced: The U.S. is expected to take the same tough line in the MBFR talks. Moscow will argue that cuts should be made on a man-for-man, tank-for-tank basis. But since the forces of the Warsaw Pact outnumber NATO's 1 million to 500,000—and since Soviet troops in Eastern Europe would be moving back a mere 500 miles into their own country while U.S. troops in Germany would withdraw across the Atlantic—the U.S. will argue for a "balanced" reduction in forces. This means the Soviet Union will be asked to cut its troop strength by a greater percentage to make up for its geographic proximity to Western Europe.

Despite all the possible pitfalls in these complex negotiations, high U.S. officials are confident that Washington is dealing from diplomatic strength. "The Soviets need us more than we need them," says one U.S. expert. "They know the technology gap between the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the world is widening and they also need to acquire marketing and management skills. We can give them those things in exchange for a more liberal attitude toward East Europe and for a reasonable approach to troop reduction. That's what détente could be about—if they play their cards right."

NEGOTIATING WITH OLD FRIENDS

As seen from Western Europe, the whole question of European security and force reductions is a two-edged sword. The West Europeans are concerned that

the Nixon Administration will use the threat of a drastic and unilateral reduction in U.S. troop strength in Europe to get the members of the expanded Common Market to lower their barriers to U.S. trade. Fearing a crisis in EEC-U.S. relations, the Europeans point to Mr. Nixon's recent statement that he will take action to insure "that the U.S. can continue to get a proper break in our trading relations with other nations."

Although the President did not name the "other nations," he is known to be exercised over the system of trade practices being constructed by the Common Market. A tariff wall around the Market was one thing and it was understandable that Europe's former colonies in Africa would get preferential trade treatment. But then came the concept of "reverse preferences," whereby the former colonies pledged themselves to give EEC bidders preference in investment projects in their area. Next, the EEC began to expand the concept of preferential trade treatment to huge areas outside its traditional zones of concern. Special deals were made for the import of citrus fruit from Spain and Israel and the talk in Brussels began to turn to the possibility of associate membership in the EEC for Mexico and Singapore. At this point, the Nixon Administration trade experts blew up. "If the EEC keeps this up," said one, "they will have a system that effectively fences out all competition from the U.S. and Japan."

Rivalry: What moves the U.S. will make to counter the EEC remains to be seen. But it seems likely that next summer's "Nixon round" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will be a lively one, with the U.S. pushing hard for clearer rules governing trade between the U.S. and the EEC. Some Europeans, however, fear that the U.S. intends to go even farther than that in its trade rivalry with the EEC. "The U.S. is planning a major trade offensive in the Eastern European countries," insists one EEC official. "They will try to set up automobile plants there, taking advantage of the cheap labor, and flood the EEC countries with Eastern-made cars with good old American names."

Unless some way is found to head off a full-fledged trade war between the U.S. and the EEC, the former allies might find themselves in a bitter rivalry for the available energy resources in the world. So far, the Nixon Administration has talked tough but done little to establish a high-level dialogue with the EEC about these problems. And many diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic are fearful that the economic difficulties could one day lead to a political confrontation between the U.S. and Western Europe. "Nixon," says one European, "may go down in history not just as the President who normalized relations with China and Russia but as the man responsible for the U.S. and Europe breaking their bonds and going their own ways."

Near East

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

4 NOV 1972

✓ All the fault of the CIA?

Walter Schwarz, New Delhi, on the genesis of an Indian myth

What goes wrong in India used to be blamed on the British, or the failing monsoons, or the Pakistanis, or the pro-Chinese Communists. Now, suddenly, it's the CIA.

In the last few weeks Mrs Gandhi and her top party officials have named the CIA as responsible for riots in Delhi and Bihar, language disturbances in Assam, student demonstrations in Punjab and Kerala, unrest in Kashmir, hostile processions in West Bengal and, most sinister of all, the emergence of a grand alliance among opposition parties.

The fashion was born in September when the Congress Party President, Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma, said at a press conference that "the CIA is creating conflict in my country and using its stooges for making peaceful demonstrations violent."

Whether this was the opening shot in a deliberate campaign to make India spy-conscious is not clear. Perhaps having come out with it, Dr Sharma could not disown it, and his Prime Minister could not disown him. Perhaps it was such a popular thing to say that Dr Sharma went on saying it and the others joined in.

Whatever the reasons behind the timing, it is fairly clear that Mrs Gandhi, Dr Sharma, and a great many other Indians believe the charges to have more than a grain of truth.

What Dr Sharma thinks the CIA has in mind was explained at his next press conference. It meant "to show after all that India is not strong, but economically weak and politically disjointed and Mrs Gandhi's victory only an accident." For her part Mrs Gandhi said she agreed there was a "cult of violence" and that this was fomented by "foreign Powers which hate to see India strong." More specifically, she said the CIA had "lain dormant" during the Bangladesh war "because the people were united." Its activities had now been "revived."

After this stamp of approval, Chief Ministers and party bosses all the way from Kashmir to Kerala came out with what the CIA had been doing to rock their particular boats. The Chief Minister of Punjab found the CIA behind the demonstrations of the ultra-right-wing Akali Dal Party, while his colleague in West Bengal singled out the pro-Chinese Communist Party as the agency's stooges.

Nobody offered evidence. "It is

not up to us to prove it but it is up to the CIA to disprove it," said Mrs Gandhi haughtily.

This remark provoked Mr Rogers into raising the whole matter with India's Foreign Minister in Washington. Mrs Gandhi now explained that she had meant that the CIA's doings were already well enough documented up and down the world.

The Americans reacted quietly. The Embassy in Delhi put out a two-line statement calling Dr Sharma's original attack "outrageous and totally devoid of fact." Then it kept quiet, waiting for the storm to blow over. Mr Rogers assured Mr Swaran Singh that no CIA activities were harmful to India.

Sceptics in Delhi put the whole thing down to political manoeuvring. "Methinks the lady protests too much," said the Indian Express, while the Hindustan Times found it "difficult to resist the feeling that the Congress Party is casting about desperately for allies and scapegoats for its relatively poor performances in the economy."

It was indeed a time of food riots after a drought, and of mounting popular exasperation over rising prices and corruption. The

Congress Party was about to hold its annual committee meeting, where the leadership was expected to be attacked from within by the left wing. And both Left and Right opposition parties were planning nation-wide demonstrations. As a scapegoat and a diversion, the CIA filled the bill.

Politics may account for the timing of the anti-CIA campaign. But the proposition that the United States is actively interested in preventing India from becoming strong is very widely accepted — and Mrs Gandhi is clearly among the believers. For most Indians the final doubts were dispelled during the Bangladesh war when the Seventh Fleet carrier appeared in the Bay of Bengal.

The correspondence columns of Delhi newspapers have been less sceptical than the editorials. Among scores of irate anti-CIA letters the least violent was from a kind soul who sought to excuse the Embassy for its denial on the grounds that American Ambassadors never knew what the CIA was up to.

The American role here has been an object lesson in how to give aid and win enemies. In the last twenty years India got more than ten thousand million dollars' worth of American aid — more than from all other countries put

together. In one drought after another, American surplus wheat and rice staved off famine. The "green revolution" which has begun to make India independent of food imports was partly financed by American dollars, as was nearly every branch of education, welfare, industry, and development.

The dependence bred resentment. And now that the aid has been cut off as a result of the war with Pakistan, there is fresh resentment. A veteran of the Congress Party's freedom struggle and now one of Mrs Gandhi's senior colleagues assured me that "Americans are far more arrogant than the British ever were. Aid was for their own benefit, not ours." This minister said he saw a pattern running through all the riots which suggested to him that the CIA was master-minding them.

The wheat and rice used to be paid for in rupees which were banked here for American use. Some of the money went on internal aid projects. A lot of it paid for the hugely staffed diplomatic and aid missions here — and also paid the expenses of an army of visiting American scholars. These scholars did much to lengthen the CIA's shadow here because they were always going off to sensitive border areas like West Bengal or Assam to write their theses. Some who were not CIA did not help matters by publicly declaring that the CIA had "approached" them.

The American profile has now been drastically lowered. Even before the war the food stopped coming in because it was not needed. The war stopped all aid not tied to projects — which still leaves about a hundred million dollars a year coming in. The Indians themselves have put a stop to the wandering scholars by insisting that they operate in the framework of a local university.

No doubt the CIA is still here, though perhaps it has pruned its numbers as drastically as the US Aid Mission has. The embassy still lists 108 diplomats in Delhi (the British 51, the Russians 67). The American mission includes a "defence supply representative" and two assistants, though no American arms have arrived here for many months. (An embassy spokesman said these people are being phased out.)

In addition to fact-finding, the CIA may well give funds to political parties and individual political friends, just as the Russians are widely assumed to finance the pro-Moscow Communists and the Chinese to help their own faction. But the notion that the CIA organises food riots and student demonstrations has yet to be proved, or even made to sound plausible.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

11 November 1972

West's refusal leads Egypt to continue relying on Soviet aid

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Cairo

President Sadat feels obliged to continue relying on Soviet military and economic aid, partly because the British and French Governments refused to deliver to Egypt their advanced Anglo-French Jaguar fighter plane, it has been learned here.

Failure of the former Egyptian war minister, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Saddek, to obtain the planes may have been one reason for his resignation or dismissal by President Sadat last month, some qualified Egyptian observers believe.

Cairo sounded out the London and Paris governments about purchasing the Jaguar before President Sadat removed Soviet military advisers from Egypt last July, these sources say.

Request repeated

The request was repeated in more formal fashion after the Soviet departure and new Soviet refusals to supply the advanced MIG-23 fighter-bomber. After the request had moved up to the highest levels of both governments, secret British and French Cabinet decisions rejected it for reasons that have not been made public.

What General Saddek and Egyptian Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Hosni Embarek, evidently hoped was to obtain credit purchases of an entire Western-supplied defense system. This would have involved delivery of several squadrons of both the training and tactical-strike version of the Jaguar, as well as an integrated air-defense system of a type similar to that used by NATO in Europe.

Retraining involved

This would have meant phasing down Soviet help, five to six years of retraining the Egyptian armed forces, and new Western options to Egypt for purchasing other military equipment as well, it is understood. The Jaguar, developing Mach 1.7 speed at about 33,000 feet altitude, has shorter range and lighter payload than Israel's U.S.-supplied Phantoms, and lower ceiling and speed than the Soviet MIG-23. But it is comparable with,

and some experts think superior to, the MIG-21, the Soviet-supplied standard aircraft of the Egyptian and Syrian Air Forces.

Israel claimed shooting down two Syrian MIG-21's in an air and artillery battle continuing through most of the day Nov. 10. Syria claimed it shot down four Israeli planes of unspecified type and admitted losing two of its own. Israel denied losing any of its aircraft, in the first air battle on the Israel-Syrian front since Sept. 8.

Appearance of Syrian MIG-21's in combat was thought by some Arab observers to be evidence of new Soviet deliveries to Syria. Syria has mainly used the slower and much older MIG-17's and occasionally MIG-19's in past fighting.

Final rejection

A final Anglo-French rejection of the Egyptian request for Jaguars was one reason for Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidky's trip to Moscow Oct. 16-18. During this trip Mr. Sidky was again told that Moscow could not presently supply the MIG-23.

Careful observers of the Egyptian scene believe the Sadat government's desire for an advanced air combat system — whether the MIG or the Jaguar — is a quest for a prestige symbol proving that at least one big power has confidence in Egypt.

Israel in better shape

It is, however, not a sign that President Sadat really wants full-scale resumption of hostilities to expel Israeli troops from Sinai. Either the MIG-23 or the Jaguar system would require many years more of rigorous training. Egypt is estimated to have one trained pilot for each of the Soviet-made front-line combat planes it possesses, while Israel has more like three trained pilots for every aircraft.

General Saddek's successor as War Minister, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail, has quietly notified Western governments that the Egyptian Army command will never again allow Russian advisers to get key command and advisory posts in the Egyptian armed forces.

This was accepted as tacit reassurance that in case of a Soviet-Western confrontation in Europe or elsewhere, Soviet personnel or units in Egypt could not act against Western forces in the Mediterranean.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 November 1972

Mideast peace dove may not flutter until '73

By David Winder
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

Nobody here expects the Middle East peace dove to be released during this week's General Assembly debate.

If it is to be released at all, it will come next year with some possible American initiative for an interim agreement.

One informed observer typified the rather languid attitude of the United Nations these days when he said: "People are waiting for the UN General Assembly session to fade into history; are waiting for the turn of the year to come and then they can look at the problem again."

There is considerable expectation that after President Nixon has shaken down his new Cabinet some time in the new year, the administration will be forthcoming with some kind of partial agreement between Israel and Egypt for the reopening of the Suez Canal.

No other peace plan — not withstanding the UN's traditional role here or increasing European desires to play a settlement role — is envisaged yet.

As one European diplomat put it, "Nobody wants to cross wires with the Americans."

Debate due for scrutiny

The debate will be watched for any signs of flexibility in the parties' approach to any possible negotiations.

As far as the UN is concerned, Israel is expected to take an even tougher position.

For some time now there have been veiled warnings about the relevance of Security Council Resolution 242.

Israel probably will let it be known that if it is pushed around too much at the UN, it may drop altogether its interest in 242 as a basis for any future settlement.

This 1967 resolution is considered the central core for any peace settlement since it was found acceptable to both the Israelis and the Egyptians. It calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Egypt's respect for safe, secure, internationally recognized boundaries.

Israel's unsympathetic attitude to the UN is well known, and Western observers feel that in spite of official Israeli denials, Foreign Minister Abba Eban's absence from this year's Middle East debate typifies Israel's back-of-the-hand attitude to the UN these days.

Willingness indicated

However, Israelis are thought to be responsive now to some diplomatic prodding from the United States.

In principle at least, Israel has been making such sounds as to suggest a willingness to make concessions. But the concern here is that Israeli concessions inevitably would be at a pace not only of their own choosing but also at a pace unacceptable to the Arabs.

Thus any American calls for major Israeli concessions such as vacating the Suez Canal east bank and the reopening of the canal itself could come up against stiff Israeli resistance.

The other vexing problem for Middle East specialists is that both Egypt and Israel have of late been indulging in a game of diplomatic hide and seek. In short they are never simultaneously interested in seeking the same objectives at the same time.

Israel for instance now appears more interested in an interim arrangement provided there are no pre-conditions. Egypt, which had earlier professed an interest, cold shoulders this approach now.

Officials disappointed

Much of Egypt's disenchantment with the American formula is directly attributable to Cairo's sour feelings about Washington.

One observer here said: "The Egyptians are bitterly disappointed with the fact that the Americans showed no response to the expulsion of the Russians. They desperately wanted some gesture to show appreciation."

This perhaps explains Egypt's more than usual preoccupation with a UN-type settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242.

Middle East peace watchers here hope that whatever resolution is approved in the coming debate will not be so tough as to present obstacles to the peacemaking processes they see as inevitably restarting in the new year.

RICHMOND NEWS LEADER

11 Nov 1972

Garbo and Insults:

Relations between India and the United States turned sour last year when the Nixon Administration sided with Pakistan in the short-lived Indo-Pakistani War. Even so, the United States had so long supported India's "experiment in democracy" that most observers felt that after a reasonable cooling-off period, the giant of the West and the giant of South Asia would soon be smiling at each other once again.

Not so. Under the peace-loving, iron-handed rule of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India has created a cult of anti-Americanism that would do any two-bit African or Latin American country proud. According to Indian officials, the United States is responsible for just about every ill imaginable, except perhaps the circumstance that Mrs. Gandhi was not born a boy. Leading the list of American bad guys is the Central Intelligence Agency, that fascist-loaded organization which preys on poor, defenseless nations at every opportunity.

Indeed, Indian Communists now

claim that the United States will post Ambassador Carol Laise from Nepal to New Delhi as part of an expanded CIA sabotage effort. Wife of that well-known CIA operative, Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Miss Laise was described the other day as a "CIA Mata Hari," whose appointment

to New Delhi would be "another insult . . . to India"—an insult, no doubt, akin to the U.S. cutoff of aid to India following the December hostilities.

In fact, Indian anti-Americanism has grown in direct proportion to the number of days during which India has been forced to struggle on without sugar from Uncle Sam; fewer dollars, more charges of CIA interference. So all the United States needs to do is to start providing financial support again, and Miss Laise will not have to worry about being compared to Greta Garbo.

Then again, Mrs. Gandhi probably would claim, even as she stuffed her piggy bank, that the Nixon Administration was trying to insult her with money.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
2 November 1972

Mody says he is CIA agent

Hindustan Times Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Nov. 1 — "I am a CIA agent." With this inscribed on a large bronze badge hung around his neck, the Swatantra Party President and MP, Mr. Pilo Mody, was today seen going round the Central Hall of Parliament.

Mr. Mody said he intended to wear the badge during the forthcoming session of Parliament if for no other reason, at least to provoke the Government which had suddenly discovered the dangerous activities of the CIA.

As the idea caught on, Mr. Mody said he had no doubt there would be a mad rush for the badges, particularly among the student community. His concern was whether those who might take to this trade would be able to produce an adequate number of badges to meet the demand.



WASHINGTON POST
19 November 1972

Gen. Amin Got a Different Message

Uganda Aid: An Election Deception

By Jim Hoagland

KAMPALA—Although the election has passed, an apparent attempt by the Nixon administration to use the executive branch to bolster the President's margin of victory continues to have impact in the deeply troubled East African country of Uganda.

The effort involved a decision by the State Department to deceive the American public about its intentions to continue financial aid to the regime of President Idi Amin in the wake of Amin's sympathetic mention of Hitler's method of dealing with Jews last September.

After its spokesman, Charles Bray, told newsmen in Washington that a development loan to Uganda was being held up as a result of American displeasure with Amin, the department cabled instructions to American Ambassador Thomas P. Melady in Kampala to tell Amin that Bray's straightforward assertion had been "misinterpreted".

Melady, who had beseeched Washington to continue aid, was also instructed to assure Amin that there was no connection between technical delays that had developed on the loan and Amin's statement on Hitler.

After Amin ignored Melady's plea that this assurance should be kept secret and released it through the Uganda press, Bray evaded direct comment on the conflicting American positions in Washington and Kampala.

But the election is over now and the impact of Jewish votes on foreign policy may have lessened. The United States is clearly pushing ahead with plans to provide more than \$6-million in aid to Amin's government, which has shown no sign of responding to any American attempts to moderate Amin's nation-destroying excesses.

Moreover, the aid is being channeled to a government that with every passing day appears to be less able to provide its share of the money and government manpower needed to administer aid projects.

Amin has allowed his army to slaughter off thousands of soldiers from tribes antagonistic to his rule and has apparently encouraged his security forces to eliminate many of the country's best educated men, whom he feared as a threat. The death toll since Amin took power in 1971 includes three Americans.

Government ministers and civil servants, whom Amin publicly ridiculed last week as "weak" and "idle" now refuse to make even minor decisions for fear of attracting the general's attention and losing either their jobs or their lives.

The two loans the United States is on the verge of formally awarding to Uganda are for building teacher training institutes and for an animal husbandry project. The fact that they are relatively small does little to mitigate their psychological importance, especially in a time when aid is hard to come by in general and especially in Africa, where a number of other governments have shown themselves capable of administering such loans diligently.

They will also follow a statement by Amin last week praising the Palestinians for the intelligence they have shown in hijacking planes. The United States, which has put itself at the forefront of the campaign against

international terrorism, has not taken note of the new Amin statement.

One of the two principal arguments that emerge from discussions with those here who support going ahead with the loans are that they were originally offered several years ago, before Amin ousted President Milton Obote.

There is a "moral obligation" on the part of the United States to go ahead with the aid, this argument holds. Only a few minor technical details of signing the loans have been delaying them.

The second is that by continuing aid the United States will have more influence with Amin and be in a better position to protect the 700 or so American diplomats, aid technicians, missionaries and businessmen who have stayed on in Uganda.

The implication of this argument is that it might be dangerous to displease Amin by stopping the loans. The Americans who have chosen to stay on are in effect hostages.

Britain, which currently has about 3500 citizens living in Uganda (more than 4000 Britons have quietly filtered out of the country in the past few months) uses the same argument for its attempts to stay on good terms with the erratic Amin.

Amin is set to take over the tea estates of 28 British farmers in the Fort Portal area of Uganda next week. The clear signs here are that Britain has decided not to make an issue of this, even if Amin offers little or no compensation, as he did not to the 42,000 Asians he has just expelled.

While publicly hinting that its policy toward Amin is based on fear for its nationals still there, Britain is known to have conveyed to the United States its private view that any possible alternatives to Amin are so much more frightening that the West should continue to try to work with him.

The alternatives presumably are soldiers in the ranks below Amin, who appear to be the only force capable of ending his rule.

This is perhaps more than any other single factor the crux of the matter. For all of his erratic behavior and vitriolic words on the Middle East, Amin has not struck at strategic Western interests in Uganda, which because of its proximity to Kenya and Zaire and to the Nile is strategic country, by African policy standards.

Two aid loans will probably have little effect in protecting the 300 American missionaries who undoubtedly will want to see their missions through under even highly dangerous conditions, from Amin's violent soldiers. But they could help protect broader political interest.

Diplomats in east Africa already talk of the danger of the new interest shown in Uganda by Somalia, a major Russian aid client.

Just as South Africa and Rhodesia have profited politically from Amin's irresponsibility, there will be American political forces that will want to deny American aid and support to Amin because his is a black government. But there are far more compelling and valid reasons for re-examination of a policy of eagerly providing loans that will give a boost to man who has engineered an African tragedy.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

19 NOV 1972

Riddle of Red Arrow: Italy Arming Libya?

BY PHILIP CAPUTO

Rome Correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

ROME, Nov. 18—The riddle of the Red Arrow remains unsolved.

Red Arrow is a freighter that sailed three months ago from the northern Italian port of La Spezia bound for the Libyan capital of Tripoli.

The merchant ship carried 110 armored personnel carriers and tanks, all manufactured by Italian arms companies, when it cast off.

Their olive-drab color had been changed to beige for desert camouflage. The arms were destined for the army of Col. Moammar Kadafi, the Libyan president who has emerged as the most militant of Arab leaders.

The riddle posed by the departure of the weapons is this: Is Italy becoming a major source of Libyan arms and is it seeking a greater role in the Middle East?

Secrecy Shrouds Affair

Indications are that the answer is yes, but exact details are hard to come by. The Red Arrow affair, as it is sometimes called, is shrouded in secrecy and obscured by information that is a stew of facts, half-truths, and falsehoods.

About all Italian officials are willing to say is that Italy ranks fifth among European arms exporters, having sold \$23.5 million worth in the 1960s, and that the heart of the arms industry is La Spezia, where 13,000 civilians are employed by arms makers.

Anyone who tries to obtain more than that is likely to end up feeling like a character in a bad foreign intrigue novel.

For example, a source who delivered a four-page memorandum on the arms deals asked that the memo be shredded and burned after it was read.

Friend May Suffer

"If it should fall into the wrong hands, my friend might be hurt," he explained.

Diplomats, politicians, and arms merchants who were interviewed abruptly ended the conversation whenever the Libyan affair was mentioned. They gave replies such as, "It is a delicate matter. I can't discuss it," or "I'm not authorized to make any statements, and don't tell anyone you even talked to me."

The reason for all this cloak-and-dagger rests in Italy's precarious political situation and in the bitterness which many Italians feel toward Kadafi.

Shortly after he overthrew the government of King Idris, in 1970, Kadafi expelled 30,000 Italian settlers from Libya and confiscated their property.

"He even expelled the dead," said one right-wing Italian, explaining that Kadafi sent the bodies of Italians buried in Libya back to their homeland.

Libya had been under Rome's rule from 1911 to 1943.

The expulsion enraged conservative Italians, who refer to the Moslem leader as "the lunatic of Tripoli." They form a powerful bloc in the current government, which is a coalition of centrist and right-wing elements. Consequently, Rome is maintaining a lid of secrecy on its Libyan foreign policy to avoid another political crisis in a country where political crises are almost a daily event.

The Red Arrow shipment was first revealed by Il Secolo, the semiofficial voice of the M. S. I. Italy's neo-Fascist party. The Foreign and Defense Ministries admitted that armored personnel carriers were among the cargo but denied allegations that the ship also carried 30 Leopard tanks, which are built by Oto-Melara, one of the country's largest arms manufacturers.

Informed sources said the government's statement was substantially correct, although a highly-placed military source said that about eight tanks of a different type—probably American-style M-47s—had been loaded on the Red Arrow.

Question Is Tabled

The press reports produced excited reactions from right-wing politicians, who brought the matter up to Parliament, which promptly tabled the question for an indefinite period.

Some Italian officials explained that the arms deals were strictly between Libya and private companies, a doubtful hypothesis. One Oto-Melara executive said recently, "Even to buy a nail we must request authorization from the government."

The affair remained quiet until last week, when Il Secolo and other newspapers reported that the government planned to supply Libya with G-91Y fighters, and advanced aircraft manufactured by the Fiat Company in Turin. Knowledgeable sources tend to discount this charge, tho they are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude.

Privately, right-wing sources said that, in addition to fighters, shipments of helicopters, tanks, and small arms are being readied for Kadafi's army. Moreover, a well-informed American with Libyan contacts said Italy is also considering a contract to supply Libya with 105 mm. artillery pieces.

Reports Called Foundless

All this was described by the Defense Ministry as "absolutely without foundation."

In attempting to learn if the information is indeed groundless, one finds himself enveloped by the mystery-cloaked world of international arms-selling and faced with contradictory statements. One executive

of Oto-Melara said all the reports were false, but his boss indicated they were partially true.

The latter then said, "I would like to tell you what I know, but I am chained by secrecy."

It should be explained that Il Secolo is not noted for its accuracy, except in military matters.

"If you want to know what's going on with the military and arms shipments, they're the people to see," said an Israeli source.

Why Arm Foe?

The question some Italians are asking is why their government is arming its arch-foe, Kadafi. A northern industrialist provided this explanation:

"Armaments must be updated . . . they become obsolete . . . However, for certain purposes, they are still excellent. This explains the constant coming and going here of foreign uniforms and gentlemen wearing turbans. In La Spezia, they are no longer a curiosity."

Other sources say that disposing of army surplus is not the only reason for the appearance of turbaned gentlemen in La Spezia. The other reason, they say, is oil.

The voyage of the Red Arrow followed the signing of an agreement between the Libyan government and ENI, the Italian-state-owned oil company. In exchange for drilling rights, ENI was to provide Kadafi's government with 51 per cent of all profits.

The sources say that arms were included in the exchange.

"No, Leopard tanks haven't been sent to Libya—not yet," said an Israeli official. "But there isn't any doubt that Italy has sent arms to Libya and is catering to Libya in exchange for the oil concessions to ENI."

To support this view, they cite the recent appearance of Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Jallud in Italy and France. Jallud spent last week in Paris, where he offered the French government oil conces-

sions and asked for arms in return. The French accepted the offer.

The French government, Paris sources said, is "preoccupied with Italy," and knows that "the Italians have agreed to sell tanks to Libya."

WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Nov. 29, 1972

Mr. MacGregor in Rhodesia

What in blazes is Clark MacGregor, recently Mr. Nixon's re-election chairman and now a United Aircraft executive, doing in Rhodesia declaring that Washington may soon recognize the white-minority-ruled state—the very state which, in the considered judgment of the international community, illegally broke away from Britain in 1965? The State Department at once denied that the U.S. had such "plans," but those familiar with the ways of Washington will find it hard not to pay heed to the remarks of the well-placed Mr. MacGregor.

Mr. MacGregor's statement raises the question of whether he is doing a political job for the administration by flying a trial balloon. If so, the balloon deserves to be shot down promptly. The United States should not be considering recognizing Rhodesia, and thereby conferring on Salisbury and on Salisbury's racial policies a significant new mantle of respectability, at this time.

The timing is particularly important. For reasons of their own, the British and Rhodesian governments seem to be edging towards reconsideration of a formula for a legal British grant of independence in return for some prospects of Rhodesian progress towards majority rule—the formula rejected in 1971 but one for which no non-violent alternative has since been posed. Just as the

American Congressional decision last year to import Rhodesian chrome gave help and heart to those who did not want to hold Salisbury even to faint standards of racial justice, so a similarly negative and anti-black effect would be imparted by an American decision to recognize Rhodesia now.

Should American policy be guided by American standards of racial equality or, more bluntly, by a political regard for the sensibilities of those Americans—black and white—who are offended by Salisbury's racial practices? Mr. Nixon's own standards for relations with white-ruled African states explicitly grant that race should be considered. The President believes, he has said, that the United States should encourage "communication" between the races in Africa and between African and American peoples. In fact, the proper question is not whether but how race should be factored in. "Communication" can have both positive and negative aspects, depending on the situation. In this situation, "communication" — meaning recognition — could give white supremacists in Salisbury a major boost at a critical period in their deliberations with other political elements in Rhodesia and with the British. This is exactly the wrong time for the United States to start such "communicating" with Rhodesia.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 November 1972

Ecology HQ in Kenya: UN torn on site

By David Winder
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.
The successes of the Stockholm environment conference are being dampened by the controversial decision of the UN General Assembly to site an environment secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya.

On paper the decision to base this 23-man secretariat in Africa appears to have overwhelming support. But the conspicuously high number of Western abstentions is a clear indication that the largely cooperative spirit that marked Stockholm has somewhat dimin-

ished in the follow-through at UN headquarters.

Fundamentally there was a pull between Western countries, which, for reasons of cost and logistics favored a European secretariat and the "third world," demanding a bigger piece of the UN action.

By acting in concert, the Group of 77, as the underdeveloped world is known — even though its membership is well above 77 — succeeded in having the first major global UN body located outside the industrialized Western world.

It remains to be seen whether the initial advantage of winning broader environment support among developing nations will outweigh the logistical objections to siting the UN environment secretariat in Nairobi. Certainly before Stockholm, support for the conference among developing nations was hardly enthusiastic.

One danger of Nairobi as some environmentalists see it is that there may be some push now to emphasize development rather than environment.

Poorer countries have long had their suspicions that the Western countries that

have "made it" are anxious to impose environmental controls at a time when the poorer countries seek rapid industrialization and development to catch up.

Such concern — lest development be given priority over the environment — is still academic, however.

A more pressing concern is the political fallout, if not in Western Europe, then certainly in the United States.

The U.S., which has voted \$100 million to the environment fund, voted against the Nairobi decision even though it subsequently pledged its support.

The problem as seen here is not with the administration but with the mood of Congress. Few UN delegates need to be reminded that U.S. House Appropriations Committee member John J. Rooney, an arch foe of the UN, insisted on the withholding of U.S. funds for the International Labor Organization.

While many Western diplomats concede

the need for some geographic distribution of UN agencies, there is concern among them and environmentalists lest a Nairobi-based secretariat with coordinating-agency responsibilities be too isolated from European-based UN bodies. There are other logistical questions.

Says one key environmentalist, not attached to the UN, on the possibilities of enlisting experts: "If you want a good man, and a good man is going to be pretty busy, and it's the best part of a day to get him there and the best part of a day to get him back, not to speak of the jet-lag aspect, then the whole logistical problem becomes grossly aggravated."

African countries in turn say opposition to their site is primarily politically motivated and that the time when industrialized countries could act as if the African countries were colonies and decide for them has passed.

NEW YORK TIMES

9 November 1972

Uganda and Racism

By Hilary Ng'weno

NAIROBI, Kenya—There are no simple moral answers to the question of the plight of Asians currently being evicted from Uganda. Certainly, President Idi Amin and his military government are exhibiting a racism toward Asians which makes nonsense of much of Africa's righteous stand against the racist white minority governments of southern Africa. There are grounds for genuine concern for the safety of any Asians left in Uganda.

Yet it is hypocritical of the world to try and look at this problem in isolation from its historical and international implications. The fate of British Asians in East Africa was put in jeopardy first not by anything any African government did but by the cumulative decisions of various British governments, starting with racially discriminatory colonial laws which placed the economies of East African nations into foreign, essentially Asian hands, and ending with the disgraceful passage by the British Labor Government in 1968 of a law barring the entry of nonwhite British citizens into Britain.

Admittedly the British in their racism have not been as crude as President Amin and his soldiers. They have not rounded up the Asians in their midst, dispossessed them, abused them, stripped them of their dignity and threatened their very lives. But then it has not been necessary. It has all been done for them by the Ugandans.

It is pointless for Britain to try and remind Uganda of her responsibilities to Uganda residents, whether citizens or not, when Britain herself has in the last five years been busy trying

to evade her own responsibilities toward British citizens. Altogether there are still more than 100,000 British citizens of Asian origin in East Africa. The British Government, until the Uganda crisis, had insisted on taking them into Britain at the rate of three thousand entry vouchers a year. Even assuming that each voucher represented five entries, this would mean that it would take more than seven years for all British Asians in East Africa to be absorbed into Britain.

A convenient timetable for Britain, but hardly one which took into consideration any of the wishes of the East African nations concerned. And a timetable which was in effect a unilateral British interference in East African affairs. For what Britain was telling East African governments was: "Sorry, old chap; we know the Asians are our problem, but you've got to take care of them until we are ready to take care of them and that may not be for another seven or so years." Given such arrogance on the part of Britain, it is a wonder that no crisis in relations between Britain and her former East African territories erupted earlier than the current Uganda crisis. For this the British and the world can thank not the statesmanship of British leaders but rather the maturity and patience of the governments of Kenya and Tanzania.

The real tragedy of Uganda is not the Asian problem, for that is Britain's tragedy rather than Uganda's. The real tragedy is that President Amin has been able in a very short time to unleash pent-up racist feelings among the public which observers of the Ugandan scene had thought were dead and gone. These racist feelings have provided the military government of Uganda with a base for popularity

which it badly lacked and needed. But they will not solve any of the problems Uganda is faced with.

The Asians have been odd-men-out in East Africa. They are hated because they are thought to be industrious, wealthy, clannish; because they do not mix with Africans; because they cheat and bribe to advance their business; because they are smarter than Africans; because they are different; because they are Asian. But they will soon be gone from the Ugandan scene. The African will remain, and it is only then that the full scope of the Ugandan tragedy will be realized.

Already a number of prominent Ugandan Africans have disappeared. The former Chief of Staff in the Obote Government and one-time Uganda High Commissioner to Ghana, Brigadier Opoloto, has not been heard of for months. The Chief Justice, Mr. Kiwanuka, is gone. So is the vice chancellor of the country's only university. Disappearance as announced by the Government of Uganda is a euphemism for all kinds of things, including murder at the hands of soldiers. Because of the pervading insecurity and terror most of Uganda's intellectuals would dearly like to leave the country if they could do so without arousing the suspicions and anger of the trigger-happy army.

The long-term prospect for the country is bleak. Economically the current Asian crisis is disastrous for Uganda. The xenophobia which President Amin has aroused among average Ugandans is bound to boomerang, with painful consequences for everyone. That is the real tragedy of Uganda.

Hilary Ng'weno is a journalist and former editor of The Daily Nation, Nairobi.

Western Hemisphere

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Nov-Dec 1972

The capabilities for conducting effective intelligence gathering and paramilitary operations have long been essential tools in the conduct of national policy. Unfortunately, however, certain misconceptions regarding the manner and circumstances in which they can be employed arose in this country after World War II and led directly to setbacks like the Bay of Pigs. Rather than shunning the possibility of using covert operations in the future to gain policy objectives, experiences like the Bay of Pigs merely underline the fact that policymakers must be educated as to what is possible, and the responsibility for this lies with the career intelligence community.

PARAMILITARY CASE STUDY

THE BAY OF PIGS

A lecture delivered

by

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

I think that the usual caveat is necessary before I get into the subject at hand. What I am about to say today are my personal views; they do not represent the official CIA view nor the official U.S. Government view. This is an after-action report on an episode in our history which engendered perhaps the most intense emotions and public reaction we have seen since World War II.

President Kennedy in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs made the comment that "Victory has a hundred fathers; defeat is an orphan." I would simply say that as Inspector General of the CIA at the time, I was probably in charge of the orphanage.

There is a very specific definition of covert operations. In the broad literature of intelligence, covert operations are about as old as espionage, which has been called the world's second oldest profession. To be properly considered covert, an operation must be designed in such a way that it can easily be disavowed by the originating government. The hand of the sponsor must not be visible.

Covert operations, on the other hand, must not be confused with irregular warfare. An example of irregular warfare that has received recent worldwide attention is the operation in Laos. Everybody on both sides knows who is doing what to whom; the aid and assistance is obvious. That is irregular warfare. A covert operation, however, to be totally covert must be so clandestine, so well hidden, that its true sources may never be specifically proven. Guesses, allegations, speculations may be made in

the public media, but no proof or verification is permissible if the operation is to be properly considered covert.

At this point in our discussion I believe it will prove helpful to simply list some of the questions that must be asked before a covert operation is properly undertaken.

- Can it be done covertly? Can the role of the sponsoring government be sufficiently concealed at each step so as to avoid disclosure and thus either failure or a diplomatic setback for the sponsor? And if the cover of the operation is destroyed at any stage, are alternative measures or withdrawal possible?

- Are the assets available to do the job required? Are the indigenous personnel available who are secure and in the proper place to do the work required? If not, are there those available who can be put into place?

- Are all of the assets of the sponsoring government being used? Can the operation be controlled? Will the indigenous forces being used respond to direction or are they likely to go off on their own? Will they accept cancellation of the operation at any time?

- If it succeeds or fails, will they maintain silence? The maxim "Silence is golden" has never been fully accepted in this country, but it is still worth asking. Also, can it be handled securely within the sponsoring government?

- Finally, and this is perhaps the most important question the United States must ask, is the risk worth the potential gain? Has there been a true evaluation of the chance of success or failure by an objective group not di-

rectly or emotionally involved with its implementation? Do the policymakers have a realistic understanding of the operation?

These are some of the basic questions which must be asked prior to the mounting of any clandestine or covert operation.

Before turning to the case study itself, a brief review of recent Cuban history is appropriate. Fidel Castro landed in eastern Cuba in 1956 with what turned out to be 12 men. He gathered forces in the Sierra Maestra in 1956 and 1957. Even more important, however, was the growth of anti-Batista groups in the cities of Cuba among the middle class, the professionals, and the elite. It was the erosion of Batista's vital political support in the cities which led directly to his downfall. The guerrillas in the countryside served merely as a catalyst in this process. And eventually, on 1 January 1959, Castro stepped into the vacuum left by the fleeing Batista.

A fact which many people do not seem to recall was that despite our misgivings about Fidel Castro, and the U.S. Government did have them, we recognized his government fairly promptly. The first cabinet of the Castro regime was probably one of the finest in Cuban history. It is worthy to note, however, that very few of the new Cabinet members stayed very long.

In addition to recognizing Castro, the United States continued its subsidy of Cuba's sugar crop which at that time amounted to approximately \$100 million. The three major U.S. oil companies doing business in Cuba advanced him \$29 million because his treasury was bare when he took over. Batista and his cohorts had seen to that. Castro was not invited to the United States on an official trip, but he came here unofficially to attend a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, and he did have an interview with the then Vice President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon. Then, one by one, the men around Castro began dropping off. He speedily expropriated U.S. property worth \$968 million. Even his closest bar-bados—the bearded ones—that had been with him in the hills started to turn against him as he appointed more and more Communists, and by the middle of 1960 it became obvious that the United States was not going to be able to do business with Fidel. This, I might say, was a very great shock to Americans. Cuba was a country that we regarded as our protégé. We had helped liberate it from Spain; we had assisted it through the

birth pangs of becoming a nation; we had helped it achieve independence. We had looked at it as one of our offspring, but perhaps we were guilty of having looked after it too closely and in too patronizing a manner.

It was in 1960 that President Eisenhower, based upon advice of his most senior advisers, made the decision that we should try to do to Castro what he had done to Batista. Here is the germ of the first mistake—no one seriously studied the question as to whether this was possible. Most of the anti-Castro people had left Cuba; they were pouring into Florida and if there was a resistance to Fidel Castro, it was mostly in Miami. One of the realities of life was that Fidel Castro had shown unique abilities, together with his brother Raul, Che Guevara, and others, in developing a militia and armed forces of some consequence. Further, they succeeded in establishing one of the better intelligence services in Latin America. It was learned at a very early date that agents sent into Cuba spent more time trying to survive than carrying out their assignment. When this happens to clandestine agents, the situation is obviously quite serious.

President-elect Kennedy was first briefed on the Cuban operation on 17 November 1960. The basic concept was to recruit exiles, send them in by ones, twos, and teams to develop the basic ingredients for overthrowing a government: an intelligence network first, and then sabotage nets, units for psychological warfare, and finally guerrilla bands—hopefully all sufficiently independent to be watertight and operable.

It should be noted that these clandestine operations in 1960 were successful only to a degree. There were many brave Cuban exiles who volunteered even though they knew full well that anyone suspected of active opposition to the Castro government in Cuba faced the prospect of a firing squad. Anybody caught landing on the shores of Cuba, either by airdrop or by maritime operation, could hardly expect clemency from the new Cuban authorities.

On 29 November 1960 President-elect Kennedy was given a briefing at length on a new approach to the Cuban problem. It had become fairly apparent, under pressures of external events, that perhaps there was not going to be sufficient time to build up a large enough underground in Cuba to do to Castro what he had done to Batista. Castro was moving closer and closer to becoming a full member of the Soviet bloc, and the Soviets were sending increasing amounts of military equipment to Cuba. Cuban pilots had been

sent to Eastern Europe for training, and Moscow as supplying or planned to supply aircraft. The Russians were also supplying or planning to supply advanced patrol boats which would make maritime infiltration difficult, if not impossible. Those were grave concerns because it was felt that the pressures of time might soon eliminate any possibility of building up any clandestine operation. One cannot reasonably take slow aircraft in against jets, for if their air defense was at all adequate, C-47's and the like would surely be shot down while trying to get agents and supplies in. Further, one cannot infiltrate a hostile coast if the opposition maintains extensive patrol activities in the surrounding waters.

Rather than trying to build clandestine nets all over Cuba—particularly in the cities with guerrilla forces supporting from the Escambrays and Sierra Maestra—it was proposed that a more substantial force be landed in order to seize a beachhead. It was hoped that support from popular resistance within Cuba or perhaps, more importantly, that support from defections within Cuba's militia and armed forces would materialize, thereby contributing significantly to the anti-Castro forces momentum and help assure their victory through more conventional military means.

On examination of what the biographers of President Kennedy have written, it can be concluded that the President never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, President Kennedy seemed to think this was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible.

Two major plans were considered. The original plan was directed at capturing the small town of Trinidad on the south coast. Intelligence available indicated it was fairly lightly held. There was an airstrip nearby, but perhaps most importantly, it was at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains, and the brigade, if it got into trouble, could head for the hills and theoretically live off the land. When this plan was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, the reaction was that the capture of a town would be too visible and create excessive "noise." Therefore another locality should be picked which would not be quite as conspicuous.

The second plan was to land at the Bay of Pigs. Since the area was sparsely populated, the proposed landing would

not involve capturing a town. The interior was swampy, and there was a limited road network. The area posed problems for the brigade; but it was hoped that it would pose more problems for the defending forces, particularly if the airborne men captured a crossroads and blocked off the incoming Castro forces, and the brigade with their large tanks and fairly heavy hand-carried guns could establish a beachhead.

Plans envisioned two air raids which, in fact, were very critical factors to the potential success of the landing. It is not known whether the President examined in any depth the concept of the air raids or the attention they would attract. The initial raid was designed to take place at D minus 2 and was directed at knocking out the Castro air force and particularly, if possible, the Castro tanks. B-26 aircraft were to be flown by Free Cubans based in Nicaragua. This would allow the Cuban exile pilots approximately 20 to 30 minutes over target area. This strike was to be followed at H-hour by a second strike with the objective of destroying whatever remained of Castro's air forces. It was anticipated that the first strike would be noticed not only in Cuba, but elsewhere. Therefore, a light deception plan was conceived whereby one of the B-26's returning from the strike would land at Key West and the pilot would announce he was one of the group of Cuban pilots who had decided they had enough of Castro, were leaving the Cuban Air Force, and had dropped some bombs on the way out. There was hope that this would provide sufficient cover for at least a few days until the operation was mounted, at which time I presume it was thought that either the cover would not be necessary or simply be merged into the whole operation itself.

In mounting such an operation, it was necessary to first train those who were to take part in it. There were more than adequate resources of Cuban manpower available in the exile colonies in Florida and elsewhere. There was one exceedingly difficult political problem however, that being the strong desire not to use any Batistianos—people who had been prominent in the Batista military forces or close to Batista himself. This almost automatically eliminated anybody that had had any experience with the Cuban Armed Forces.

The recruiting in Miami was done under goldfish bowl circumstances. There were 113 Cuban exile groups. Some of them were significant and some of them were insignificant, but they were all active, they were all vocal, and

they were all there. It was most difficult for the State Department, the CIA, the Attorney General, and others involved to persuade the Cubans to work together in a cohesive organization simply because many of them did not want to work together due to prior political associations.

The system of recruiting was done as clandestinely as possible. The recruits were then taken to the deactivated Opa Locka Naval Air Station and were flown out "covertly" to Guatemala where a wealthy landowner had made a sizable portion of his mountainous *finca* available for training. A training base had been hacked out of the wilderness. The President of Guatemala, Ydigoras, was aware of what was going on and co-operated fully. President Somoza of Nicaragua provided the airfield for the B-26's.

In retrospect, it might have been wiser to have trained everybody in the United States where they could have been isolated somewhere in the vast reaches of a Fort Bragg or a Fort Benning. Latin America is not an easy place to do such training because in countries the size of Guatemala or Nicaragua nearly everybody knows what is going on. As early as 30 October 1960 an article appeared in the Guatemalan paper *La Hora* which described a military base in the mountains designed to train men for an invasion of Cuba. This was when the cover started to unravel. Paul Kennedy of *The New York Times*, a very astute journalist whose circuit ran from Mexico City to Panama, was not far behind *La Hora* in producing a story on the base—who was there, what they were doing, and what they were going to do. The discussions in Miami were such that in his book Schlesinger quotes three separate newsmen who upon returning from Miami were able to describe exactly what was going on without being specific as to where the landing was going to be made, or when it was going to be made, but that there was going to be a landing, that it was going to be against Cuba, and that it involved a great number of the exiles.

The operation was exclusively under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked if they would provide evaluations first of the feasibility of the plan and secondly of the quality of training. They also, of course, provided upon request both supplies that were necessary and manpower to assist in training and administration. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not responsible for the plan. It was not their plan, and the

postoperation blame that was placed on them was put on them by others running for cover. It was a CIA operation.

Frequent meetings with the President from January through March and periodic progress reports were used to keep the President informed. As the evidence of apparent Russian assistance to Cuba continued to grow, pressure was put on the President to mount the operation. Let me also note that there was a very considerable Cuban lobby operable. The Cuban exiles had considerable money. Many of them were apparently wise enough to have kept the bulk of their wealth in the United States prior to 1959. They were acquainted with Americans and the American political system, and a steady stream of them descended on Washington to urge greater U.S. action in support of the exile movement up to and including a full-scale invasion of Cuba by the United States.

During this period a serious conflict arose within the exile training camp as a result of some of the Batistianos being brought into the brigade. These former members of Batista's army were professional military men whose talents were judged to be useful to the operation. A mutiny occurred, however, which quickly became known to the rest of the world. Twelve Cubans were arrested and incarcerated, and the entire affair was written up in the press.

With a brigade of 1,453 trained Cubans in being, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed both the Trinidad plan and the Bay of Pigs plan as being feasible. The U.S. military personnel who reviewed the brigade described them as well trained and capable of doing their job. Here we run into what will perhaps throughout history be the most controversial part of the operation: I label it what the Cubans thought, what the Americans thought, and what Castro thought.

There are no available figures on Castro's intelligence operation in the United States. However, given the great number of Cubans in this country, he undoubtedly had a fairly complete information flow from not only our press and radio, but from his own sources of information as well. Castro was highly nervous in the spring of 1961, to say the least. He was aware that an operation was being mounted. He was not aware of its size or whether U.S. forces would be involved. He feared the latter greatly, without question.

The anti-Castro Cubans in exile, on the other hand, were convinced that the United States would not let the opera-

tion fail. One of the aspects of the postoperation inspection was specifically directed to the question of whether any of the U.S. personnel told the Cubans that U.S. military forces would back them up. That, I would submit to you, is almost an impossible question to answer. If you are training a group of men to go into battle, you aren't saying, "Okay fellows, go ahead, but if you don't make it, it's rough." As an instructor you would give your trainees every bit of encouragement, and if you say something like, "We're behind you all the way," does that mean that you are committing U.S. military forces? The best available evidence indicated that no U.S. national who was involved in training, assisting, or direction of the Cubans ever promised U.S. military assistance, but obviously they were not discouraging the Cubans. On the other hand, the Cubans to a man as well as the Cuban Revolutionary Council, expected that should the brigade falter, U.S. Marines would pour out of Guantanamo, airborne units would be dropped, and it would be over about like that.

As to President Kennedy's intentions, however, there can be no question. The President frequently reiterated his statement that no U.S. personnel would be involved, that he wanted no Americans on the beach, that there would not be any commitment of U.S. forces behind the Cubans, that this was to be an exile operation.

The allegation has been made that "the operators" deceived the President. That is not correct. "The operators" principally involved were Allen W. Dulles, Gen. Charles P. Cabell, and Richard Bissell. They are all men of honor and integrity. They were all very much involved in the operation. They were all reasonably convinced that it would succeed or had a good chance of success. Mr. Dulles has been quoted by both Schlesinger and Sorenson as telling the President that he thought that this operation had a better chance of success than the Guatemala operation. Perhaps he did not tell the President the Guatemala operation only succeeded by the narrowest of margins. This was to be a very close matter and entirely different from the operation against Arbenz, who had but a very limited force to support him as opposed to Castro whose 200,000-man army and militia were rapidly increasing in both quality and strength.

The method by which the President was oriented on the operation has been described as a series of meetings where three or more of the operators would brief the President on the latest developments. The President would have one or two of his personal staff with him, the Secretary of State, and any others he deemed necessary. There would be no papers left; there were no staff papers circulated. The operation was very closely held within the U.S. Government. Similarly, it was very closely held within the CIA.

Many aspects of the operation were well done. The B-26 strike on D minus 2, despite having to operate at maximum range, was successful. It did manage to damage the Castro air force, but the quality of the Castro air force had been underestimated. The Sea Furies were known to be there and were considered dangerous, but the P-33's, which were ignored or were not considered to be dangerous, did prove to be one of the more decisive elements.

The cover on the D minus 2 airstrike, mentioned before, was ripped off in a matter of minutes. Circumstances had this event occur on the same day that an actual pilot in the Castro air force defected and landed in Jacksonville. The press was all over both Cuban planes instantly. The Foreign Minister of Cuba in the United Nations denounced the United States for open attack on Cuba. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, had not been thoroughly advised on the operation. He had been given what was later described as a rather vague briefing of the operation. Ambassador Stevenson immediately denied U.S. complicity, and practically before the words were out of his mouth it was fairly obvious that they were not true. This then created a rising crescendo of concern on the part of the President, Secretary of State, and others. On Sunday night—the landing was to be made on Monday morning—the President cancelled the H-hour strike. The B-26's were already warmed up and ready to take off from Nicaragua when the word came in to cancel.

General Cabell, Acting Director of the CIA at the time, was given permission to appeal to the President who was at Glen Ora in Middleburg, Va. Cabell decided not to appeal, but after going back to the operational headquarters and seeking advice from a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he called the President in Middleburg at 4:30 a.m.

Monday morning and asked whether the President could supply some U.S. military assistance, specifically some aircraft from the carrier *Boxer* to come in and cover the landing. The President turned it down.

The landing went in as scheduled. Of the five battalions—I would call them reinforced companies—that landed, only one landed in the wrong place; it hit a reef. The rest got ashore, and the tanks got ashore. The airdrop was successful, and then Castro's jets appeared: two Sea Furies and three P-33's. Two of the principal landing ships, one containing the bulk of the ammunition, were sunk. The others were driven away, not to return. And from that moment on, the operation was doomed.

The brigade fought brilliantly. They probably took 10 to 1 casualties from the other side. But it was 1,453 men against 20,000 with another 80,000 in reserve. Not only were Castro's planes available, but all of his tanks started to move south from Camp Libertad outside of Havana. Despite the most strenuous efforts to assist the brigade and to get them additional ammunition, they could not win against such odds. By Wednesday it was all over as the brigade was out of ammunition.

At a meeting Tuesday night in the White House, after a congressional reception, the situation was described to the President. He authorized two unmarked planes from the *Boxer* to fly high cover in support of the B-26's, but they were not to engage in hostilities unless attacked. There was a mixup in time. The B-26's arrived an hour before the *Boxer* planes; four of the B-26's were shot down, and among the men lost was an Alabama Air National Guardsman crew who had volunteered to substitute for the Cuban pilots, who were exhausted.

The President was under the impression initially that the H-hour airstrike was actually going to be made from the beachhead. But, of course, the airstrip was never secured to that degree, and the concept of eight B-26's bombing from the beachhead was simply not feasible. Also, there was no reserve available to reinforce the brigade, and the rationalization that once the beachhead was secured then Cubans could pour in from Florida and that assistance would come from the United States and Latin American countries was not valid. The Cuban Revolutionary Council, which had been held incommunicado up to the time of the landing, was taken to Washington to see the President. They asked if they could be immediately sent

to the beachhead—three of them had sons with the brigade—but by then the operation had failed.

Now let us look at why the Bay of Pigs landing failed. Why did we mount it in the first place? We mounted it for a political objective, to get rid of a government that we disliked intensely that had cropped up near our southern shores. We mounted it with the thought that the objective would be accomplished by a covert operation when we did not want to use our conventional forces. We had not been able to get rid of Castro by diplomacy, and our increasing economic pressure was not proving to be any more effective. All intelligence reports coming from allied sources indicated quite clearly that he was thoroughly in command of Cuba and was supported by most of the people who remained on the island.

About 2 weeks before the operation, the President had announced that the United States would not intervene in Cuba. Nevertheless, shortly before the landing, the Castro security forces rounded up approximately 200,000 Cubans and put them in concentration camps. These people whose commitment the Castro regime suspected were precisely the elements in Cuban society upon which the success of the landing depended.

What we were really trying to do was to do something inexpensively that we did not want to do the hard way. Affecting this choice was a mythology about covert operations that had arisen after World War II. The brilliant exploits of the French Resistance, of the Danish Resistance, of the Italian partisans, of Tito's partisans, of some of the operations behind the Japanese lines in Burma all helped create a belief that you could accomplish with covert operations what one did not wish to do by conventional or overt means. Similarly, the operations in Iran and Guatemala had been vaguely alluded to and written about without ever the full details of the operations being exposed either in the government or elsewhere. These added to the mythology that there was some mystique by which you could use a clandestine organization to neatly and cheaply remove most any dictator you wished. This is inaccurate and dangerous. A clandestine or covert operation can be used to support military operations and can be used when you do not want to commit regular forces. Such operations must be used, however, with the knowledge that if unsuccessful there will come a time

when you have to end the support and lose the indigenous forces—as well as your integrity—perhaps never to be regained.

In looking back over both the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs landing, several important lessons can be derived—the most vital of which arises from the operators' failure to secure accurate intelligence. Inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the Bay of Pigs disaster. There is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operation. There was a totally erroneous estimate of the quality of Castro's fighting forces, a lack of realism in evaluating the potential resistance, and therefore as a corollary, a lack of realism in estimating the number of forces required to do the job. There was a lack of knowledge about Castro's control in Cuba even though the British and French intelligence reports were available on the subject.

Organizationally, a large part of CIA was excluded from the operation. The present Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, who was then Chief of Operations for CIA, was not involved in the operation. It was handled in a separate compartment, and a very great portion of the expertise in the agency was excluded. In like manner, the bulk of the military expertise of the Pentagon was excluded because knowledge of the operation was handled on such a close basis within the Joint Staff.

Now when I say that the bulk of the CIA was excluded, I mean that the operators running the operation were assessing and evaluating the intelligence, not the intelligence directorate, where it should have been done. Much of the intelligence came from the Cuban resistance, which was not always an objective intelligence source, and, as later in the missile crisis, their reports had to be scanned and evaluated based upon other information.

The White House advisers have noted in their books that nobody in the White House was really being critical about the operation. They assumed that the President was accepting the advice of qualified experts, and therefore they were unwilling to submit themselves to being the opposition to the operation. To my knowledge only two documents were written in the Federal Government opposing the operation, one by Chester Bowles, the then Under Secretary of State, who had, inadvertently heard about the operation and opposed it. Roger Hilsman, then Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence, also heard about the operation, asked to

be briefed on it, and was turned down. Arthur Schlesinger says that he too wrote a memorandum that was opposed to the operation after he had learned about it. But these documents were not given much weight.

The question of whether the same organization collecting intelligence should be permitted to conduct covert operations has provoked continuing debate in the intelligence community over the years. It was a question which was addressed when the National Security Act of 1947 was being considered before Congress. It is a question which has frequently come up, and it is certainly one that is worthy of note. Within an organization such as CIA, it is possible to compartmentalize it so that the intelligence evaluators are separated from the collectors, but in this instance this was not done.

And then, finally, the covertness or lack of visibility of the operation must be examined. It lost all of its veils, all five, before it was ever mounted. By the time the landing took place, it was well known an operation was being mounted. It was well known who was involved. It was well known that it was totally and completely supported by the United States. And at some point along the line somebody, somewhere around the President should have said, "Mr. President, this is going to create one hell of a lot of noise. It is going to be very obvious that we're behind it. If it succeeds, great; if it fails, we are in for deep trouble." Obviously most people thought it was going to succeed. In fact, most of those talking to the President thought it was going to succeed.

Also, trying to mount an operation of this magnitude from the United States is about as covert as walking nude across Times Square without attracting attention. (Although, I must say that the latter is becoming more of a possibility every day.) In retrospect, the use of the U.S. bases would have been more feasible because we did have the capability for controlling access to a sizable geographical area. We could have isolated the brigade; even the training of the B-26 pilots could have been done in the United States; and perhaps, only perhaps, it could have been done without having been disclosed.

Policymakers must be educated as to what is possible. I think they will be in the future. The shock to President Kennedy was great and he blamed the CIA, but he blamed the military just as much. The latter was misplaced. Nevertheless, it is very important that policymakers be educated as to what covert operations can do or cannot do and not

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was born in Rochester, N.Y., educated in public schools there and at Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Mass., and graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University in 1938.

After graduation he worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation in Washington, D.C., as an editor and personnel director. In 1942 he joined the Office of Strategic Services and served in Europe with that organization and as a military intelligence officer on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th U.S. Army Group where he was the G-2 briefing officer. He left the military service with the rank of major, and for his service received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, French and Belgian Croix de Guerre, and the European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars.

After the war he returned to the U.S. News as an editor of *World Report Magazine*. In 1947 he went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant to the Director, Assistant Director, Inspector General, and from 1962 to 1965 was Executive Director-Comptroller. In September 1965 he resigned from CIA to accept an appointment on the faculty of Brown University in Providence, R.I., as Professor of Political Science and University Professor. Professor Kirkpatrick was the occupant of the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of National Security and Foreign Affairs at the Naval War College during the 1971-72 academic year and has since returned to the faculty of Brown University.

In 1960 he received the National Civil Service League annual award as one of the 10 outstanding career employees of the Federal Government. In 1964 he received the President's Award for Distinguished Service, the highest award that can be given a civilian in the Federal Service.

He is the author of *The Real CIA*, published by Macmillan in January 1968, and *Captains without Eyes*, published by Macmillan in 1969, numerous articles, and has contributed to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook*.

look on them as some type of easy device whereby one can simply reach out and press a button and bang, a resistance group comes up and suddenly an enemy is destroyed. The obligation for destroying this myth lies with the career personnel.

There was nothing more secret about the Bay of Pigs than about nuclear weapons. Yet it was handled as though it was so sensitive that people who were trusted with the highest secrets of the government could not be trusted with it.

The staff work must be complete. Periodic assessments must be made, and

NEW YORK TIMES
19 November 1972

The Cuban Connection

By James Reston

WASHINGTON—For the first time in many years, the United States and Cuba have a common problem, which may lead to reappraisal of the relations between the two countries. President Nixon doesn't want American commercial airplanes to be hijacked to Havana and Fidel Castro, according to the Swiss, doesn't want them to land there, and this is now under the most careful if oblique diplomatic discussion.

Mr. Nixon's problem is very simple. He wants secure, on-time air traffic within the United States and abroad, but the American air traffic is not secure, it is not on time, for passengers are subjected to security baggage checks at every airport, primarily for fear of criminals who regard Cuba as a sanctuary.

Fidel Castro's problem is a little more complicated. He is waging an ideological war against the United States and Latin America, and vice versa, but most of the Americans who hijack planes are not Communists seeking sanctuary in Cuba but ordinary criminals stealing planes, demanding millions in ransom money, and hoping to get both the money and freedom when they land in Havana.

On the testimony of Swiss officials, who represent the United States in Havana, this is not what happens. They say that the Cuban Government is not sympathetic but very tough on the hijackers, who are jailed under very severe circumstances.

According to the Swiss diplomats, the Cuban Government is not only

WASHINGTON

"The skyjacking problem has forced the U.S. and Cuba to begin talking again."

tough on the hijackers, but suspicious that these hijacking operations may be used by the United States as a means to spy on what's going on in Cuba.

Accordingly, Castro is not sending back the hijackers to the United States

these, in turn, must be reviewed in the most tough, highly critical, and objective manner. There must be those that are going to say "no" or at least express all the warnings and let the President know the dangers that he is taking.

While no one questions the absolute authority of the President to make policy and to insure that it is properly implemented, the locus for the conduct of the operation is important. It should be at a much lower level of government. Having covert operations run out of the White House or even out of the Office of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in any society.

If the President makes the policy, get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes wrong, he can fire and disavow, which is what a President should do, not acknowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President, but I think that this is essential in this area. Mr. Dulles, incidentally, after the failure of the Bay of Pigs, as he had done previously when the U-2 went down over Russia, said to the President, "If you wish, I will go." He was a very wise and able man, and he recognized that when an intelligence failure takes place, the first expendable person is the director of the operation.

There is a further corollary to what I have said thus far: a U.S. controlled intelligence base must be in existence. In this case it would have meant an intelligence network operating in Cuba which was knowledgeable, controlled, and reliable. There was no such network in Cuba at the time. Instead there were scatterings of intelligence nets. The information, to a large degree, was controlled by Cuban exiles who, of course, wanted us to go into Cuba. It was not a U.S. controlled intelligence base.

My final comment is that the Bay of Pigs experience does not mean we should forget covert operations as a tool for implementing national policy. In fact, that is the last thing it means. We should continually examine the concept and doctrine and reevaluate all covert operations and irregular warfare activities, keeping the capability in being. As has been the case with our military forces, when a war is over our immediate instinct is to demobilize; the same is true in intelligence. But the capability for mounting a covert operation is an exceedingly important capability for our government to have. It may not be used but, like certain military capabilities in peacetime, the expertise should be available and ready if needed.

because he suspects them of subversive intelligence activities against Cuba, and he is keeping them in jail because he doesn't trust them, even if they have Communist backgrounds.

Also, Castro, again according to the Swiss, is holding the ransom money that lands in Havana with the hijackers, not because he wants to help the hijackers but because the U.S. Treasury impounded between \$60 million and \$70 million in Cuban assets when Washington broke diplomatic relations with Havana, and he wants to use this hijack money to get the \$60 million to \$70 million back.

What troubles officials here in Washington is that one of these hijackings to Cuba may end in a disaster and that the American people, already inconvenienced by baggage checks and long delays in air travel, may then revive the Cuban crisis by demanding that action be taken against the Havana sanctuary.

The Nixon Administration, annoyed as it is by Castro's anti-American propaganda and subversion in Latin America, would prefer to leave bad enough alone, and let Castro suffer in isolation with his own economic failures at home.

But this will not be easy if Cuba continues to be a sanctuary for skyjacks. The United States has been paying little attention to Latin America in the last few years. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has established a keep-out doctrine in Eastern Europe and China will be doing much the same in Southeast Asia, while the United States no longer tries to apply the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba.

According to one diplomatic report, the Cubans may put the latest three American skyjacks on public trial, partly to keep the diplomatic situation from deteriorating any further, and partly to discourage hijackers from landing there.

In any event, the skyjacking problem has forced Washington and Havana to begin talking again about the future, though indirectly through the Swiss Government, but while everybody denies it, these indirect talks could lead on to a new accommodation with Havana as they did last year between Washington and Peking.

President Nixon is very cautious about these things, but it is awkward for him to explain why he wants to reach an understanding with Brezhnev in Moscow and Chou En-lai in Peking but won't even talk to Castro in Cuba. This is undoubtedly why, after the most private talks with the Swiss in Washington and Geneva, Secretary of State Rogers has made clear in public that the United States now wishes to try to reach an accommodation with Castro on this entire problem.

Accommodations between nations come about in strange ways as was obvious last year in the Kissinger visit to Peking. The skyjacking problem has now forced Washington and Havana to talk again, however indirectly, and it could result in a new appraisal of President Nixon's relations with Latin America, which by his own admission is long overdue.

WASHINGTON POST
17 November 1972

Accommodation With Cuba?

Accommodation with Cuba could begin, Latin band John Plank speculated presciently in 1969, "with a serious bilateral United States-Cuban dialogue about the hijacking problem, a matter of concern to both Castro and us and whose resolution would immediately and tangibly benefit both parties." This is the larger significance of Havana's and Washington's newly expressed interest in a hijacking dialogue. Handled properly, it could lead through cultural exchanges, claims settlements, trade talks and political relations—the familiar route—to an American detente with the only Communist state (Albania aside) still out in the cold.

But given Fidel Castro's suspicions, not to say his political investment in portraying the United States as a devil, our manner in dealing with Havana is crucial. We do not stress this point only because Mr. Nixon last week gratuitously observed that he anticipated no change in Cuba's policy and, therefore, no change in his own. The success, which is to say the potential, of the hijack dialogue is at stake. Cuba has asked to discuss not only the hijacking of American planes to Cuba but the hijacking of Cuban boats to the United States and what it believes to be the closely related issue of the "illegal" flight of Cubans by means not involving hijacking (by private boats, for instance). The State Department has responded positively but, in accordance with past policy, only to the offer to discuss takeovers of American planes.

We assume this response was a bargaining position, not a final position, because "the hijacking problem" cuts both ways. For the United States its essence is safety in the skies. For Cuba its essence is the security of the Castro government: By preventing its citizens from departing—last year Havana halted the six-year airlift that had brought a quarter of a million refugees to Miami—Cuba means to give them no real alternative but to accommodate to Communist rule.

It could well be that a warmer political atmosphere would make negotiation of both halves of the problem easier. The fact remains that the American interest in coping with plane hijacking until now has been subordinated to its interest in making life a bit more difficult for Fidel Castro.

Perhaps Castro was looking anyway for a face-

saving way to start coming in from the cold. Perhaps the Russians, tired of the cost and nuisance of supporting Cuba, gave him a nudge. At any rate, the last two hijackings have been notably different from most of the earlier ones; the last two plainly have involved a large degree of criminality and sheer danger. Mr. Castro seems to have understood that the surge of American concern over the two hijackings gave him a certain opening that he did not have or need when hijackings were the stuff of bad TV jokes. We think that, in his offer to bargain, he ought to be presumed serious until proven not so.

We would further argue that it is not only the link between Americans' safety in the skies and Castro's legitimacy that should incline the United States to bargain seriously with Cuba. If President Nixon can deal directly with Moscow and Peking, why should the smallest and weakest of the Communist states alone be held at arm's length? In the dozen Castro years, the hemisphere has seen that neither the man nor his doctrine nor his disciples, certainly not his example in Cuba, has excited "revolution" anywhere beyond his borders. Castro himself now makes no more than a ritual appeal for the cause which a few fearful Americans, but virtually no realistic Latins, identify with his name. Nor in a period of detente with the Soviet Union, and of intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles, does it make political or military sense to overdo the old worry that Moscow will make Cuba a "base."

In reaching out to Cuba, there is a certain problem in reassuring those American allies who, either in response to American entreaties or for reasons of their own, supported the political and economic boycott of Havana which the United States organized a decade ago. But just last June at the Organization of American States, no fewer than seven Latin states declared that each country should make up its own mind on Cuba. Some particularly insecure or repressive Latin governments may need some special handholding. But surely that problem is manageable.

To be sure, Fidel Castro remains a very tough and fractious fellow to deal with. We would be the last to say, however, that he's too tough for Richard Nixon.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 NOV 1972

C.I.A. MYSTERY: PERU'S ANCHOVIES

Agency Takes Up a Problem
of Sea Currents and Fish

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17—The Central Intelligence Agency's thirst for worldwide intelligence has turned to Peruvian anchovies and a "mysterious" warm current in the Pacific that made the fish disappear this year.

A lengthy classified Intelli-

gence Memorandum, prepared last month by the C.I.A.'s Office of Economic Research and obtained today by The New York Times, reported that the warm current, known as "El Niño de Navedad" ("Christmas Child") had driven the anchovies from their feeding grounds and beyond the reach of Peruvian fishing fleets.

Inasmuch as the processing of the anchovies into fish meal is Peru's foremost manufacturing activity — providing employment for tens of thousands of workers aboard the fishing boats and in coastal factories and supplying 30 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings—the unusually early arrival of the current is a ma-

jor blow to the Peruvian economy.

The C. I. A. also discovered that the vagaries of the current are already having an impact on worldwide prices of fish-meal-based livestock feeds and, consequently, on cattle and poultry prices. It may even hurt commodity dealers in the United States and West Germany.

The C.I.A. explained that anchovies thrive in the cool waters of the north-moving Humboldt Current. Every December, warm currents move south to northern Peru, but by March they are pushed away by the Humboldt Current.

But every seven years the warm currents, for unknown reasons, push far south of their

normal range, forcing away the anchovies and curtailing catches sharply.

"Peruvians call this phenomenon El Niño de Navedad because it usually appears off their shores during the holiday season," the C.I.A. said.

But this year when an excellent fishing season had been expected, the Humboldt Current was particularly weak, "allowing the Niño to last longer than usual," the memorandum continued.

By June, 1972, the C.I.A. reported, the anchovy catch "had fallen to only about 10 per cent of normal."

Peru had expected an output of two million tons of fish meal this year, but at the end of August the stocks had

fallen to 325,000 tons and all exports were banned despite major export commitments.

The C.I.A. study concluded that following the subsequent ban on all fishing, "the fleet and fishmeal plants will lie idle for many months and unemployment will swell."

The memorandum warned that many fish-meal companies might collapse "if not kept afloat by new government loans" and unless the Peruvian Government allowed "the least efficient firms to go under

while assuming their debts and offering other jobs to their workers."

Furthermore, the C.I.A. said, Peru's revolutionary military government had relied heavily on fish-meal sales to cover the import requirements for its five-year development plan, which includes oil and copper ventures and manufacturing.

Because Peru held large fish-meal stocks from last year's production, the C.I.A. said, she still may earn \$270-million from these exports in 1972. Last year sales brought \$330-million.

JAPAN TIMES

17 November 1972

Churchmen Assail Uruguay

By MAJORIE HYER

Washington Post

WASHINGTON — A World Council of Churches (WCC) report charges that the present government of Uruguay has engaged in "widespread violation of basic human rights," including both physical and psychological torture of political prisoners, in its current efforts to wipe out Tupamaro revolutionaries.

A State Department official who conferred recently with the three-man team which compiled the report said that the churchmen drew a grimmer picture of the situation in Uruguay than was generally reflected in diplomatic sources.

"They portray a deeper area of concern than I was aware of," said Charles A. Meyer, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs.

The churchmen say in their report that "thousands" of Uruguayan citizens have been arrested and held incommunicado without trial since April 15, when the Uruguayan congress approved a 30-day "internal state of war" against the Tupamaros.

"Persons arrested and held indefinitely are presumed to be guilty of subversion and possible complicity with the Tupamaro urban guerrilla movement and are subjected to military justice which is very slow (only three military judges in the country) and from which there is no appeal, the report says.

The report cites "impressive evidence" of the use of torture by both police and the military. While such measures are "purportedly aimed at the Tupamaros," the churchmen charge,

they are "in fact extended widely to broad segments of the population for political reasons."

The World Council of Churches report was compiled by three U.S. churchmen who spent five days in Uruguay in June investigating. They are Dr. William P. Thompson, chief executive officer of the United Presbyterian Church, the Rev. Dr. Eugene L. Stockwell, assistant general secretary of the World Division of the United Methodist Board of Missions, and the Rev. Dr. Thomas J. Liggett, president of the United Christian Missionary Society of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

The latter two are former missionaries in Latin American and speak fluent Spanish.

In their report they note "strong suspicion that military and police assistance given to Uruguay (by the United States) helps to buttress the repression . . ."

Dr. Stockwell said in an interview that during their visit to the State Department the churchmen urged "immediate cancellation of all police and military aid to Uruguay as a minimum" and consideration of ending economic aid as well.

His impression that "we didn't get very far" in that request appeared to be borne out by the State Department's Meyer.

While stating that, "any program we have anywhere is susceptible to constant re-evaluation," he said of the U.S.-funded police training program: "I still believe in a program designed to teach police efficiency, in the best sense of that word, which includes moderation."

NEW YORK TIMES
19 November 1972

An Opening to Cuba

Now that President Nixon has opened up a speaking relationship with Communist China, developed a commercial and economic détente with Communist Russia and indicated a policy of peace and reconstruction for Communist North Vietnam, it would logically follow that he miss no opportunity to begin what may well be the most touchy of all such maneuvers vis-à-vis the Communist world: an unfreezing of United States relations with Cuba. Although in comparison to China, Russia or even Hanoi, Castro's Cuba is not much more than a roaring mouse, it is still—geographically, politically and emotionally—a major disturbing factor in the foreign policy spectrum of the Americas, particularly of the United States.

That opportunity to embark on a new policy—despite the President's rigidly adamant position toward Cuba expressed in a newspaper interview only a few days ago—may be nearer than anyone had hitherto dared to believe. Ironically, it is the recent criminal hijacking of two American planes to Cuba that has presented both the Cuban and United States Governments with the chance to test each other's desire to push, if ever so slightly, against the immense barriers that still separate them.

In reaction to these two hijackings—of an Eastern Airlines 727 on Oct. 29 and a Southern Airways DC-9 on Nov. 12—the Cuban Government has now specifically suggested the opening up of bilateral negotiations to deal with the problem, at the same time alleging in its usual florid language that the United States had started it all by permitting a succession of "hijackings" of Cuban vessels by Cuban exiles, defectors and refugees operating out of Florida.

Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Cuban statement that Dr. Castro is ready and even anxious to work out an agreement on the hijacking issue; and it is equally apparent from Secretary of State Rogers' unusually warm and personal response that the United States wants to do so too—whether directly or through third parties. If this opening is achieved, it would indeed represent a particularly high order of statesmanship on the part of both the United States and Cuba to move on to other things.

It simply makes no sense any more—and President Nixon as the supreme pragmatist surely perceives this too—to persist in a policy of diplomatic and economic quarantine against Cuba that was invoked by the Organization of American States nearly a decade ago under totally different circumstances from those of today.

Peru renewed ties with Cuba in July. More recently, four Caribbean nations—Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago—have decided to seek "the early establishment of relations with Cuba, whether economic or diplomatic—or both." Ecuador and Panama are considering doing likewise. Chile had breached the O.A.S. economic embargo even before the election of a Marxist President, Salvador Allende, insured the resumption of full ties. Mexico never adhered to the O.A.S. boycott, and Canada, which now has a permanent observer at the O.A.S., has always maintained relations with the Castro regime.

It is obvious that Washington will have increasing difficulty maintaining the O.A.S. quarantine. No dramatic initiative is called for; merely quiet communication to the other American Governments that Washington is ready to consider negotiating with Havana on broader issues than hijacking, and a relaxation of the O.A.S. boycott.

WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1972

To Curb Hijackers, Improve Ties With Havana

Somehow passing the hijack screening, three armed men boarded and commandeered a Southern Airways jet in Birmingham Friday, picked up \$2 million in ransom at one stop, forced the pilot to take off at another although the FBI had shot out the plane's tires, wounded the copilot, and finally landed on foam in Havana. The public should learn at once what flaw in the hijack screening let the three board. The FBI must explain why it took the considerable risk of starting to shoot. The media must ask themselves whether, by their play-by-play reporting of the 29-hour, 4,000-mile adventure, they did not scare or embolden the hijackers to act more rashly than they otherwise might. It seems a miracle no one was killed.

In the end, however, hijacking comes down to what the hijackers do in the end. No one can safely predict what angry and unbalanced men will do. But one can say that, if hijackers knew they had no haven, it could not fail to affect their calculations. For hijackings in the Western hemisphere, of course, the commonest haven sought is Cuba.

Now, Fidel Castro has been far from all bad on the matter. He has quietly shipped some American hijackers back through Canada and made life so miserable for others that they have tried to depart. Cuba's ideological compulsion to remain open to political soulmates, however, and the notion still afloat that Cuba is about the only place to go, have drawn hijackers to Havana nonetheless. The past weekend's incident followed by only two weeks the flight to Cuba by a group including two Washington men linked to a double murder in an Arlington bank. One hopes Cuba will return all criminal hijackers in due time, but the fact is the problem of return would not keep arising if planes were not hijacked and directed there in the first place.

The plain requirement is a known public firm guarantee of no haven for criminal hijackers in Cuba. There is only one effective way to secure such a guarantee and that is for Cuban-American political relations to be normalized. Good sense and the whole drift of international affairs commends such a development anyway. It becomes increasingly an anachronism in a time of detente for Washington and Havana to remain at political sword points. Hijacking provides what should be the clinching argument—a good non-political argument, at that.

From President Nixon, however, comes the stiff, stale old diplomacy. He told The Washington Star-News last week there would be "no change whatever" in his Cuban policy "unless and until—and I do not anticipate this will happen—Castro changes his policy toward Latin America and the United States." Why is Mr. Nixon so hard-nosed? These days his administration neither tries to demonstrate Castro is "exporting revolution" nor contends Cuba is lending itself to intolerable Soviet military purposes. Officials pressed to justify the Nixon policy are reduced to citing harsh boilerplate rhetoric sounded by Castro in such unlikely precincts as Bulgaria. President Nixon, as some reports say, may indeed have it in mind to improve relations with Cuba—the Florida vote is in—but evidently he wants Fidel to come to him on hands and knees. Negotiating, it's called.

It's an attitude as unworthy of a great nation as it is unnecessary for a re-elected Chief Executive. Mr. Nixon insists he's deeply concerned about both promoting detente and eliminating hijacking. But here he has the chance to serve the two goals and he turns the other way.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 November 1972

Chile: It Is All in the Eyes of the Beholder

By Louis Wolf Goodman

NEW HAVEN, Conn.—If one were to rely solely on U.S. coverage of news from Chile for an understanding of current developments in that country, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Government of Salvador Allende is vastly unpopular, illegitimate, incompetent and repressive. One could further conclude that the Chilean left has been held in check only by the strength of the army rather than a commitment to democracy. Such conclusions are fundamentally erroneous and based upon a superficial understanding of the economic and political struggles being waged and pro- and anti-Government forces in Chile. In our judgment, the U.S. press fosters misconception about Chile:

• That the Allende Government is vastly unpopular in Chile. This asser-

tion is a clear example of a class bias in press reporting. Information used by foreign correspondents in Chile tends to represent more accurately the attitudes of the upper class and segments of the middle class than those of the working or popular classes. A September 1972 survey of Greater Santiago commissioned by the opposition-controlled weekly, *Ercilla*, gives evidence about Government support which differs from the view in the U.S. press.

These results indicate that close to 60 per cent of Santiago's population looks favorably on the present Government's performance, a majority feel that the strategies of the opposition are harmful, and more people would vote for Allende today (36 per cent) than did in Santiago in 1970 (34 per cent). Equally important, this survey shows that Santiago's small upper-income group overwhelmingly opposes Allende's Popular Unity coalition, the

middle class is divided and the lower class is enthusiastic. Moreover, Greater Santiago always trails the provinces in support for Socialist candidates. No mention of the above findings was made in the U.S. press despite the wide discussion they received in Chile.

• That Allende's efforts to move the country toward Socialism are causing widespread economic chaos and hardship.

Allende was elected on a platform that explicitly rejected the moderate reform path of development which characterized the previous Christian Democratic administration. The electoral support received by the left was hardly an overwhelming mandate but it gave Popular Unity the opportunity to move the nation toward Socialism. Any such major change will produce dislocations. One question that must be asked is where in the social structure these dislocations have been concentrated?

In Chile, the greatest economic difficulties are being felt by those who have benefited most under capitalism, i.e., the upper and middle income sectors. There are shortages of consumer goods. It is now more difficult for the relatively comfortable sectors of the population to maintain their patterns of consumption. Last December's "March of the Empty Pots" was essentially a protest by middle- and upper-class housewives who found it difficult to obtain certain desired goods in their own neighborhood stores. Similarly, strikes by shopkeepers in the central business district and work stoppages by professional people are middle-class protests. These store owners and professionals do not

serve the poor, nor do they want the Government to continue its efforts to control distribution for the well-being of low-income sectors. While it is undoubtedly true that these groups have experienced restrictions on consumption and wealth, others have clearly benefited.

The opposition labels restrictions on the accumulation of wealth and property as attacks on democratic freedoms. Certainly it has been the Government's aim to undermine the economic base of the monied classes, but it has respected the fundamental political right of dissent by legal means.

In every case of nationalization, intervention, or purchase of major interest by the Government in private

companies, the administration has used only legal means and controls authorized by already-existing (although sometimes obscure) laws.

Chile's central importance today is that it is the first nation to attempt a Socialist democracy. This is a test of the strengths and limitations of democracy as a political framework and Socialism as an economic system.

Louis Wolf Goodman is assistant professor of sociology at Yale. The article was written with the assistance of Jose Luis Rodriguez, Brian Smith, Van Whiting and David Apter, members of the Chilean Study Group.

WASHINGTON STAR
23 November 1972

Canal Zone Command a Paper Outfit

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

QUARRY HEIGHTS, Canal Zone — Granted a respite from extinction by President Nixon himself, the U.S. Southern Command is understandably sensitive about its unique status as the world's most top-heavy military organization.

Southcom, as the Army, Navy and Air Force area command is called, has never been short of critics, largely because it is basically a paper organization with no less than 13 flag officers in relation to a few thousand troops in the Canal Zone and a few hundred officers and men in the military advisory groups in 16 Latin countries.

Critics in the past have charged that there were too many generals and admirals for so insignificant a force; that the advisory groups in the various Latin countries served very little purpose for their cost; that nothing was accomplished here that could not be done as easily and less expensively from the Pentagon.

Some new assessments are now being made in view of some changes.

The military groups have been reduced from 17 to 16 by Ecuador's request for departure of the U.S. group there, and the number of officers and men in the groups has been pared from about 800 to less than 400.

Troops more Qualified
The U.S. armed forces ap-

pear to have improved the quality of the in-country personnel. Four years ago, many troops assigned to the groups came with little or no knowledge of Spanish or Portuguese, and often were picked without special qualification. Today, all of the personnel must have a language competency of "3" on a scale of "5" — in other words, modest fluency.

In the 1960s, the groups were caught up in the Kennedy administration's policy of democratizing Latin America, a lofty aim they did not seem able to achieve. Even so, the policy existing tended to isolate the group, personnel from politically ambitious military figures in the host countries.

Military procurement has undergone a drastic change affecting the groups' role. In post-World War II years, all of Latin America acquired surplus U.S. materiel from uniforms to aircraft, from weapons to naval vessels. It was automatic and expected. Gradually, the United States, becoming involved in the Vietnam war, took the view that the Latins needed only security equipment because they faced no serious external threat that the United States would not handle for them. The United States cut back drastically on what planes, ships and weapons were available for Latins.

New Sources Found

The Latins reacted by simply going shopping elsewhere for their hardware. The French, Germans, Swedes,

Dutch and British, in varying degrees, began flooding Latin America with salesmen and the Latins began spending their money on sophisticated Mirage jets, AMX tanks, German patrol boats and even reconditioned British aircraft carriers.

By 1968, the U.S. advisory groups had nothing to sell or grant, little influence on the Latin officer corps and the quality of their intelligence function was inferior to that available in other embassy offices.

New Rationale

Today, the war in Vietnam is nearly finished as far as the United States is concerned and, while there are still close restrictions on what Latin armies can buy, Washington's policy is no longer to try to steer, influence and cajole Latin capitals. Washington takes the more practical view that as long as the Latins are going to buy arms, they might as well get them from the United States.

Given the changed world situation, differences in U.S. policy, and the facts of life about Latin America today, there are those who conclude that the small but better-trained U.S. military groups be maintained as points of contact with the Latin military.

The number of flag officers remains high in Panama headquarters of Southcom, and there are two or three generals stationed in Brazil and Argentina. Proponents of the present structure say the Unit-

ed States needs officers of general or admiral rank to deal with their Latin opposites, since Southcom is charged not only with defense of the Panama Canal but also with coordinating U.S. military activities — including military aid — throughout Central and South America.

Critics continue to charge that Southcom is a navy without vessels and an army without troops — a full-fledged area command with a brass staff just as rank-heavy as the other seven regional worldwide commands of the Defense Department. These flag officers are expensive to maintain with their staffs and privileges.

Obviously, critics say, any major military threat against Panama's canal would be countered by naval, air, ground or missile forces from the United States proper. The 193d Infantry Brigade here can protect the canal against any local threat, they say, and any attack on the canal by a world power would mean World War III.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1972

Brazil Peasants Find Their Plight Worsens

By MARVINE HOWE
Special to the New York Times

ESCADA, Brazil, Nov. 16 — On some days the people on the sugar plantation called Providence have nothing to eat, but like most farm workers in Brazil's impoverished Northeast, they appear resigned to their empty lives.

Attempts at modernization and industrialization have not solved the basic problems of the important sugar industry but only aggravated the situation by increasing unemployment.

The Most Rev. Helder Câmara, the outspoken Archbishop of Olinda and Recife, deplores what he describes as "the subhuman" condition of the rural workers, who lack decent housing, clothing, food, schools or hope. "If something is not done to better their condition, inevitably there will be ferment," he has warned.

The situation of the sugar cane workers is worse than it was a decade ago because their pay has lost more than half its purchasing power, according to the Rev. Antônio Melo, one of the most vocal advocates of agrarian reform in the Northeast.

Flight to the Cities

"People are leaving the countryside for the cities, but they are going into the slums, not into industry," said the priest, who is director of the Agricultural School of Escada.

The school, run by the Federal Government, is a ray of hope amid the quiet desperation that characterizes the life of the sugar workers. Most of the 150 boys at the school, who generally started working in the

cane fields at age 8, are determined to escape to a better life.

"I want to be a farm technician and take my father away from the plantation," said 16-year-old Manuel Jorge Tavares, whose father earns less than the minimum wage of \$1 a day to support 12 children.

Life is increasingly difficult for Maria do Carmo da Conceição, who lives with her husband and five children in two rooms in a row of wretched shacks on Providence Plantation here. The children cannot go to school because they don't have shoes or clothes.

A Consoling Creed

"We can't eat meat any more because dried beef has gone from 33 cents to \$1.85 and my husband only earns \$5 a week working in the cane fields," she said. "Some days we all go hungry because there's nothing to eat. All we have is the strength of God."

Such fatalism is widespread among the cane workers, according to a Recife University sociologist, who explained: "The Pentecostal Church has gotten a strong hold among the hopeless peasants who can tolerate existence because they are told they have been saved."

For lack of any alternative, some 150,000 peasants are bound to the sugar plantations of the Northeast in the hot, humid coastal area.

The industry, founded by the Portuguese settlers in the 16th century, was hurt by competition from the West Indies and Cuba in the 19th century. It forced large owners to set up sugar mills, but they failed to keep up with technology. At

the same time more enterprising businessmen in southern Brazil started a sugar industry that rapidly outstripped the Northeast in productivity.

The workers suffered most in the decline. In the early nineteen-sixties the Peasant Leagues gathered a significant movement to change rural institutions, but they were crushed in the 1964 take-over by the present military government.

The Need for Reform

The Government has been aware for some time that reform is necessary in the Northeast but seems uncertain how to go about it. In the meantime subsidies are paid to the producers to hold the industry together.

When Juscelino Kubitschek was President he set up the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast in 1959, spurring the establishment of light industries as well as hydroelectric projects, roads and irrigation, but the sugar problem was barely touched.

Father Melo got support in 1963 for a sugar cooperative that appears to be a valid if costly and limited attempt to improve the life of the cane workers. The 490 members earn three times more than workers on the plantations, according to the priest. Each received 25 acres and credit for planting at the outset, and several have been able to buy trucks, donkeys and cattle.

"We have tried to convince the Government that agrarian reform is not only necessary but possible," Father Melo said

in an interview.

Several agencies have been set up to bring about land reform but are bogged down in organizational problems and landowners have openly opposed the efforts. A senator declared that the workers in the Northeast did not know how to farm and were not ready for agrarian reform. Some workers fear that they may lose their jobs.

All large owners must submit reports on the use of their land by Dec. 31. Unused holdings are to be put up for sale, preferably to the workers already on the land, who will receive financial aid.

The Sugar and Alcohol Institute, which buys sugar from the mills and resells it on the domestic market and abroad, has embarked on a plan for reorganization of the industry.

R. Parry Scott of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas, who has been engaged in social research here, commented: "It is highly questionable that the present processes of modernization of the Northeast Brazilian sugar industry will contribute to a bettering of the situation of the rural worker in the near future."

Many workers have solved the problem by going to the cities. Recife, more than any other Northeastern city, has acquired the problems of the sugar industry, according to its Mayor, Augusto Lucena. Of its population of 1.3 million, twice that of two decades ago, 40 per cent are unemployed or underemployed, with serious problems of infant mortality, malnutrition, sanitation, housing and schooling.

but airing them in a Latin-American setting would be different.

Americans who have followed the Panama developments also believe that it could wind up antagonizing Administration and Congressional leaders—the very parties Panama hopes to influence by calling attention to her longstanding grievances.

Disagreeing, Mr. Boyd says that a Council debate would not interfere with the talks between Panama and the United States, and that the presence of the "world community in Panama would help public opinion to appreciate the inequities Panama has endured."

He said he had received favorable response for a Council meeting in Panama "in principle" from Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann of France, and that the idea was approved by Yugoslavia, India and the three African countries on the Council.

March when it will be the Panama delegate's turn to be president of the Council for the month.

Broad Topic Likely

It is anticipated that Panama will offer some broad topic for the Council session, such as measures to enhance peace in Latin America. But Mr. Boyd said: "Not to talk about the Canal Zone would be like going to church and not praying."

Negotiations between the two countries bogged down seven months ago on a new treaty to replace the 69-year-old pact under which the United States built the canal and was given jurisdiction in the 10-mile-wide strip "in perpetuity."

There has been increasing friction in recent years over the powers exercised by the United States in the Canal Zone, where 40,000 Americans live—13,000 of them military personnel—and where courts and the police, school and stores and all facilities are run by the American authorities.

Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, who has been the ruling force in Panama for four years, has in the past threatened to "march into the zone." His first act after his election

in August was to reject the \$1.9-million annuity the United States pays Panama so that the "entire world" should know that the zone had not been bought, ceded or leased, but was being "occupied arbitrarily."

United States authorities have acknowledged the legitimacy of some of Panama's grievances, and have offered to make concessions in a new treaty, saying they are ready for negotiations whenever Panama signals.

However, the United States says that a public and probably rancorous debate would tend to "freeze" positions and would set a dangerous precedent of using the Security Council as a bargaining tool in influencing bilateral negotiations.

It also is suggested by diplomats here that the meeting could become an exercise to embarrass the United States. There is the chance that Cuba, though not a member of the council, would come to protest against the American naval base at Guantanamo or renew her charges that the United States keeps a "colonial" grip on Puerto Rico. Both issues have been heard many times

NEW YORK TIMES

12 November 1972

ENVOY BIDS U.N.
MEETING IN PANAMA
By KATHLEEN TRIGG
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Nov. 11 — Panama, unhappy with United States negotiating terms for revising the 1903 Panama Canal Treaty, is pressing for a Security Council meeting in Panama to present her grievances.

Aquilino E. Boyd, Panama's chief delegate, has flown home to report that the majority of the Council's 15 members have told him they were favorably inclined toward a session in Panama. The United States is not.

He plans to return with a formal invitation and an offer to share the costs of the meeting unless his Government is persuaded that it would be wise to resume private negotiations with Washington and forego a public debate.

Diplomats here see a resumption of the negotiations as unlikely at the moment and expect Panama to propose that the Council members come in